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UNITY AND DIVERSITY OF CULTURES

Humanism and Education in East and West

AN INTERNATIONAL
ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION
ORGANIZED BY UNESCO

M. Jawaharlal Nehru

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad

Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan — Albert Béguin

John T. Christie — Ras-Vihary Das — Clarence H. Faust

Helmuth von Glasenapp — Humayun Kabir

Yensho Kanakura — Ibrahim Madkour

G. P. Malankosekera — André Rousseaux — Jacques Rueff

Hilmi Ziya Ulken — A. R. Wadia



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*Humanism and Education
in East and West*

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Interrelations of Cultures

Humanism and Education in East and West

The Old and the New World

Humanism and Education in East and West

AN INTERNATIONAL
ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION
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U N E S C O

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Introduction

AT its Fifth Session, the General Conference of Unesco had adopted a resolution¹ authorizing the Director-General to organize "a discussion between thinkers and philosophers of different countries about the cultural and philosophical relations between the East and the West".

In implementation of this resolution, a round-table discussion was held at Parliament House in New Delhi (India), from 13 to 20 December 1951, on the theme of: "The concept of man and the philosophy of education in East and West." The present volume is intended to present to the public the discussions which took place and the conclusions and recommendations formulated by this round-table.

Unesco embarked on the preparations for this discussion at the beginning of 1951. With the help of Swami Siddheswarâ-nanda, member of the Ramakrishna Vedantic Mission (India) and Professor Olivier Lacombe, of the University of Lille and the École des hautes études of Paris, a basic document was prepared² in order to make clear the terms of the problem to be submitted to the round-table.

The National Commissions of Unesco's Member States were asked to transmit any written observations they might wish to make within the frame of this international discussion.

Twelve eminent specialists, chosen in consultation with the National Commissions, from different quarters of the world, were invited by Unesco to take part in the discussions:

Mr. Albert Béguin (Switzerland), writer, editor of the periodical *Esprit*;

¹ Programme for 1951: Resolution No. 4.1211.

² See Appendix I.

Professor John Traill Christie (United Kingdom), Principal of Jesus College, Oxford;

Professor Clarence Faust (U.S.A.), Dean of the Faculty of Humanities, Stanford University, Stanford, President of the Fund for the Advancement of Education established by the Ford Foundation;

Professor Helmuth von Glasenapp (Germany), professor of Indian civilization at the University of Tübingen;

Professor Yensho Kanakura (Japan), professor of Indian civilization at the University of Tohoku;

Senator Ibrahim Madkour (Egypt), member of the Egyptian Senate, member of the Fuad I Academy of the Arabic Language, formerly professor of philosophy at the University of Cairo;

Professor G. P. Malalasekera (Ceylon), professor of philosophy at the University of Colombo;

Professor Giuseppe Pisanelli (Italy), member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, professor of philosophy at the University of Rome;

Mr. André Rousseaux (France), writer;

Mr. Jacques Rueff (President of the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies), member of the Institut de France;

H.E. Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (India), formerly Chairman of the Executive Board of Unesco, Indian Ambassador to Moscow;¹

Professor Hilmi Ziya Ulken (Turkey), professor of philosophy at the University of Istanbul.

The Government of India, as the host country, also invited the following thinkers to take part in the discussions:

Professor Ras-Vihary Das, professor of philosophy at the University of Saugar;

Dr. Humayun Kabir, former professor of philosophy, Adviser to the Ministry of Education;

Professor A. R. Wadia, Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the University of Baroda, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

The Government of India gave its agreement to the choice of New Delhi and of the dates 13 to 20 December 1951 for the

¹ Shortly after, Dr. Radhakrishnan was elected Vice-President of the Indian Union.

round-table discussion; it helped Unesco to organize the meeting and undertook responsibility for the practical arrangements and the organization of the secretariat of the sessions.

Before the opening of the discussions, a ceremony was held during which a wreath was laid at the Mahatma Gandhi Memorial.

The public and the press were admitted, by invitation, to the formal opening and closing meetings, at which H.E. Maulana Azad, the Indian Minister of Education, took the Chair.

H.E. Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister, attended the closing meeting, at which he delivered an address.

H.E. Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan was elected Chairman, Senator Ibrahim Madkour and Mr. Jacques Rueff, Vice-Chairmen, and Professor J. T. Christie, at the request of his colleagues, accepted the duties of rapporteur.

The Director-General of Unesco was represented by Mr. Jean Thomas, Director, Cultural Activities Department, who was assisted by Mr. Jacques Havet and Mr. Krishna Kripalani, both of the Philosophy and Humanistic Studies Division of Unesco.

Dr. Guenther Patzig, a German philosopher holding a Unesco fellowship, attended as an observer. Twenty-four other observers from various Indian universities were also present.

The discussions were based on papers prepared beforehand by the specialists taking part, and on the comments transmitted by the National Commissions of Australia, Austria, France, India, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

The meetings were divided into two groups: during the first two days, the discussions opened with prepared speeches on the broad theme of the concept of man in East and West; in the last two days, the main topic was that of the principles on which education is based in the various cultures concerned. Each of the opening speeches was followed by a general discussion; at the end of each day, the observers had an opportunity to put forward their own comments and questions.

On the basis of the draft report presented by Professor Christie, the last meetings were devoted to the adoption of

the report on the discussions, including general conclusions and recommendations addressed to Unesco, and to governments and educational institutions, regarding the best means of developing closer intellectual and moral ties between the peoples of East and West.

The Conference considered that it was inadvisable to overload the present volume with a full record of the discussions. In accordance with the wish it has expressed, the following pages include: the final report of the round table, with general conclusions and recommendations; the speeches made at the formal opening meeting by H.E. Maulana Azad and H.E. Dr. Radhakrishnan; a series of essays written for this publication by the members of the round table, incorporating the substance of the views they expressed during the discussions and the contributions they had written beforehand; the speech made at the closing meeting by H.E. Mr. Nehru.

The Appendix contains the basic document prepared by Unesco, and the biographies of the members of the round table.

Unesco wishes to express its deep gratitude to the Government of India, which granted generous hospitality to the round-table Conference, to the high personalities who honoured the opening and closing sessions by their presence, and to the philosophers and writers who participated in the preparation of the Conference or took part in the discussions.

Report of the Discussions, followed by General Conclusions and Recommendations

WHATEVER the value of the conclusions and recommendations that we reached, it would certainly be agreed by all the members present that the mere association of representatives from India and Ceylon, the Far East and the Middle East, and from different countries of Europe and America, was of great value. The easy terms upon which we established contact were symbolic of the mutual understanding which Unesco is founded to bring about. Nor could any more suitable meeting-place have been chosen than New Delhi. Had the same discussions taken place in Paris or in London, the effect would not have been the same. In New Delhi, we had the modern East all round us, while among the monuments of the past we could feel the spirit of an older India still alive and operative. The setting of our Conference disposed us all to a special interest and curiosity about the theme of our discussions.

Before meeting for the first session the Conference paid a visit to Rajghat, where a wreath was laid on the memorial of Mahatma Gandhi. At a preliminary meeting, H.E. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan was elected Chairman and, as Vice-Chairmen, Senator Ibrahim Madkour and Mr. Jacques Rueff. Mr. J. T. Christie was appointed rapporteur. It was agreed that on Friday and Saturday the more general aspects of the subject should be discussed; on Monday and Tuesday, their application to educational problems. The 25 observers who had been invited were asked to contribute comments in the last hour of each session for the first four days, but would not be present on the last day, devoted to drawing up general conclusions.

In the afternoon, the delegates met in the Central Hall of Parliament House and, in the presence of a large audience, were addressed by the Minister of Education, who spoke in

Hindi. A reply on behalf of Unesco was made by Mr. Jean Thomas, Director of the Cultural Activities Department of Unesco. Speeches were also delivered by Dr. Radhakrishnan on behalf of the East, and Mr. André Rousseaux on behalf of the West. The Minister of Education began by stressing the differing conceptions of man in East and West: in the eyes of the East, man was an emanation of God, to the West he was a progressive animal. Each side had tended to correct its view in the light of the other, but the difference still obtained, and had lately even increased, since the West had laid a new emphasis on science. In the field of education, the West regarded instruction as a means to an end; the East regarded it as an end in itself. The West may have been more successful in the practical furthering of education, but the Eastern view was deeper and nearer the truth.

Mr. Thomas emphasized the suitability of India, land of famous sages and teachers from Buddha to Mahatma Gandhi, for such a conference as this. Our ideal was unification and we must not overestimate the contrast between the two sides. By sympathy and understanding we might hope, first to find this unity, and then to express it in our educational ideals.

Dr. Radhakrishnan said that in spite of wars there was a world-wide desire for unification and for active, positive peace, a world in which citizens of any State could feel "at home everywhere". The most dangerous division today was not between East and West, but between Communism and anti-Communism. Communism itself was a typically Western product with its features of logical rigidity, intolerance and propaganda. The East was well fitted to correct this one-sided view of man's nature, and the West, which had in some ways gone further than the East in democracy, could learn from the East tolerance and spirituality.

Mr. André Rousseaux pointed out that in our century instead of having reached universal harmony, a very serious crisis seems to be shaking the whole world. However, he added, upon thorough investigation one finds a basis for unity. He recalled Maritain's phrase: "The primacy of the spiritual". If we go far enough, he said, into the depths of our natural and super-natural truth, our contradictions will disappear. So, he would rather not hear us speak of "a closer contact" between East and West, but of their real union for

a common fate, because as he observed, they are not really separated.

The points raised in these opening speeches were to recur throughout these discussions: the accepted contrast between East and West and the danger of over-stressing this contrast; the debt, spiritual, philosophical and scientific owed through the centuries by East to West and West to East; the recent predominance of science in the West, and the advantages and disadvantages which might accrue to the East from the scientific outlook and in particular the results, good or bad, for education that might be expected from a new emphasis on the scientific as opposed to the spiritual.

The sessions of the Conference fell into two halves: during the first two days, the discussion was opened by speakers who had contributed papers on the wider issue of "The concept of man in East and West"; on the two following days, educational methods and ideals were the chief topic. Although discussion naturally ranged outside these limits, it will be convenient to observe the division in giving some account of the proceedings.

In the course of the first two days, two main themes recurred, both in the opening speeches and in subsequent comment: (a) the relation between Eastern and Western thought; (b) the significance of the new scientific outlook, particularly in the West.

The conventional contrast between East and West was the leading topic of the first speech made at the Conference. The idea of the active, progressive West, drunk with the sense of its own success, over against the passive, contemplative East, was a dangerous misconception. This might be the aspect under which the West liked to present itself to the rest of the world, but it did not do justice to the facts. There was much more than this in the classical Greco-Roman tradition, but the West, at the time of the Renaissance, had in fact selected from the classical tradition just those features which flattered its own self-esteem, and there was much in classical antiquity which the East was better qualified to appreciate than the West. Could not the East do a great service in re-interpreting the Western classics to the Western mind, besides contributing from its own resources of "spirituality", still so largely unknown in the West? This danger of finding from one's own records and traditions only what one wanted to find was illus-

trated by several later speakers: the Renaissance had found one kind of legacy in the remains of Greece and Rome, the nineteenth-century romantics had found quite another and had stressed the mystical and oriental aspect of Greek civilization.

The frequent references appearing in the essays already circulated, to the cultural debt of East to West and West to East, were amplified by many speakers. Aristotle had returned to the West largely through Arabic intermediaries, though there was a Byzantine source as well; European mystics in Spain and elsewhere had something in common with Eastern thinkers, while Boehme in the seventeenth century owned a debt to Eastern thought which could perhaps find a parallel in Hegel in the nineteenth. The debt of East to West had perhaps been under-stated in the papers so far circulated: the effect of Alexander's invasions was seen for centuries in Eastern art; the effect of Christian missionaries, particularly the Jesuits, had been profound, not only in religion, but in culture and in education; later still, the British contribution to India, whether one liked it or regretted it, could not be ignored. One speaker claimed that there was hardly a single aspect of Eastern thought and philosophy which could not find its counterpart somewhere in modern America! At the same time, there was far fuller knowledge of the West in India than there was of the East in Western countries, a situation which ought to be remedied.

By the end of the second day, the Conference appeared to agree that the fundamental unity between East and West far outweighed the differences, so familiar to popular thought. But on the third day, it was evident that some members wished, on reflection, to modify this impression that there were no deep divergences. After all, differences due to geography and climate must persist: the speaker from Turkey emphasized important distinctions as well as resemblances between the two cultures, though there were many cross-divisions. Nor was India synonymous with the East: much that could be truly predicated of Indian thought and religion did not apply to Islam, as we were reminded by the Egyptian member, nor to China and Japan. The notion of time, and therefore of history, as *maya*, unreality, might not be typical of all Indian thinkers, but it was found in many and could not be reconciled to ideas that generally prevailed in the West. The Chairman

himself suggested that there were two different conceptions of man's nature in East and West: to the Western mind, the divine is external to Man; for the East, the divine element is immanent from the first in Man, and true human growth is precisely the development of this element.

However, in spite of these qualifications, the Conference believed that many of the differences were not beyond reconciling; they were more "attitudes" than basic differences; they were, as a French speaker said, "evolutionary" and could be modified by time and by education. From the practical point of view, the present moment was ideally suited to the initiation of a new policy of sympathy and mutual understanding. Scientific invention had brought us together far more than ever before in history. It was impossible for East and West to live in isolation any longer: even the general mass of men were aware of cultures alien to their own. Both sides were bound to meet, and it was for our generation to see that they met in amity, and not in suspicion. One hopeful point was repeatedly stressed: the wars and catastrophes of the twentieth century had not arisen between different civilizations, but from the uncivilized minorities within a single culture. As the Chairman reminded us in his opening address, Marxist Communism and the opposition to it were both characteristic products of Western civilization.

The second main topic in the first part of our Conference, predominance of science and its effect on the character and ideals of man, recurred later in the strictly educational discussions; but it was clear from the first, that it was for all speakers a vital issue. Two views, broadly speaking, found expression: on the one hand, Western man was "moving into a machine age": there was serious danger that in his effort to master nature by means of science, man would find that he had enslaved himself as well. Scientific materialism was one of the more regrettable "exports" from the West to the East; it threatened spiritual values and "the autonomy" of man.

On the other hand, it was asserted, not least by Indian representatives, that science had ensured the happiness and health of thousands, who 50 years ago would have died without its aid. Scientific specialists would increasingly be needed for the welfare and economy of the world. To repudiate

science and the scientific attitude was not only undesirable, but impossible.

This conflict of views led to considerable discussion of the term "reason". The speaker from U.S.A. expressed his concern that the Conference should even appear to disparage the place of reason in life and education. "Right reason" was their shield against vague emotionalism, anti-intellectualism and such excesses as are called to mind by the Nazi phrase "thinking with the blood". This timely protest gave rise to a more philosophical, though desultory, discussion of reason, at later sessions. A French member warmly agreed that reason was in its true sense the mark of man, autonomous and divinely-created, to whom God had given, in St. Thomas' phrase, the dignity of being a cause (*la dignité de cause*). We must distinguish, the Conference agreed, between this sense of reason and the sense in which it was applied to the purely intellectual element in man, unnaturally divorced from the rest of his personality. Was not this, roughly speaking, the difference between Pascal and Descartes? Human reason in its best sense was a very different thing from the hard over-logical rationalism of the Marxist for whom even history was subject to a single rigid interpretation: this led to propaganda, intolerance and persecution. We needed to regain a sense of "the mystery of history". That lower kind of reason, said the French speaker, could be compared to a lemon squeezer: it crushes the ideas that are fed to it and then throws them away.

The educational bearing of these reflections was thoroughly discussed in the second half of the Conference, but before we had come to the end of the first half, mention of the alleged intolerance among scientific rationalists led to some discussion of tolerance and hence of religion, a subject which had not appeared prominently in most of the papers submitted. The debate about reason had been carried on mostly by Western delegates; but now Indian members expressed their views. Tolerance was only too clearly a virtue which most men needed to learn, but tolerance tended by easy steps towards apathy: and how far should we tolerate intolerance? No answer was found to this familiar conundrum. An Indian speaker maintained that tolerance was not enough: tolerance too often implied condescension, but the tolerance worth

having combined appreciation of the other point of view with a deep conviction of one's own.

There was clearly suspicion of religion among some members. One speaker sketched an ideal community with a class of leaders at its head. Pleading for the qualities of charity, sympathy and self-sacrifice, he surprised some of us by saying that for his highest class he would have no religion at all. History showed that religion had been generally a divisive force. If some religion was thought necessary for the two less cultured classes of the State, it must not be held blindly or it was bound to become fanatical and intolerant.

One of the Western delegates wondered why religion should be subject to this distrust in an Eastern philosopher's mind. He would have thought, on the contrary, that India is perhaps the first place in the world where philosophy is the least separable from religious sources. That is, at least, what Western thought looks for in India nowadays: religious philosophy fit for uniting innumerable souls rather than for disuniting them and setting them against each other. Would not the East fail in its mission if, on the contrary, it tended to dissociate religion from philosophy?

The Chairman then suggested that a misunderstanding had perhaps slipped into the debate. We must not, he said, confuse religion and fanaticism. The most justified warnings against intolerance do not apply to religious thought when it is considered as an element of life and spirit. The delegates agreed with him that one must distinguish religion whose influence may be of great importance in the life of ideas, and fanaticism, which gives rise to war among minds, if not among nations.

The educational part of our Symposium, broadly speaking, turned on two topics: the impact on education of (a) science, especially in the West; (b) democracy, especially in the East. The discussion opened with a commentary by the American speaker on his paper already circulated, and his speech formed a suitable transition from the more general subject to the more specialized. He reiterated the danger, in his view, of a "flight from reason". But he realized too the danger of education if the approach were too rigidly rationalistic. The U.S.A. had many practical problems to solve and perhaps there was a risk that education should become "preoccupied with

process" and unduly suspicious of "absolutes". Two schools of thought about education could be distinguished along these lines. Further examination of the philosophic foundations of these schools might discover basic agreements between them and provide the foundations for the resolution of their practical differences. The speaker from the U.S.A. pointed out that another aspect of American thought, namely, the principle of tolerance of opposed philosophic positions, was important as a basis both for the avoidance of practical conflicts and the discovery of theoretic agreements.

Subsequent speakers were divided on this issue of the place of science and the scientific approach in education. An Eastern member deplored science entirely: as far as he could see, its main uses in the modern world were either industrial or militaristic, and both were regrettable. Others came to the defence of science: it was absurd to regard it as purely utilitarian: the ideal of "knowledge for its own sake" could be predicated of the scientist as well as of the humanist. Nor was it fair to say that the influence of science in education was bound to be materialistic. This may have been so at the end of the nineteenth century but, since 1900, there were many indications, e.g., in the philosophy of Bergson, that conscious logical reason no longer held its old supremacy in man's personality, even in the eyes of scientists.

These considerations led other members to make a special plea for the association of philosophy with the teaching of science at the university stage; but it must be real philosophy, taught by philosophers, not expounded in books called "Histories of Philosophy", which only made students think they understood philosophy when they had merely studied the lives of philosophers. The Turkish speaker pointed out that there are two sorts of philosophical teachings: a cinematographic view of doctrines, which leads to scepticism, and a conception of the evolution of human thought through successive improvements and expansions, which is but the history of problems and is never prejudicial.

The Conference in general concurred with the American speaker when he claimed that the educator must do two things (a) train the specialist for his work; (b) (even more important) train specialist and non-specialist alike to be thoughtful citizens.

At a later session, the English member introduced a plea

for humanism: was not this the approach required, an approach which was more than the mere imparting of a mere technique, but at the same time was more concrete than instruction in philosophical absolutes. The "humanities" were not simply an alternative course of study to science as they were too often regarded in English schools; the humanities were part of every man's birthright. But much depended on the quality of the teacher, and here perhaps the West might learn from the East with its deep traditional reverence for the personality of the wise teacher. Science teachers today were too often content to communicate a technique; the humanist communicated his whole personality. Humanist education was not mere vague emotion; it led to its own kind of knowledge, less calculable and exact than scientific knowledge, but for most men even more important.

The Egyptian speaker would interpret humanism in another sense: the whole of the moral and intellectual principles which govern man as an individual or as a member of a community. It is a human inheritance which has been formed throughout the ages and amid the various civilizations. It is neither purely Eastern nor purely Western: it is only international. There should be established a complete scale of these international values which ought to be religiously respected and observed everywhere. Otherwise a society of nations would not be of much avail. Let us beware also of certain national values which incline to prevail over international values. It is to be feared that a domineering nationalism would not yield its place to internationalism.

The above résumé will give some idea of the disjointed but lively discussion on the question: what part was to be played by science in modern education. Some concrete questions were also asked by one or two Western members, and answered by one of the Indian professors. He agreed that the university system in India was too much at the mercy of examinations; for this reason he would like to see some part of the university course (e.g. general lectures on philosophy, especially for scientists) not tested by examination. He thought that the highest standards in the university were prevented from being attained owing to the economic value attached to a degree. Asked whether in India, as in the West, the superior education gained by the young graduate isolated him

from his family circle, he replied that this certainly was a danger in India where the family circle was more integral to society than it was in the West. Questioned about the Hindu view of history, he admitted that any philosophy which regarded time as unreal could not attach much importance to the study of history, but this was not his own view on the matter.


The second topic which took up most of the time remaining to the Conference, was the impact of democracy on education, particularly in India. The question had already been raised at an earlier session whether the "new democracy" was really capable of absorbing and profiting by the higher education represented by the universities. A European delegate had been asked, in view of a remark made in his paper, whether he thought that the great majority in any country were "doomed to exclusion" from the benefits of higher education. He replied that he certainly would not say that, but added candidly that he believed that it would be a long time before the "new masses" could be effectively linked to what was an ancient and aristocratic tradition of culture. A similar attitude received some support from a later contribution by an Indian speaker. His sketch of an ideal community with its three classes was strongly reminiscent of Plato, a fact in itself indicative of a link between East and West, and he had a somewhat Platonic fear of democracy. A man, he said, was only fully man in proportion as he could rise to appreciation of the higher values: there were inevitably many who had neither the desire nor the power to rise: were they in reality very different from animals? This view could hardly be taken as typical of the Conference as a whole, but it was a salutary warning against the facile idealism which sometimes accompanies the champions of democratic education. At any rate, it was pointed out by another speaker from the East, if universities did not discriminate among their applicants, they would soon cease to be universities in the true sense and become "degree-getting machines". A third Eastern speaker pleaded for more attention to the imagination and aesthetic qualities of the child in the early stages of education. Concentration on the intellectual abilities which enable a youth to pass examinations was one-sided and would lead to intellectual arrogance.

An Indian speaker, formerly a professor of philosophy, now in the service of the Ministry of Education of India, in his address followed the lines of his circulated paper: science had brought to mankind new contacts between nations on a wide scale. In respect of space and time, the world was more nearly a unity than ever before. Cultural unity must be fostered to match it. We must create a common ideological background, not only for the educated few, but for the mass of men. That men's opinions *could* be shaped and guided was only too apparent from the effects of mass-propaganda: for propaganda, democracy must substitute education. Universities were not solely a matter of higher education: on them largely depended the supply and quality of teachers for the schools, and without devoted teachers, no system, however well-organized, could flourish or become the basis of the universities.

There were obstacles to true democracy which only education could remove: the myth of racial superiority, the nationalist presentation of history. We lived in an age of revolutions; these were bound to come and only education, acting as mediator between tradition and experiment, could prepare men for revolution without violence and bloodshed. The first effects of education in an immature democracy might be to isolate the young student from his home traditions and to give him, as it were, two standards. But the educational process, once started, must press on until the student had attained an integrated outlook: only by the cultural integration of the individual student could we achieve an integrated society and at length an integrated world.

Mr. Thomas, speaking for Unesco, assured the Conference that much of what was to be recommended had already been undertaken by Unesco. An enquiry was being conducted into the teaching of philosophy, and he was glad to find the Conference suggesting a closer association between philosophy and science at the university level. Moreover, Unesco was soon to publish a history of the scientific and cultural development of mankind, which might go far to meet Professor Kabir's plea for an integration of thought between the nations.

The above account of our discussions is designed to cover only what was said at the conference table. It will be seen from the Appendix that some members contributed learned and illuminating papers, e.g., Professors Glasenapp and



Ulken, which had been read with profit by all members of the symposium, but did not lend themselves to general discussion.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

It will be evident from the foregoing résumé of our discussions that they were grouped round individual papers already circulated, and each contributor was then asked to amplify his point of view at the conference table. Speakers were free to develop their thoughts as they wished and were not asked to provide answers to specific questions. Nevertheless, a number of conclusions emerged, though they were not expressed in the form of unanimous or majority resolutions.

Together with the basic document there had been circulated an Addendum entitled "Some crucial questions".¹ The Conference could not have had the time to answer all these questions, but the Addendum, printed in the Appendix, may serve as a frame in which to embody our conclusions. What follows was in substance read to the Conference at its last meeting and general agreement was given to its publication. This series of questions in the Addendum did not emphasize the divergence between East and West, but was constructed with the assumption that, on the broad issues about the concept of man, his nature and his education, members might not indeed be unanimous, but their differences would not correspond to the division between East and West. So indeed it turned out at the Conference itself. Within the first few sessions, it had become a truism to say that the conventional distinction between the active West and the contemplative East was fallacious. There were divergences which followed an East-West division and they appear in this expression of our views; but it would give a wrong perspective to allow undue prominence to such divergences, although they will be noted in their place. (References are made to the sections of the Addendum.)

Section I: The relationship between religion and the spiritual and ethical life. It was generally agreed that in India religion was

¹ See Appendix I.

more truly the basis of ethics and philosophy than it was in the West, where many books on ethics have been written with no reference to religion at all; but though this applies to India, it is not true of other parts of the East, e.g. China. Both Eastern and Western members expressed the fear of religion as a divisive influence; better no religion than one that was fanatical and intolerant.

Section 2: Man's power to master nature by technology. Here the Conference was divided, but not according to an East-West division. Many realized the deadening effect of a machine-age on the soul of man, and the damage done to education if it was reduced to the mere communication of a scientific technique. But it was claimed by representatives from the West and India alike that science had brought health and life itself to thousands, and must not be undervalued. Nevertheless, if it were true that scientific reason had enabled man to master the world, there were signs that it might enslave man himself and this was too high a price to pay for any conquest of nature.

This conclusion is closely linked with the issue raised in *Section 3: "The limits to be assigned to the power of the intellect: intellectual learning and the cultivation of the whole man."* Here there was agreement, even among those who set a high value on reason, that the intellectual element was only one part of man's nature and some feeling that, particularly in the West, it was tending to usurp excessive authority. Members agreed in a plea for educating the imagination and the spirit as well as the mind (here aesthetic values would play a vital part: see *Section 4*). Most members of the Conference felt that only thus could a student's mind be integrated, and without integration of the individual there could be no integration of a society.

Section 5: Conceptions of education and the idea of equality: the participation of all in cultural life. From the earliest stages, education should emphasize the dignity of the individual whatever his social status: the Gandhian conception of basic education should be developed. Nationalist tendencies in education, especially in the teaching of history, which assumed the

superiority of one race over another, were to be universally discouraged. One speaker, with a measure of agreement from others, asserted that even so, it would inevitably be a long time before the mass of men could be linked to an old tradition of aristocratic culture.

Section 6: What part can national and international institutions play in a "new humanism"? Humanism of some kind was a basic element in all true education, providing a counter-weight to excessive technology in the West, and in the East fortifying an outlook that might become unduly vague and other-worldly. Educational institutions both in East and West, and international organizations, could play an important part in this matter. The East might supply new "classics" as required for the new humanism.

Section 6: The value of patriotism and the danger of nationalism. There was general concurrence in stressing the evil of aggressive nationalism; but even humanism must begin by being what one speaker called "patriotic humanism". The young must begin with their own country and their own language. It was a contemptuous attitude to other peoples rather than a pride in one's own that was injurious.

Section 8: Tolerance. While recognizing tolerance as a virtue which the world still needed to learn, the Conference was alive to the dangers of a tolerance which was hardly to be distinguished from apathy: tolerance with conviction, and without condescension, was the only effective kind.

Section 9: Time and eternity. On this topic, members really were divided, and nothing approaching a conclusion was reached. To the Western mind, time was a reality and history a study of basic importance. To some Eastern thinkers, though not to all, time was an unreality, and hence history was a subject of little importance, although this did not represent the views of Islam, which had produced notable historians.

Section 10: The importance of a philosophy of human labour. Members were in agreement with one speaker (see the section on work in Mr. Béguin's paper) that work today, owing to techni-

cal devices, was losing its old respected place in man's life. To rediscover an ethic of work was a primary task for philosophers today.

Section 12: The education of the full human being and the training of the specialist. After full and varied discussion, the Conference agreed that while specialists were more than ever necessary in the modern world, a specialized training was often no education at all. Specialists and non-specialists alike should study the humanities as part of their full education as men: in particular, philosophy should be imparted in lectures and classes (preferably not for examination) to all students of science. The philosopher could learn from the scientist, but could also show the scientist some limitations of science.

These views represent some conclusions of the Symposium irrespective of the difference between East and West. On that particular subject the Conference was broadly agreed that:

1. The difference has been over-emphasized in popular thought.
2. "The East" was by no means synonymous with India.
3. Certain differences due to geography, climate, etc., must always remain and could not be changed.
4. Even so, the typical *attitudes* of Eastern and Western man are products of evolution and in the process of time could be modified by cultural contacts.
5. Such contacts are now possible on a scale unknown before, and should be encouraged by every means available.
6. We take hope from the reflection that wars and world conflicts have not arisen from differences of civilization such as are represented by East and West, but between the uncivilized and fanatical minorities within a single civilization. It was to eliminate such uncivilized minorities by means of education that East and West might co-operate.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That contact between East and West should be encouraged by a series of conferences held both in Eastern and Western centres, to be attended by groups representing philosophy, science, arts and education.

That suitable books should be produced for use in schools and universities, both in East and West, giving an account of the teaching of the "Prophets" and leaders of religious and philosophical thought. In this connexion the Conference noted with satisfaction the attempt made by leading educationists, especially the British, for the study of the ethical, philosophical and religious classics of the world. (The document on the subject was circulated to the members of the Conference by the courtesy of the Chairman.)

That the "classics" of the East should be better known in the West than they are at present, and that to this end Unesco should establish a committee to choose such "classics" and to supervise their publication.

That the teaching of science should at all stages be more closely associated with the teaching of philosophy.

That education, especially in its early stages, should give more scope to development of the imagination and aesthetic sensibilities of children.

That history, as taught in schools, should be re-orientated away from a nationalist outlook, and that the publication of historical textbooks should be supervised by joint committees representing different nationalities.

That the work already undertaken by Unesco in the educational field, such as providing information on different national types of education and establishing a panel of experts available for advice on the subject, should be further encouraged.

*Addresses delivered at the
Formal Opening Session
of the Symposium*



Presidential Speech

by

H.E. MAULANA ABUL KALAM AZAD

Minister of Education of India

Friends,¹

On behalf of the Government of India and on my own behalf I have great pleasure in welcoming you all to this Symposium.

Unesco has, since its inception, been organizing seminars, discussion groups and symposia for considering various problems that affect the relations of nations and countries and for creating better understanding through the exchange of knowledge and experience in many fields. This Symposium is concerned with an even more fundamental issue. Today, philosophers of East and West have met to discuss the concept of man himself. Who can deny that this issue is the basic one of the modern age, and on its satisfactory solution depends the future of man. I am therefore specially happy to welcome you here to this ancient land of philosophers and seers. I earnestly hope that the spirit of India with its long traditions of wisdom and spirituality will inspire all your deliberations.

I

In the last 6,000 years or more, the human being has travelled over a vast region from his early beginnings in primitive society. This period has seen man overcome many hidden obstacles and meet the challenge of inanimate nature and the animate world. In spite of all the vicissitudes which man has had to face during this period, there has, on the whole, been continuous and steady progress in wresting from nature some of her greatest secrets. Veil after veil has been torn asunder

¹ This speech was delivered in Hindi.

from the hidden face of nature and secrets that are still unknown are yielding to his quest.

While man's triumphant progress in unveiling the face of nature has been steady and continuous, can we say with equal confidence that he has succeeded in unveiling the lineaments of his own self? Can we say that after 6,000 years of quest of the real, man today sees himself as he essentially is? I think you will agree that we have to make a sad confession in this matter. The mirror that man has fashioned reflects all aspects of the world but not his own inner self. We have to admit that man has not yet been able to form a clear picture of his own nature. The secrets of the universe are clearer to him than the secrets of the self. For some 3,000 years or more, philosophers have again and again asked: what is man, whence does he come, and whither does he go? The questions still remain largely unanswered. It is obvious that man cannot achieve a satisfactory solution of the problems of the individual, society, nations and international relations till he knows clearly the nature of his own self and determines what the place of man is in the vastness of the universe.

The basic issue before you is the consideration of this problem. You have met to discuss the concept of man as it has been enunciated by thinkers in the East and the West. I would, at the very beginning, like to emphasize that in speaking of the East and the West, we are thinking only of certain special features in the thought of these regions. This cannot and does not mean that there are not large areas of common and agreed ground. Man all over the world has adopted common methods of reasoning and thought. The human reason is one and identical. Human feelings are largely similar. The human will operate in more or less the same manner in similar situations everywhere. It is therefore natural that the human's way of looking at himself and the world is largely common in different parts of the world. His attitudes towards the unknown mysteries of existence are also largely similar. The Greeks who looked with admiration and awe upon the peaks of Olympus shared the same feelings as the Indians who meditated in the valleys of the Himalayas and looked upon their eternal snows.

In spite of large areas of agreement, human minds in different regions of the world have adopted a different approach

to some of their common problems. Even where the approach has not been different, there has been a tendency to place a different emphasis on the different aspects of common problems and common solutions. No two situations are exactly alike. It was inevitable that people in different regions should pay greater attention to different aspects of common problems. It is on account of such differences in emphasis that we describe a particular mode of thought as characteristic of a particular nation or region. It is from this point of view that I will try to formulate what are the differences that distinguish the East from the West. I think you will all agree that even where the solutions are similar in pattern and outline, there are differences in shade and colour which justify us in calling some of the solutions Eastern and others Western.

There are, as I have said, many points in common between the views of philosophers in the East and the West but the emphasis is different in India, Greece and China as strikes us from the very beginning of recorded history. In India, the emphasis of philosophy has, on the whole, been on the inner experience of man. Philosophers here have sought to understand man's inner nature, and in this pursuit have gone beyond the regions of sense, intellect and even reason and sought to assert the identity of man with a deep hidden reality. In Greece, the philosopher has been interested mainly in understanding the nature of the world outside. He has sought to determine the place of man in the outer world. His view has therefore been, on the whole, more extrovert than in India. In China, on the other hand, philosophers have not worried about the inner nature of man nor about external nature but have concentrated on the study of man in relation to his fellows. These differences in orientation have exerted a profound influence on later developments of philosophy in each of these regions. We find therefore that there are striking differences in their respective concepts of man.

The Greeks approached the concept of man from an external point of view. Hence we find that from the earliest times, Greek philosophy devotes far greater attention to what man does rather than to what man is. It is true that some of the earlier Greek philosophers thought of man as essentially a spiritual entity, and we find that this is perhaps the prevailing mode of thought till the time of Plato. With the advent of Aristotle,

there began, however, a new orientation in which the attention is diverted from the idea of man to man's activities in the world here and now. Under the influence of Aristotle who defined man as a rational animal, philosophy became more positive. In course of time, this positive, empirical and scientific attitude became the prevailing climate of thought in the West. Rationality distinguishes man from other animals, and it is through the exercise of rationality that he has advanced far beyond his early animal origin. Nevertheless, he remains essentially and fundamentally a progressive animal. Rarely has this thought been expressed so beautifully as by the German philosopher, Riehl. While he admits that man has descended from the animal, he points out that he has now reached a stage where he must look above and not below. He is the only animal that stands erect and can continue to do so only if his look is upward. God is the goal towards which man must strive if he is to retain his present stature.

It is true that the influence of Christianity and the persistence of the Platonic tradition remained a powerful element in European thought. Thus we find that the scholastics in the medieval ages were at times more theologians than philosophers. Even in the modern period, there is a strong religious idealistic strain in European thought. Since the beginning of the modern age, this strain has, however, steadily yielded place to a philosophical outlook dominated by the concepts of science. The triumphant progress of science began in the seventeenth century and increased man's power over nature. The success of science dazzled the Western mind and induced a faith in its unfailing efficacy. The West sought to apply the concepts and methods of science in all fields of human experience and treat man also as an object among other objects. In course of time, a materialistic and scientific temper became the pervasive outlook of the West. We find a culmination of this development in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Darwin sought to establish that man is descended from animals while Marx argued that his mentality is largely the resultant of his material environment. Freud in the twentieth century went a step further and taught that not only is man descended from animals, but his mentality retains even today traces of his animal origin.

As opposed to this conception of man as a progressive animal,

we find in the East a completely different concept of man. The East has from the very beginning emphasized man's intrinsic spirituality. The contemplation of the inner reality of man gave rise to the philosophy of Vedanta in India and Sufism in Arabia. This spiritual concept of man has deeply influenced the mentality of man throughout the East and is not unknown even in the West. According to this outlook, we cannot understand the essence of man if we regard him as only a material entity. The real nature of man can be understood only if we conceive of him as an emanation of God. There was in Eastern philosophy a strong pantheistic strain. In different schools of Indian philosophy, all things are regarded as expressions of God's being but even then man belongs to a special category. For he is the highest manifestation of God's being. In the words of the Gita (XI : 18):

*Thou art the Imperishable, the Supreme to be realized.
Thou art the ultimate resting-place of the universe,
Thou art the undying guardian of the eternal law.
Thou art the Primal Person.*

Similarly we find that according to the Sufis, man is a wave of the boundless sea that is God. He is a ray of the Sun that is God. Man can regard himself as different from the Eternal Being only so long as his vision is clouded by the evil of ignorance. Once there is enlightenment, all these distinctions dissolve and man recognizes himself as a moment in the being of the eternal.

The concept of man which the East has framed regards him as not merely an animal superior to all earthly creatures but as essentially different in nature. Man is not first among equals but has a being which is higher than that of any other creature. He is not only a progressive animal, but reveals in his being the lineaments of God Himself. In fact his nature is so high and elevated that nothing higher is conceivable to human reason. In the words of the Chhandogya Upanishad (9 : 4):

That is Reality. That is Atman (Soul). That art thou.

This doctrine has also been beautifully expressed in Arabic:

*Man arafa nafsahu faqad arafa rabbahu.*¹

¹ He who knows himself knows God.

The same principle, when further developed, gives rise to the idea that man is not an isolated individual but contains in himself the entire universe. In the words of the Gita (XI : 7):

Here today, behold the whole universe, moving and unmoving and whatever else thou desirest to see, O Gudakesa (Arjuna), all unified in My body.

A Sufi poet has expressed the same concept in the Arabic verse:

*Watahsab annaka jarmun saghir
Wa fika antawi alemun akbaru.¹*

It will be readily agreed that there can be no higher concept of man. God marks the highest limit of human thought. By identifying man with God, the Eastern concept of man elevates him to godhead. Man has therefore no other goal but to re-establish his identity with God. He thus becomes superior to the entire creation.

II

We have till now discussed the concept of man from the point of view of the philosophies in the East and the West. We now wish to review briefly what religion has to say on the question. If we consider the attitude of Judaism and Christianity, we find a clear statement in the Old Testament that God created man in His own image. From this it would follow that man shares in the attributes of God. A strong element of spiritual mysticism has characterized the attitude of Christianity and has acted as a check to the predominance of extreme materialistic tendencies.

In Islam we find traces of the influence of the same outlook. In fact the Koran has gone a step further in its exaltation of man. The Koran proclaims that not only is man created in the image of God but is His regent on earth. In speaking of the creation of Adam, God says (2 : 29):

Inni jaelun fil arde khalifat²

¹ Thou thinkest that thou art a small body: thou knowest not that a universe greater than the physical world is contained in thee.

² I want to create my viceroy on earth.

This idea of the viceroyalty of man profoundly influenced the Arab philosophers. Two things may be noted in this connection. As regent of God on earth, man has an immediate affinity with Him. This also makes man superior to all creation and makes him master not only of animal life but also of the forces of nature itself. The Koran proclaims again and again (XIII: 45):

Whatever is on the earth or in the heavens has been made subject to man.

It is generally recognized that Aristotle deeply influenced most of the Arab philosophers, but even in their interpretation of Aristotle, they show clear indications of the influence of the idea of man's viceroyalty of God. Avicenna (Ibn Sina) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd) are metaphysically Aristotelians but their spiritual orientation in Islam makes them recognize that since man shares in God's attributes, there is no limit to the heights which he can attain in both knowledge and power. Muslim scholastics like Al Ghazzali, ar Razi, ar Raghhib Ispahani and others have further elaborated this idea in their various philosophical writings.

We must, however, admit that while the conception of man in both Vedanta and Sufism gives him a lofty status, neither of these philosophies can escape the charge that if, on the one hand, they set no limit to human capacity, they, on the other hand, imply an element of fatalism that circumscribes man's power. The explanation of this paradox is to be found in their concept of the relation of man to God. Since man is an emanation of divinity, whatever man does is ultimately God's doing: whatever happens is due to the will of God. From this it is but another step to think of man as a mere toy in the hands of fate.

It has been said that while the concepts of Vedanta and Sufism in their pure form have been responsible for some of the highest spiritual attainments of man, they have to some extent acted as an impediment to human progress on the secular plane. Emphasis on the unity of man with God made society relatively insensitive to human suffering, as such suffering was regarded as mere illusion. We find, therefore, that Eastern societies have often been indifferent to the removal of the causes of social malaise. This explains why some modern thinkers are seeking for a formulation of the philosophy of Vedanta without its fatalism.

There is a similar paradox in the Western concept of man. A philosophy of materialism would, *prima facie*, seem to indicate a determinist outlook on life. Since the law of causality reigns throughout the material world, the same law would tend to hold in the field of human action. This tendency culminates in the psychological theories of the Behaviourists. The Western mind, however, asserted itself against such a deterministic concept and exhibited an energy of spirit which has rarely been equalled and perhaps never surpassed.

One of the main tasks of the present Symposium should be to examine how we can combine these two concepts which have so profoundly influenced both philosophy and religious outlook in the East and the West. The Eastern conception of man's status, if combined with the Western concept of progress, would open out to man the possibility of infinite advance without the risks implicit in the misuse of science. It may also indicate a way out of the fatalism which otherwise seems to follow from the Eastern conception of man's identity with God. The Eastern conception of man's status is not only consistent with the progress of Western science, but in fact offers an intelligible explanation of how scientific progress is possible. If man were merely a developed animal, there would be a limit to his advancement. If, however, he shares in God's infinity, there can be no limit to the progress he can achieve. Science can then march from triumph to triumph and solve many of the riddles which trouble man even to this day.

There is a further reason why a synthesis of the Eastern and the Western concepts of man is of the greatest importance to man's future. Science in itself is neutral. Its discoveries can be used equally to heal and to kill. It depends upon the outlook and mentality of the user whether science will be used to create a new heaven on earth or to destroy the world in a common conflagration. If we think of man as only a progressive animal, there is nothing to prevent his using science for furthering interests based on the passions he shares in common with animals. If, however, we think of him as an emanation of God, he can use science only for furthering God's purposes, that is the achievement of peace on earth and goodwill to all men.

III

I have tried to indicate that the Eastern and Western concepts of man are in some ways complementary. If the one has emphasized the intrinsic excellence of his being, the other has laid stress on the progress he has achieved and can achieve through his own efforts. If the one has stressed the spiritual elements in his nature, the other has pointed out that spiritual excellence must also have a requisite physical basis. If in spite of differences in emphasis, the Western and the Eastern concepts of man can be reconciled, there is no reason why the philosophy of education in these two regions should not also be fitted into a wider philosophy of education for the world.

In both the East and the West, the prevalent systems of education have given rise to various paradoxes. The East puts a disproportionate emphasis on individual salvation. Man sought knowledge as a means to his own redemption. The Eastern mode of thought with its preoccupation with individual salvation has at times paid inadequate attention to social welfare and progress. In the West, on the contrary, there has been a greater emphasis on the need for social progress. In fact, considerations of social welfare have at times led to the growth of totalitarian societies in which the individual has been suppressed. Today when East and West have been brought nearer one another through the operations of science, it is necessary that the bias, whether in favour of the individual or of society, should be rectified and a system of education evolved which will give due regard to both individual and social values.

Herein lies the importance of education in the modern world. Experience has shown that education can profoundly affect the development of individuals, and through individuals, of societies. If the individual is not an integrated personality, society cannot be harmonious. The function of education in the modern world is therefore to build up integrated individuals in an integrated society and the concept of both the East and the West must contribute to such development.

Before I conclude, there is one other problem to which I would like to draw your attention. The question often arises whether education is a means or an end. I would say that on the whole the West has looked upon education as a means

while the East has looked upon it as an end. If education is regarded as a means, the question arises what is the end for which it is a means. The West has often regarded social welfare as the end, but social welfare is a concept which can be interpreted in different ways. In any case, the tendency to regard education as a means leads to some diminution in the value of education. I am inclined to think that the Eastern concept shows a truer understanding of its real nature. By regarding education as an end in itself we recognize knowledge to be one of the ultimate values. I do not think that any Western philosopher would deny the importance of knowledge but its value cannot be fully appreciated unless education is recognized as an end in itself. Further, such recognition would raise the status of man. From this point of view also I am inclined to think that we should look upon education as an end rather than as a mere means to some external good.

IV

To sum up. In the Eastern concept, man as an emanation of God shares in His infinite attributes and is capable of achieving mastery over the entire creation. In the Western concept, man is no doubt an animal but there is no limit to the progress that he can achieve in the material field. His scientific achievements are visible proof of his superiority over the rest of creation, and have given him domination over the sky, sea and earth. We may, therefore, say that Western practice has substantiated the claim which Eastern theory has made in respect of man. Since, however, the Western concept has not emphasized the spiritual origin of man, his triumphs in the scientific field have themselves become a source of danger to his survival. If, therefore, the achievements of Western science can be utilized in the Eastern spirit of man's affinity with God, science would become an instrument not of destruction but for the establishment of human prosperity, peace and progress.

I hope this Symposium of philosophers from East and West will succeed in reconciling the concept of man as a spiritual entity with the concept of man as capable of infinite material progress and thus help in the realization of the Kingdom of God on earth.

Address

by

H.E. DR. S. RADHAKRISHNAN

IF a future historian is asked to describe the central feature of our age, he will not refer to the social and economic upheavals, the wars and catastrophes which fill the headlines of our newspapers but will point to the growing unity of mankind. Whether we like it or not we live in one world and require to be educated to a common conception of human purpose and destiny. Peace is the main objective of nations in the East and in the West. Peace is not the mere absence of war, it is the development of a strong fellow feeling, of fraternal appreciation of other people's ideas and values. Distinctions of a physical character diminish in importance as the appreciation of the significance of the inner life of man increases.

It is a happy augury that this conference is organized by Unesco, which is the specialized agency of the United Nations charged with the task of promoting mutual understanding and intellectual solidarity. Here we are assembled, representatives of the East as well as of the West, to join hands in the great work of building bridges between peoples on the plane of mind and spirit. There is much we have to learn from the peoples of the West and there is also a little which the West may learn from us. This is possible only if we approach our task in a spirit of humility and teachableness.

Our Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, made a confession some time ago that he was "a queer mixture of East and West out of place everywhere and at home nowhere". We must learn to be out of place nowhere and at home everywhere.

Mankind can realize this unity only by a scrupulous appraisal of the ideas and ideals of life underlying different civilizations and by the development of a world perspective, in which the different experiments of human life fall into their

places. The general impression that the whole spiritual and material background of the East is so different from^o that of the West, that neither can ever understand the other, is wrong. There are no fundamental differences in ultimate values, though there are significant differences of emphasis. The fundamentals of human experience, the data for philosophical reflection, are everywhere the same—the transitoriness of things, the play of chance, the emotions of love and hate, of fear and jealousy, anxiety to overcome the corruptibility of things. Regarding these, there is neither East, nor West. The two developed appreciably similar views in regard to the nature of reality, the concept of mind and the theory of knowledge. The causes which have split up the map of the world do not indicate so profound a division of mind and spirit as may be found in the members of the same family or in two citizens of the same country.

The world is unified physically but is mentally divided. We all live whether of the East or of the West in what has been called the “contemporary uproar”. It is our task to produce normal, balanced individuals in whom the inner and the outer life are reconciled. When we reach difficult places, when we face hard problems which seem formidable, we get back to first principles and raise the question of the ultimate postulates of thought and life.

II

Today, when reference is made to East-West relations, often we do not have in mind the Orient and the Occident, Asia and Europe, but the political East and the political West of Europe. When Christianity was the prevalent religion of Europe, the Roman Catholic and the Protestant forms represented the West while the Greek Church and the Russian Orthodox Church represented the East. Even today in the elections to the Security Council, the seat allotted to Eastern Europe is being contested by Greece and Byelo-Russia. The split between the Communist East and the Democratic West is a split within the Western world.

The pedigree of Communism can be traced to Plato, the New Testament, the Levellers of Cromwell's day, Ricardo, Adam Smith, Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, Engels, Lenin.

Some of the characteristic features of Communism are those of the West.

The Greek mind was of a dialectical order. It laid stress on the primacy of reason. Communism claims to utilize a scientific method and analysis. It is possessed of a sense of certainty, a sense of its own infallibility.

Humanism has been a character of Western thought from the Greek times. The Greeks concerned themselves with social conditions and postulates. The Marxists wish to bring about a perfect society on earth. They protest against the effects on the working classes of the industrial revolution, starvation wages, child and female labour, overcrowded slums, destruction of family life. In the name of social justice, they criticize the capitalist order.

The logic which drives a missionary cause to aggressive propaganda is nothing new in history. "Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature."

The law of contradiction lays down that contradictories cannot subsist together. The conflict between the Communists and the non-Communists is on the same pattern as the conflict between the Jew and the Gentile; the Greek and the Barbarian; the Christian and the heathen; the Protestant and the Catholic. This view is based on the philosophy of either-or. It divides the world into two opposite camps—the kingdoms of light and of darkness.

We shall have heresies and persecution of heresies so long as we have a sacred doctrine and an authorized body of interpreters. If dogmas are the expressions of final and infallible truth, we cannot escape from doctrinal controversies and inquisitorial methods. During the early centuries of Christianity, seven councils were held to define the true doctrine and pronounce against heresies.

The main, though not the exclusive emphasis of the West is on scientific reason, humanism, missionary propaganda and a division of the world into opposite camps. Communism exaggerates all these features. In his work on the teachings of Karl Marx (1914) Lenin writes that Marx "was the genius who continued and completed the three chief ideological currents of the nineteenth century, represented respectively by the three most advanced countries of humanity: classical German philosophy, classical English political economy and

French socialism combined with French revolutionary doctrines".

Not only is the creed of Communism a product of Western thought, but its propagation is also due to leaders who were trained in Western capitals, Berlin, Paris, Geneva. In the first world war it was the German High Command who put the future Russia into a railway coach, sealed it and sent it out to explode in the then Finnish station of Petrogradt.¹ It is therefore somewhat strange that Communism should be treated as an Eastern doctrine, though it is now spreading in the East.

III

Eastern thought has been characterized by a different outlook. Its main features are faith in an unseen reality of which all life is a manifestation, the primacy of spiritual experience and anxiety to harmonize apparent opposites. This view of life awakened a large part of Asia to thought and art and influenced other parts of the world.

The real is the essence of the soul. The aim of a human being is union with reality. This union is to be effected not by reason alone but by the whole personality. We must grasp the real not only by thought but by our whole being. It is not a question of entertaining ideas but of transforming the self, renewing our being. By contemplation we transform the whole man and assimilate him to the nature of the object.

Religious experience is a vision, an awareness, a release into boundless freedom. This awareness is what is called knowledge; its opposite is ignorance, confinement within the narrow bounds set by the mind and the senses. As religion is experience of reality, there is less concern with religious doctrine than with religious feeling, religious life. Religious conflicts relate to theories of the universe, to doctrines of God. Religious experience is not a matter of belief in a set of propositions but response of the whole self to the daily challenge of actual human relations. It is a way of living, of love and wisdom. This does not depend on theories. A sense of the mystery

¹ The British Foreign Office was certain that the Bolsheviks were the paid agents of Imperial Germany and Bolshevism was "a movement fostered solely for the furtherance of German ends".

of God produces humility, which is a foe to all fanaticism.

Refusal to transgress the limits of the definable comes out in the teachings of the Upanishads and of the Buddha. The real is *advaita*, non-dual, *advitiya*, secondless. The Buddha who preached wisdom and compassion did not indulge in theories of reality.

"The Tao that can be expressed is not the eternal Tao; the name that can be defined is not the unchanging name."

Doctrines are necessary; we cannot think what we like. But they are all inadequate; we cannot enclose the truth within words and concepts. The language in which the truth is expressed consists of many dialects adapted to the needs of different peoples."

If conformity to doctrines is to be regarded as the final test, believers in different creeds will be profoundly alien to one another. If modes of life are taken into account, religious men can be said to be like one another. The view that our creed represents the truth and those who deny or dispute it are heretics is a dangerous one. India has been the home of different religions and the Indian attitude has been one of hospitality to other creeds. In consistency with this spirit, the Indian National Congress passed a resolution on 19 October 1951, in the following words; "It has been the aim and declared policy of the Congress since its inception to establish a secular democratic State, which, while honouring every faith, does not discriminate against any religion."

Dr. Karl Ludwig Reichelt in *Religion in Chinese Garment* says: "The Chinese are, at the same time, Confucianists, Taoists and Buddhists. This is given visible expression, not only in the circumstance that some of the divinities are to be found in all the religious systems, but also by the fact that in some of the smaller localities there are common temples, where the respective God-images of the three religions are enthroned in full harmony. While the daily worship is connected with the ancestral tablets of the home, the average Chinese likes to visit some temple on special occasions and whether it is Taoist or Buddhist makes no great difference. If you press him and question him more particularly about his philosophy of life as a whole, you are apt to hear many curious things: most often a loosely articulated system of thought, in which the old Chinese outlook, shaped according to Confucian pattern

has been loosely combined with a Buddhist philosophy of existence."¹

This concept of man stresses the spiritual as the principal element, as distinct from the rational. Every individual has a spark of the divine. He is essentially subject, not object? If we attempt to possess him as flesh, as mind to be moulded, we fail to recognize the essentially unseizable. Man is not a product of natural necessity as he bears the image and impress of the divine.

While the unique value of the human individual is admitted theoretically, its implications have not been worked out in the social structure. There is more real democracy in the West than in the East. That many men should, by the accidents of birth and opportunity, have a life of toil and pain, hardness and distress, while others no more deserving have a life of ease, pleasure and privilege, arouses indignation in sensitive minds.

Because of the latent divinity of all men, no individual, however criminal he may be, is beyond redemption. There is no such thing as "all hope abandon, ye who enter here". The spirit is in each one as a part of himself, as a part of the substratum of his being. It may be buried in some like a hidden treasure, beneath a barren debris of brutality and violence but it is there all the same, operative and alive. "The light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world" cannot be put out. Asanga tells us to have "compassion for the wretched, compassion for the hot-tempered, compassion for the angry, compassion for the slave of passion, compassion for him who is obstinate in error". Sāntideva asks us to "do good even to our worst enemies". Honen, the Japanese teacher (1133-1212) taught the worship of Amitābha, Infinite Light. "There is no hamlet so forlorn that the rays of the silver moon fail to reach it, nor is there any man who, by opening wide the windows of his thought cannot perceive divine truth and take it unto his heart."

These are the central principles of the Christian religion, whose heart is that of the East; whose brain—its theology, whose body—its organization, are Graeco-Roman. Jesus emphasizes the central simplicities of all religion. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God;" "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as

¹ E.T. (1951), p. 173.

thyself." We are called upon to develop the mind that was in Christ Jesus. The way and the truth are to end in life. Again "The Kingdom of God is within you." St. Thomas Aquinas says: "Great is the blindness and exceeding the folly of many souls that are ever seeking God, and frequently desiring God; whilst all the time, they are themselves the tabernacles of the living God, since their soul is the seat of God in which He continuously reposes." God is nearer to us than we are to ourselves. St. Augustine says: "When there is a question whether a man is good, one does not ask what he believes or what he hopes, but what he loves." "In my Father's house are many mansions."

Jesus asks us to love our enemies. The doctrine of eternal hell is inconsistent with the spirit of Jesus' teaching. "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do." "For He maketh His sun to shine upon the evil and upon the good and sendeth His rain upon the just and upon the unjust." The Psalmist says: "If I ascend up into heaven, Thou art there, If I make my bed in hell, behold Thou art there also." If we do not see God everywhere, we see Him nowhere. The end of the world is the transubstantiation of all creation, the universal incarnation.

Dr. Walzer asserts about Al Fārābī's views: "There is one universal religion, but many forms of symbolic representation of ultimate truth, that may differ from land to land and from nation to nation; they vary in language, in law and in custom, in the use of symbols and similitudes. There exists only one true God for the philosophical mind, but He has different names in different religions."

IV

In a world filled with anger and hate, where we look in vain for a smile of humanity, for a sigh of understanding, we must turn back to that fundamental religion of spirit which is neither Eastern nor Western but universal, if we are to bring to our task a little hope, a little charity. "Except the Lord build the house, they labour in vain who build it." Unless we have a sound attitude of mind, a spiritual philosophy of life, we cannot build anything that will endure. We must adopt the Eastern outlook on life with its faith in the divine possibilities of the human soul, unity of all life and existence

and insistence on an active reconciliation of different faiths and cultures so as to promote the unity of mankind.

Man, as the object of scientific enquiry, as fully understandable in terms of race, or heredity, psycho-analysis or economic determinism is neither the true nor the entire human being. He has in him the element of spirit which gives him his uniqueness. No man is the duplicate of his neighbour; no one is a mere example of a class. He is more than the rational, historical being. He is a vehicle of the divine. From the spirit in man, his powers and qualities fan out, like the spokes of a wheel to the rim which is his outward form. The closer any thought or action approaches to the centre, the greater is its intensity and the more closely is the diversity integrated into unity. The farther it is from the centre, the wider is its extension, and the looser its integration.

We should look upon apparently conflicting opposites as not fundamentally incompatible but as capable of reconciliation by mutual modification, if necessary. There are two ways of dealing with evil and error, the way of firm resistance, a steady denial, negation; the other is the way of comprehension which enters into the mind of the erring or evil individual and transforms him from within. Psychological conflict as much as physical warfare darkens the mind both of those who use it and those against whom it is used. The whole history of Western development, as of any other cultural growth, illustrates how different currents have mingled their waters. Even the so-called heresies which were condemned and persecuted have become part of the Western heritage. Though Justinian closed the schools of Athens and did not desire any compromise with neo-Platonism, the latter entered into the stream of Christian thought. St. Augustine's deepest ideas on God and the world were moulded by neo-Platonism. In the Middle Ages, heretical and non-Christian Aristotelianism influenced Christian theology. St. Thomas Aquinas used the foundations of Aristotle for building his revealed theology. Gibbon saw in the history of the Crusades the world's debate, and yet the spirit of Islam has influenced the world's thought. Look at the devastating wars between the rival fanaticisms of Catholicism and Protestantism three centuries back. Their seemingly insoluble conflict has now faded away.

All this teaches us that our enemies are not as black as we

paint them when our passions are aroused. Five years ago we hated the Germans and the Japanese. We vowed a Carthaginian peace. We were forbidden to speak even to their children. Now we are on the Rhine as guarantors and friends of the Germans. We have concluded a treaty with Japan. We are now prepared to welcome these "dangerous" people into the family of free nations and harness their dynamic energy for democracy. Suppose we win the next war for which we are making such vast preparations, are we sure that we will not be in the same predicament again with a change of partners?¹ History warns us that the present conflict between Marxist logic and missionary fervour on the one side and our zeal for God and man on the other, can also be terminated by a process of understanding and adjustment. If we know only our side of the case we do not know even that. Need we revert to the ancient pattern of self-righteousness, dividing mankind into sheep and goats. Charity is the quality we need most. St. Paul's statement that "we are members one of another" is a true observation as well as a call to moral order. If we wish to achieve peace we should avoid the passion of self-righteousness which gives to every conflict a religious flavour. When a war is of "ideologies", we resolve to win the war even if, in the process, the whole world is ruined. When we fight for a piece of territory, the war will cease when the objective is achieved. If we fight for righteousness, we are dedicated to a war of destruction. The military methods involved in a new war are so disastrously dangerous and the economic, social and cultural consequences of a third world war would be so catastrophic that the winner would be left with nothing but uninhabitable ruins and unalterable misery. Any man in his normal state of mind will shudder at the prospect. We must save mankind from collective suicide.

Mankind is once again standing on the brink of an abyss the depth of which no man can presume to measure. There is a new sense of foreboding, a sense of fatality, of vast masses moving slowly and irresistibly towards a final collision. Let us dedicate our gifts to a reasonable objectivity and sanity in our

¹ "We might even say that if the whole of Russia and the entire body of her satellites were to be buried under the deepest oceans from this moment, something like the same predicament would still be with us tomorrow, though the terms of it would be transposed by a regrouping of the remaining powers." Herbert Butterfield: *The Scientific Versus the Moralistic Approach in International Affairs*. *International Affairs* (October 1951, p. 414).

thinking. Neither the political East nor the political West need imagine that they are the appointed educators of humanity. It is our task, as thinkers above the battle, to act as bridges—when all the bridges are down—not only between East and West but also between the partial and complementary truths buried under the warring philosophies. The spirit of religion is the essence of democracy. Appreciation of differences is a characteristic of both. Democracy functions where people differ and not where they agree.

When the Soviet leaders speak of the coexistence of the two systems, they get behind their doctrinaireism and adopt a view which brings them close to Eastern thought. In a lecture to Communist leaders, Stalin once said: "If capitalism could adapt its production not to getting maximum profits but to the systematic improvement of the masses of the people, then there would not be any crisis, but then capitalism would not be capitalism." We need not quarrel with words. America, prominent among capitalist countries, is striving to improve the general welfare, not only of the Americans but of the whole world. With the lessening of the general tension, the Soviet system itself may undergo radical changes and become a true people's democracy where there will be the freedoms whose lack in Russia we deplore.

The Greek and the barbarian, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and the Moslem, the Protestant and the Catholic, the Allies and the Axis powers of the last war have now learnt to live together. It is a matter of no small importance for the peace and advancement of the world that the Communist and the non-Communist should learn to live in this world, if not in harmony, at least in reasonable mutual accommodation. Even in a family, if the husband and the wife cannot love each other, they learn to put up with each other. If we put up with people, it does not mean that we give in to people. If we have a little more charity, the possibilities of the future seem to be infinite, surpassing all hitherto known forms of adventure.

In this troubled age the responsibility, nay the opportunity, of the leaders of thought is great, for in the long run, ideas, not things, will determine the future of mankind. We have for our motto an ancient text which proclaims that truth will conquer. The spirit of man will prevail, the spirit capable of understanding, endurance and compassion.

2
*Essays written by the
Participants in the Round Table*

Some Aspects of the Relations between East and West

by

ALBERT BÉGUIN

GENERALIZATION of the vast question suggested as the subject for our discussion would be impossible without dangerous simplification. I shall therefore confine myself in the present instance to comments *on facets* of the problem which can serve to initiate a discussion.

THE AGE OF CIVILIZATION

When we compare Eastern and Western man, on the basis of the most widely accepted definition of each, the date of the composite images we use is either the present or the relatively recent past. In other words, we are taking the two types of man (or civilization) either as they are today in the twentieth century or as they found each other in a period which may be taken as coinciding more or less with the Renaissance (contacts, particularly by the Arab world, were numerous and fruitful in the Middle Ages but it was a period at which appreciation of the differences between cultural "families" lacked all precision; interest in the exotic was limited and means of research still primitive). Granted that the essentially traditionalist temperament of the East tends to produce a kind of static condition (to which the East ascribes the fortunate persistence of certain fundamental values, but which the Occidental tends to regard as being to some extent stagnation), it may be argued that the Eastern world is ageless or at least a world whose ideal it is to remain unchanged by time. The Occidental, on the contrary, has long been conscious that his is a world in movement and he is prone to equate its changes with progress. When he first came in contact with the civilizations of Asia, the impression made on him was that he

had advanced beyond them and that they were at a stage of evolution which he had passed.

This Western view is, of course, far from unchallengeable, at any rate so far as it implies a value judgment. It must, nevertheless, be taken into account, for instance, when it is suggested that the specific feature characterizing the Western mind and distinguishing it from the Eastern cast of thought is its distinction between the sacred and the profane, the spiritual and the political, or when it is claimed that the dominant tendency of the West is purely one towards scientific knowledge, mastery over the physical world and personal liberty. All this is applicable (but only to a very limited extent) to the modern civilization of the West, though it would be but the crudest caricature of the Middle Ages. All the characteristics accepted as most typical of the Eastern plan of life—the primacy of the spiritual, the daily contact with sacred things, the emphasis on the interior life and the ideal of sanctity—are as typical of medieval Europe.

It is therefore not surprising that the rationalist thought of the past two centuries should have concluded, from these facts, that the West had attained a stage in terms of absolute progress behind which Asia lingered, firmly caught in a past age of history. For those who accept this view it is an easy step to the hypothesis of a necessary evolution of the Asiatic peoples destined to pass through the same stages along the same way as ourselves and hence aided by our influence. This point of view often had a powerful hold on the minds of European laymen and missionaries overseas; and when, as in Japan, examples began to occur of rapid assimilation of technology and when, to cap it, its concomitant proved to be the birth of nationalism in Asia, this was regarded as a confirmation of the "progressive" hypothesis.

In its pristine form this hypothesis is no longer tenable—at a moment when the greatest crisis of all time appears to be the price paid for a line of evolution which it is difficult to continue calling "progress". The West is being led to revise its scale of values and to reconsider the work of its hands and mind. There are some who seek a yardstick for this examination of conscience and amendment of life in Europe's oldest heritage, the legacy of the Christian Middle Ages. Others, as yet few in number, turn to the wisdom of Asia—not always

drawn admittedly from its clearest fountains. However, very many remain faithful to the European concept of historical evolution to the extent of maintaining that the solution lies ahead of us, in perfecting, not in resisting, mechanized civilization (the Marxists are not alone in thus turning their faces to a future seen as the crown of the work begun in the West with the Renaissance).

Whatever the truth may be, we must not reject without further consideration either the notion that there is a scale of relative ages of civilizations nor the hypothesis that the peoples of Asia have started along the road on which Europe has preceded them. However, in the light of the present crisis, we cannot assert with confidence that evolution on these lines might not lead to death instead of life. We should view both the relative ages of civilizations and the differing genius of the peoples with other eyes, not as destined in the course of years to be reduced to the dead level of a civilization truly world-embracing (or at least more nearly so than now), but as the elements in a blessed diversity, and to see in the differences arising from the diversity of age and genius so many special and necessary vocations. The right solutions for our problems would no longer be deemed to lie in the triumph of one civilization over another of which it was the guide and teacher; they would follow from the sharing of the treasures of which each was the guardian. The immutability of the East would be given its true value as a cherished treasure of spirituality needed by a world riddled with "activism". On the other side the urge to tame the earth on which we live would be recognized as a useful complement to a too passive spirituality.

This attitude seems to me the only one which justifies an attempt at rapprochement and interchange between East and West.

THE MEANING OF HISTORY

One of the outstanding acquisitions of Western thought is the philosophy of history. Ever since Hegel, Liberal and Marxist thought alike have assessed the significance of human life in terms of an historical process whose laws they seek to determine.

This notion of the march of time as having significance—even a mandatory significance—would appear to be foreign to the East. However, it is not foreign to the traditional spirituality of Europe. It was the attempt to develop a theology of history (St. Augustine) which distinguished medieval Christianity among other things from the religious and mystical thought of the East, and the reaction of Christianity in our own day to the modern materialist philosophies has been to seek to revive that great tradition. Hence the return to a long neglected eschatology, which re-emerges alike in the neo-Calvinism of Barth and in Catholic theology and even liturgy, as in the restored “waiting” Liturgy of Holy Saturday. The world is viewed in the perspective of Judgment Day; and the whole time process, and all the involvements of each of us in it, are thereby seen to scale (that is the significance, more particularly, of the work of such thinkers as Péguy and Claudel). It is this outlook which has given rise to the new schools of Christian thought: these pay close attention to contemporary history and take the view that the created being does not work out his salvation by himself but in the community and as a member of it.

This is the most considerable modern attempt to relate life in time to a spiritual background and may be the first step towards a synthesis which the East could grasp on the basis of the primacy of the spiritual, and which the agnostic West could understand from the starting point of the natural brotherhood of man and the demands society may make upon the individual. Given this hypothesis, a great importance would undoubtedly be given to the differential appreciation of the ages of civilizations, of the genius of the various nations and of their contribution to the solution of the crises of today; provided, however, that the concept of the time process as a steady linear progression was replaced by the more complex notion of a number of coexistent time progress regimens—that applying to intellectual and scientific knowledge which is the most linear of all; that of historical events shrouded in the obscurity of incomprehensibility; that relating to the conquest of tyrannies of every kind, in which progress is by bursts, followed by relapse and a new beginning; and that of spiritual growth, which is perhaps a regimen of lapse of time with no progress bound up with tradition (according to the East)

linked with the salvation of the individual (according to Christianity).

The concept of the multiplicity of time regimens is the complement of that of the multiplicity of types of national genius and removes the dangers that lurk in the idolatry of history (Marxism).

SOCIAL CRISES

In one respect at least the position of East and West is very similar. In both worlds re-examination of the traditional forms of civilization is demanded by the conditions of material, intellectual and moral destitution in which a considerable majority of the world's present population exists. There has always been widespread destitution among mankind (Middle Ages, crises in Chinese history, etc.) but the growth of the world's population, coupled with the new types of altruism evolved by modern thought, have made the inequality of living standards a yet more crying scandal. In Europe the prevalence of injustice and oppression is a fact which none would dare to deny; American prosperity hides open sores; over vast regions of Asia men live a sub-human life, of which the very thought is intolerable to men of conscience. In the face of this appalling evidence it is all too clear that the schemes of values on which our several societies have long been founded no longer suffice for the attainment of viable solutions. We must re-examine them from the ground up.

More particularly education requires to be entirely recast in the light of two facts: the present numbers of mankind and the hopelessness for many of them of ever having access to culture in the traditional sense. Neither in Asia nor in the West can there be any further question of forming an abstract judgment of the value of a particular concept of man or of a particular educational ideal. Both must be thought out afresh in terms of the circumstances of the majority of our kind. Marxism has made the attempt from its own angle. We must now see whether we are able to proffer answers other than the Marxist; if we cannot, we are finished.

WORK

It is a matter of special urgency to consider the meaning of human labour in terms of our respective countries and civilizations and under the threat of permanent crisis. The problem has always existed: theology and philosophy have met it but their answers seem always to have been given on the basis of particular social and economic conditions (slavery in antiquity or more modern times—the Negroes'—servile status of manual workers and glorification of certain activities regarded as noble, etc.).

The initial tendency of a rapidly growing technology was to ease the lot of man, and in practice it did bring about indisputable progress in this respect, with work made lighter, hygiene improved and machines replacing manual toil. There is no need to set out in detail the other side of the picture, in which technical progress figures as the source of such grave evils as the subjection of man to the tyranny of cold statistics, his reduction to a nameless unit, the loss of the creative element in work and of independence. Moreover, there is the darker aspect of the application of modern resources to war and destruction; and the risk of power being concentrated in the hands of the few and ultimately in those of inhuman and irresponsible entities (States, financial combines, dictators).

Some people who claim to follow but who perhaps oversimplify the lessons of Asia, would be inclined to pronounce technology to be evil in itself, the accursed offspring of human pride and of a spirit of domination which would bend Nature to its unholy purpose. To them, the only remedy is retreat into the past, the destruction of all machinery and man's return to solitude and meditation. But this is vain nostalgia; history does not retrace its steps and the men we have to save are not men of yesterday but of today with all they have and lack now, with their present convictions and yearnings. Technology and science are instruments and, as such, are neither good nor bad. They must be not destroyed but tamed and restored to their proper status. They are dangerous when they become idols, but when they are kept in their place as instruments only, the danger vanishes. Thus a great spiritual renaissance will be needed to restore them to their true focus.

The initial effort—and this has enormous implications

educationally—must be concentrated on creating what now is almost entirely lacking, a spiritual background to work. The traditional Christian background is still conceived of in terms of outmoded forms of human toil; while the Marxist version remains marked by nineteenth century materialism and by a messianic spirit of revolution which is extremely potent during the period of struggle against tyranny but does not furnish a valid ethic for a new society.

Here again the East, with its notion of man's fellowship with the rest of the created cosmos, could make an important contribution to the building of an ethic of work in which other elements would be the Western regard for fair shares and a satisfying efficiency.

EDUCATION

From all the foregoing there should emerge the main lines, not of an educational system, but of a policy for education. The crisis in which we are living compels rejection of the aristocratic systems through which other civilizations produced minorities of outstanding culture, while leaving the people as a whole in its ignorance. Whether we like it or not, the spirituality of the masses is no longer vital enough to replace all other knowledge. The very fact of their being reduced to such grim straits has brought the masses of today, not indeed to maturity for they are not themselves capable of ensuring their own material and spiritual progress, but to a stage in adulthood at which they realize more and more clearly their right to culture. Western societies (including America) have long met this claim by allowing the underprivileged the crumbs—or a faint reflection—of the culture imparted to the few. This has involved no change in the principles of what is still called "humanism" but is perhaps merely the education appropriate for the men of an age now past. The schools still purvey learning only remotely related to life as our contemporaries know it. Where the syllabus is modernized, the process consists in the inclusion of science or, more accurately, applied science—that is, an education that breeds mere technologists, if not slaves of technology; it will never humanize technology, master it, spiritualize it in modern terms for it is created for and by

technology, with never a window on the outer world. Even the educational media which technology has invented—radio, films, etc.—only complete in the adult what has already been begun and carried far in the schools.

While the writer claims no special knowledge of Asia, it may be asserted that the majority of Eastern peoples have not reached the stage described above. Among them the educational problem arising is that simplest type, long since resolved in Europe, which consists in conquering illiteracy, and the great danger lies in the fact that the masses of the East are catapulted into a world dominated by technology without a transitional stage and without its being feasible to give them in short order the knowledge which would enable them to form judgments on it and to escape in some measure the domination of their intellects by technology. We may, however, reckon with equal justice that some surprises may be expected from this encounter of peoples emerging direct from an age of faith with the assumptions of technological civilization. At the very least, we must not fail to note the effects of this encounter on a still living spirituality which has not been degraded to the level of a mere science.

Thus in East and West alike completely dissimilar and almost opposite circumstances create the danger of man's subjection to the impersonal tyranny of figures, technology and material success. What we have to find are the reserves of spirituality, respect for human personality and the sense of what is sacred, in all civilizations and all tradition which could serve to fashion a new type of man; a man who takes full advantage of the instruments he has invented but with a renewed awareness that he is capable of greater things than the mere mastery of nature.

Any education whose effect is not to promote this reawakening is a sure way to the tyranny of man over man. No method of education, however scholarly and however soundly based on tests and statistics, is beneficial in itself. Our analytical knowledge of man has, of course, resulted in educational, as in medical, progress: but all it has done has been to improve the technique in either case. It is not thus that the mind is enriched and there are no methods for attaining the true liberty to which all men aspire. The source to which men must return is man himself.

But it is not one source but many, each differing according to an epoch and tradition. We shall make no progress by formulating and agreeing on a single definition of man in the abstract. The diversity of mankind, the very richness of this diversity, might be compared to the music of the symphony to whose complexity each instrument contributes its note.

Humanistic Education in the West

by

JOHN T. CHRISTIE

I am asked to contribute a "point of view" on the subject of our forthcoming Conference, and a point of view, especially on educational questions, must be coloured by a man's own educational background and limitations. Speaking as one who had an old-fashioned classical training at school and college, I have returned, after nearly 20 years as a head master, to be the principal of an Oxford college. I am very conscious that Oxford, like other less ancient universities, has changed its outlook. It now stands for a wider and more democratic view of education; and, secondly, the study of science has increased enormously in range and importance.

However, although a classical education may not be the one best calculated to fit a man for the immediate problems of 1951, it should enable one to understand the history of culture and education better than a scientific outlook can. In fact, all humane education in Europe since the Renaissance, and particularly in the nineteenth century, was strongly influenced by a classical outlook. It has often been claimed that it is the foundation of Western civilization, and I have frequently seen the phrase "Western or Christian civilization". The two epithets have very different implications as we shall see. My knowledge of Eastern thought is small and superficial: it is a compound of interest tending towards admiration, tempered by ignorance tending towards wonder. The view of the ordinary Englishman who has a similar background to mine is that the Eastern ideal is contemplative and tends towards the negation of self, while the Western outlook is more practical and more self-conscious. At first sight one might expect a knowledge of the humanities and a humanistic education to be the ideal bridge between the two, and it is worth enquiring how far this is a right view. If it were, it

would greatly help us to answer the question which is to be discussed at this Conference.

A training in the humanities and a training in science share between them the school and college education of Englishmen today, and evidently the humanities are nearer to Eastern philosophy than science is. Nevertheless, from the first, humane ideals, inculcated by training in literature and art and religious observance, have been strongly coloured by the practical bent of the Western mind, and the classical emphasis on conscious reason and a sense of form. All this of course took its rise from ancient Greece, and in the writings of the Greeks there is little of the contemplative ideal, though we can find traces of it in Plato. Here, as elsewhere, Plato is too great a man to be entirely typical of his nation and his age. Even to him poets were teachers and prose-writers were "persuaders": active reason and not passive meditation is the master conception. It is noticeable that recent left-wing students of the ancient Greek outlook tend to criticize Greece, and the classical education founded on it, for not being practical enough, and for a failure to develop science in the interests of society as a whole. A number of recent writers have attacked all that is mystical and religious in Greek literature and in so doing have exaggerated this element.

Christianity, the second strand in our Western tradition, no doubt had a strong strain of contemplation in it and still has. But it was quickly Europeanized by Greek reason to fit it for its conflicts with a pagan world. The mere fact of the use of the Greek language strengthened this tendency, and soon it became yet more organized and practical in its outlook when it became the official religion of the Roman Empire. The Renaissance only stressed anew the debt of Europe to the classical outlook and perpetuated the aristocratic aspect of classical education, a fact which both limited and strengthened its effect. Classics, especially in England, were the foundation of the ruling-class outlook and one can see, even today, that politicians brought up in this tradition feel themselves more at ease with imperial and foreign problems than with domestic and economic questions which have no parallel in the history which they had studied. Western culture in the usual sense was never more than the culture of a small minority. Among our thinkers and writers in England in the last two centuries

there have always been a few whose interests were directed to the East, often beginning with our political and economic connexions. But I imagine that they were always isolated and somewhat alien figures. Such an interest and such a point of view only became popular when it was absurdly romanticized and distorted by the poet and even by the lady novelist. The second half of the nineteenth century was the time of our greatest material prosperity, and it was characteristic of the Western qualities of enterprise and individual initiative. But that period bred its own critics and Matthew Arnold gives a memorable though perhaps idealist picture of the Eastern character as it seemed to us, in one of his poems, which is worth quoting:

*In cities should we English lie,
Where cries are rising ever new,
And men's incessant stream goes by—
We who pursue*

*Our business with unslackening stride,
Traverse in troops, with care-fill'd breast,
The soft Mediterranean side,
The Nile, the East,*

*And see all sights from pole to pole,
And glance, and nod, and bustle by;
And never once possess our soul
Before we die.*

. . . .

*Some sage, to whom the world was dead,
And men were specks, and life a play;
Who made the roots of trees his bed,
And once a day*

*With staff and gourd his way did bend
To villages and homes of man,
For food to keep him till he end
His mortal span*

*And the pure goal of being reach;
Hoar-headed, wrinkled, clad in white,
Without companion, without speech,
By day and night*

*Pondering God's mysteries untold,
And tranquil as the glacier-snows
He by those Indian mountains old
Might well repose.*

Since Matthew Arnold, a great change has come over education and it certainly has not been a change in the direction of Eastern philosophy. Science puts an equal emphasis on form and on practical results, and also, quite unlike the humanities, it stresses what can be weighed and numbered and is reducible to statistics. Thus it would appear to be further than ever from the traditional Eastern outlook. But it is worth remembering that even so, science is a great internationalizer. (I well remember a Unesco conference in 1946 in London attended by Professor Gilbert Murray, Dr. Julian Huxley and the President of the Royal Society. We heard an eloquent plea from a politician for more interchange of ideas between East and West and for the encouragement of Unesco. Eminent speakers at once pointed out that their own departments, science, mathematics, philosophy, already had strong links of this kind, and it was obvious that the scientists, in their own subject, inherited a great common tradition, the equivalent today of the seventeenth century ideal of the republic of letters.)

Even so, it seems that neither science nor the humanities by themselves can be the foundation for a bridge between East and West. Clearly if the unity of knowledge and the unity of the world is to be saved in this precarious century, we must do our best to bridge the gap. On our side, I doubt whether this can be done by trying to infuse an oriental element into our education. Certainly at the schoolboy stage, and here I speak from some experience, the Eastern outlook as given in books that are intelligible to immature minds, seems hard to grasp. I have more than once used with a class of clever boys of 17 to 18 a book about Eastern religions. They could understand what was written, but found it hard to link it on to anything with which they naturally sympathized. They are told for instance that in the Eastern world view "there is no such thing as individuality: persons are no more individual than the waves of the sea have a separate entity as waves". I remember being asked to explain what was meant and I found myself quite unable to do so. Perhaps we shall hear more at this

Conference of ways in which the Eastern outlook could be made acceptable to the immature Western mind.

And yet I feel sure that Eastern ways of thought have in them an element which, if transposed into a Western key, could give us on our side something which we sorely need. In many books written by teachers of humanity and also of science in the last twenty years there has been an emphasis on the vital importance of *contemplating* them without asking "what do I get out of this," and, still more, without an eye on an examination. It is a plea for what Sir Richard Livingstone calls "the vision of greatness". Dr. Livingstone is a humanist, but his point of view is not unrecognized by scientists. I feel it myself in a present-day university where many students come from much more limited and uncultivated homes than was the case 30 years ago. The work of great minds is set before them, but they have been trained to study them solely with reference to examinations and they really believe that once they have "done" a book with notes and a lecturer, they have, as it were, sucked the orange dry. I would say that until you sit down in tranquillity and let the great mind do its work on you, you have not begun to understand what a great mind is.

No doubt this kind of contemplation is far removed from what Eastern thinkers have meant by it, but the attitude of mind is one of great importance to civilization when we are all in danger of too much trivial activity, and when, as Matthew Arnold says "We never once possess our souls until we die". In its purest form the contemplative ideal alone will not stand up to the demands of life, even for the highly educated man; and no doubt this has always been so. The early Christian who took contemplation seriously had to isolate himself as a hermit or shut himself up in a monastery. The practical English mind brought up in the Christian tradition has always found that he needed the "stiffening alloy" of something like stoicism before it could be a creed for life. I have been head master of two schools, both founded with a strong and ancient Christian tradition, and I have often found conscientious boys worried by the difference between the pure and unworldly ideals of Christianity and the practical demands of school life. What passed in our public schools for Christianity was often nearer stoicism with a

Christian tinge. Indeed, the typical Englishman of the nineteenth century, especially if he was of the kind who came out to India, took the ideal of "the gentleman" as his guide and made his Christianity depend upon it. You may have heard the story of the British officer who was captured by Muslims and offered his life if he would renounce his Christianity. He had never noticeably been a Christian, but he refused to abjure his formal faith because "it was a damned ungentlemanly thing to do"! (Is it true that a similar change has come over Buddhism in the Far East? I have seen it stated that after Buddhism had reached China, it was stiffened with Confucian ideals rather as our Christianity was stiffened with stoicism.) No doubt this contemplative element needs to be made more practical or combined with a practical life if it is to stand up to modern demands, but there remains the danger that it may be swamped by the typically Western materialist approach. We in the West appreciate the power and the wisdom of some Eastern ideals and we should try to introduce such ways into our own education both at home and at school. But I am not sure from what I have heard of present Indian education that this aspect of education is stressed any more here in India than it is with us; in fact it may be less emphasized. (I should like information on the point.) Is it true that Indian universities are at the mercy of examinations even more than our own universities, and do not take as their ideal knowledge for its own sake? I am sure that we in England suffer from the temptation to regard our universities as means to an end, "degree-getting machines". I need only refer to Sir Walter Moberley's book *The Crisis in the Universities*. If the East has copied this side of Western education, I am afraid it has copied the worst.

We have our own university problems, some of them peculiar to this age, and I do not know how far they are shared by Indian universities. Since I was a student myself, the university is open to a vastly larger proportion of the population. This is particularly true of Oxford and Cambridge which still enjoy, perhaps unfairly, a greater prestige than any others. There are some twenty colleges in Oxford and in a single college a hundred applications for twelve places is not uncommon. This is a healthy tendency and nowadays the idler with social ambitions is comparatively

unknown at Oxford, but it is a tendency with its own dangers. It is my duty to interview all our applicants, and I 'am left wondering how far an ancient residential university is the best thing for *all* the young men (and, I imagine, the young women) who apply. One feels that some are not suited by intellect or by temperament to a university career, and at the age of 20 would be better in practical work. A half-way house between a theoretical course of study and earning a livelihood is a technical college, and most of us are agreed that England is very much behind with technical education, certainly as compared to America. Again, even those who are suited to further study until they are 22 or older, owing to the incidence of military service, have worked so hard as boys and so narrowly, in order to gain an award, that they are devitalized when they arrive and are not sufficiently resilient to make the most of what is offered them. One excellent result of generous State aid is that the poor boy now has a good chance of reaching Oxford or Cambridge without having to face the severe competition necessary to gain a scholarship offered by the college. Having seen more of other universities both in England and in America in the last two years, I am struck by the peculiar advantages of a residential university. Much of what is most valuable in education goes on outside the class-room and the library, and takes place in the students' rooms in informal groups and discussions conducted often with great vehemence and considerable ignorance, but very broadening in their effects. The financial problems of a residential university are great, but even where there cannot be residence, opportunities for informal discussions or debate are of the essence of a good university.

There remains a second question which goes back to the very foundations of a university. What is its function in the life and education of a country? There is no doubt that instruction is far more highly organized than it used to be, and no one can regret that this is so. But this only increases the danger that the university may come to be regarded as a superior high school. Here, I think, some knowledge of the history and origins of universities is important, and I find that scientific students in particular have no interest whatever in the origins of a university. A university originated in a band of students who collected together to pursue knowledge for its

own sake under the guidance of some eminent personality. This was the case for example at Paris and at Padua. There is a sense in which a university could remain true to its origins and its functions if there were no junior students at all. I must not pursue this idea at the moment, but I have heard it said that Eastern students in particular are not interested in the history of anything. An abstract and unworldly outlook on life and a fundamental pessimism about progress discourages one from interest in history, whereas we have learned to believe that unless you know how a thing developed you cannot understand what it is. I would freely admit that our own former belief in progress had been severely shaken over the last 50 years, but this does not debar one from a sincere interest in history and origins. Is it true that there are few records of any kind for the history of ancient India and chronicles have to be invented without the help of dates? We inherited the historical approach from at least two sides: From the Greeks and Romans who were proud of their traditions, and scientific in their approach to chronology and from the Hebrews for whom God was essentially a god who worked through history that had a beginning and will have an end. Is this sense of history, I suggest in all humility, a thing that the East could profitably imitate from the West? It seems to us that human beings will naturally take some interest in the past which has made them what they are, and if there is no real recorded past they will invent one, often to their credit.

On the other hand, the ideal of knowledge for its own sake, in the sense of philosophical or religious knowledge, is one which the East has traditionally cherished more than the West; and Western thinkers could well "go to school" to the sages of the East. This emphasis on the world of knowledge and philosophy can never be an item in an educational curriculum. It is more an aspect of the whole approach to learning and it begins before the university and even before the school.

I can never forget, in my own educational experience, that the boys and the young men who come to the schools and universities are largely what the homes make them. The home, it has been said, is the first local education authority. For centuries in England the home was the first teacher and schools could rely on the homes for a background of simple

and traditional knowledge in the form of tales or prayers: "This story shall the goodman teach his son", etc. Schools have varying effects on the pupils, and a school with a strong character leaves its stamp on all its members. But unless there is some synthesis between school and home there will be a conflict. The young creature will have two standards: this is natural enough at 16, and such a tension is an important part of growing up. But to have two standards at 26 is wrong and is an impediment to forming an integrated character. I find this question acute in the personal lives of some of the undergraduates I know today. The doors of Oxford are open to a far wider class of student: boys from simple, uncultivated and often philistine homes come suddenly into a world of older culture. Many of the young men, it seems, adjust themselves admirably. Their parents are proud of them and they are not ashamed of their parents. This is not always the case, and the conflict may lead to a suspicion of education in the hearts of the parents, and a contempt for a simple home on the part of the young man. The only solution from our side is continued friendliness and sympathy with boys from widely different backgrounds, without a lowering of any of our intellectual standards. The spread of democracy in England has made this problem acute. Is there possibly a parallel problem in India and other Eastern countries where the sudden impact of Western education and Western materialism has produced a similar conflict? Is it possible that students who talk faultless English, who know Milton and Macaulay by heart, will return home to a way of living which Milton and Macaulay could hardly have approved? If this is so, these students may be fine flowers of culture, but they are, so to speak, cut flowers, flowers in a vase with no root from which to perpetuate in their own families the education and outlook they have learned. This is an inevitable danger unless culture in its wider sense passes through the universities to the homes of the next generation.

These considerations would suggest that a bridge of some kind there must be between East and West, but for the present it must remain a *bridge*, across a wide and inevitable stream. The civilizations on either bank of this stream go back too far to produce any true mixture of cultures. In constructing such a bridge, or in strengthening any bridges that we have, education

must be a prime factor. The purpose of such education will not be to inculcate one side with the sentiments of the other in such a way as to shake one's loyalty to one's own traditions, but it must inculcate sympathy with a point of view which at first is bound to appear very different and in some respects unattractive. It must not consist of imitation on a superficial level. On our side the organized aspect of our education is not the one of which we are most proud. It must be remembered that our educational machinery is only beginning to grapple with problems which have arisen from the great social revolution which has happened in England in the last 30 years. We are still making progress by trial and error. But behind our organization is a genuine ideal, the ideal of a Western culture based on Christian classical foundations and historical in its approach. This we believe is more worth exporting, not for direct imitation, but for sympathetic study, and we can gain much from the converse process. It means that there must be contact, not only at a student level or a school level, but at the level of the instinctive, unanalysed community point of view.

The Concept of Man and the Philosophy of Education in the East and the West

by

RAS VIHARY DAS

IT is not my purpose here to criticize the basic document, but I shall perhaps be able to develop my own position better by indicating my disagreement with some of its apparent assumptions. It seems to be assumed that there is one civilization in the East and quite a different one in the West, resulting in seeds of conflict between peoples of the different regions; and that by mutual understanding, the chances of conflict may be removed or minimized. As is admitted in the document itself, there is not just one civilization in the East. There are many, and we may altogether fail to discover any unity among them. So the distinction of civilization into Eastern and Western seems almost meaningless. Secondly, I would seriously question whether conflict between one people and another ever arises from any conflicting viewpoints in their respective civilizations. England and France or France and Germany may be said to share the same civilization and yet there have been frequent conflicts between them. I am definitely of the opinion that conflicts between nations or individuals generally arise, not out of viewpoints in their civilization, but from uncivilized elements in their character.

Following the ordinary usage, I have spoken above of different civilizations but the question may well be raised whether it is at all significant to speak of many different civilizations. Civilization after all pertains to human beings, not to material things, and men are civilized or uncivilized in virtue of certain qualities of their heart and soul. Civilization thus connotes some mental and spiritual excellence, just as health means a certain physical or bodily excellence. Health does not mean one thing for an American and another for an Indian (in that case medical science would be impossible); similarly civilization should mean, essentially and ideally, one and the same

thing for all. The so-called different civilizations mean either the different stages in our approximation to the ideal of civilization or else the different expressions or outward modes which civilization has found for itself in different circumstances.

When we speak of the civilization of a country we are apt to suppose that all the people of the country are civilized more or less in the same way, but really the different individuals of the same country are not civilized in the same way or to the same extent. A civilized Indian will not differ essentially from a civilized Englishman, although they may dress or speak differently, but internally they will differ widely from their relatively uncivilized compatriots to whom they may conform in their dress and speech.

If it is true that all conflicts proceed from the uncivilized parts of our nature, then what is needed for harmony and peace is not merely an understanding of our so-called different civilizations, but an earnest effort to civilize ourselves by disciplining our mind and will. We do wrong, not because our vision is blurred, but because our will is vicious. Nevertheless an understanding of the nature of man, not merely in his historic actuality but also and specially, in his non-historic, spiritual ideality, should be of immense help in all our conscious efforts at changing or improving his present unhappy condition.

If we want to know what a man is, we must know what he does. What he does, as a man, i.e. rationally, always implies some ideal which he seeks to realize in or by his acts. If a man's life cannot be separated from his acts, we must admit that his ideals form an integral part of his nature. The ideal of a man's life is the god he actually worships. It is this god which shapes a man's life after its own image. Any other god unrelated with a man's ideal is either an idol or a myth. In any case, it is easy to recognize that ideals are the most important elements in culture. The ideals pursued by a man or a group of men show us clearly the kind of culture they have. If the ideals shape the life of a man, we may well say that a man is determined by his culture.

I am taking culture as a normative concept in contrast with the positivistic concept of the anthropologist, with local and temporal limitations. By culture I mean something which man as a rational being ought to achieve in life, a good which should be pursued for its own sake. It is a clear condemnation of a

man's life that he lacks culture; on the contrary we imply strong praise when we say that a certain person is highly cultured.

I would also, as already suggested, emphasize the universal character of culture. If culture represents the ideal of human life, it cannot be different for different persons. If truth, beauty and goodness are not different for different peoples and countries, then the ideal culture which should be an embodiment of these values cannot vary with time and place. Different people in their various ways try to approximate to the one supreme ideal of humanity. We are worshippers of the same God in our temples and mosques, churches and synagogues.

Actually, however, all men are not equally fitted to pursue the highest ideal of life. Man's nature is highly complex. According as a particular side of his nature acquires dominance over his other sides, he becomes wedded to the particular mode of life which appears to provide satisfaction to his nature.

I cannot critically develop here what I take to be the real human nature. I shall be content with stating my views somewhat dogmatically.

Man is patently one with his body, and no man is ever found apart from a physical organism. But his whole being cannot be expressed or understood entirely in physical terms. In traditional language, we can say that he is also mind and spirit or reason. We can describe him as a unity of body, mind and spirit. If we ignore one of these elements, body or spirit, we falsify the real human nature. We get either a mere animal, or God; but not man.

Body stands for the sensible, material part of our being. Mind is responsible for consciousness and intelligence and other physical characters which we share in common with the higher animals. To spirit or reason we owe whatever conceptions we have of the supreme ideals (or ultimate values) and our sense of loyalty to them. At present we have no clear understanding of the relation between these elements of our nature. But we know spirit cannot work without intelligence, and intelligence or mind cannot operate apart from bodily functions.

All these elements, though present in every man, do not have equal importance. We should attach more importance to mind than to body and still more to spirit than to mind. In fact one man is better than another only in attaching more importance to the higher parts of his nature.

We may symbolically conceive man as a spirit bound to his body. His culture or civilization (we might say, his true religion) consists in gradually emancipating himself from the domination of the body or in employing his mind more in realizing spiritual ideals than in satisfying bodily cravings (although no real need of any part of our nature can be wholly ignored). We find that we degrade ourselves and get involved in all sorts of unworthy struggles and conflicts, when we try to acquire more and more material goods instead of trying to realize spiritual values.

What are spiritual values? For our purpose, we may accept the usual division of consciousness into thinking, feeling and willing, each having its characteristic ideal. Thinking, feeling and willing are functions of the mind when they are concerned with mere facts or ordinary objects. When they are directed towards ideals, they may truly be called spiritual functions. Truth, beauty and goodness have traditionally been recognized as the proper ideals of these spiritual functions.

These ideals may be differently conceived and formulated but I am convinced that ideals worthy of man cannot be conceived entirely in material terms. They are otherworldly in some sense and they lend dignity and worth to our human nature. Real culture consists in the increasing realization of these ideals.

The most important task of the philosophy of education, as I understand it, is to bring to clear consciousness the ideals for which men should live, and then to find out the proper means of inculcating them effectively on the minds of young students.

Education cannot mean merely the development of our potentialities, because there are potentialities for good in us as well as for evil. Nor can it mean mere preparation for life, because life may be worthy or unworthy. Our educators must realize as clearly as possible what kind of potentialities they are to develop in us, what kind of life they are to educate us for. That is, the ideals which constitute the essential elements of culture must first be clearly understood and appreciated.

But all are not equally qualified to pursue the highest ideals. As we suggested above, different people, although living in the same country and even belonging to the same family, are often at different levels of mental and spiritual development, and cannot therefore all attempt to realize the highest ideals.

Mere health or physical well-being is a good enough ideal for many; some fewer aim at moral and intellectual excellence and still fewer can aspire after higher spirituality. In a well-ordered society, there should be room for people of different ideals and also provision for the satisfaction of their varying needs.

We may not and should not have hide-bound castes, but we cannot do away with all distinctions. Saints and soldiers, scholars and athletes, philosophers and merchants, cannot all be merged together into a homogeneous mass. If we are to avoid chaos and confusion, we should have a well-understood gradation of classes, based on the difference of ideals pursued by them. The supremacy however must belong to those who can point to, preach and practice, the highest spiritual ideals. They should guide and control the affairs of men, without being able to derive any material advantages from them. Plato's philosopher-statesman, without any family ties or earthly possessions, or the ancient Hindu sage, owning no material wealth and yet ruling over kings, seems to indicate the kind of people who might bring the present distracted world to a better state.

We need not make a fetish of democracy. It is after all a form of government or political administration, concerned to regulate our worldly affairs and external public relations. It does not touch all sides of our being and cannot supply a motive for the highest activities of our soul. Moreover, democracy, as it is organized nowadays, seems to place the world at the mercy of half-educated journalists and unscrupulous financiers. This cannot be an ideal state of affairs. There should be a rule of reason rather than one of mere number. Reason is not equally powerful or acute in all people. The number of those who possess reason of the right kind and are willing to be guided by it, and not by prejudice and greed, is limited. So when we decide any question by a mere majority, we cannot be sure that we have arrived at a just or rational decision. That this is so is apparent from the respect we pay to the opinion of an expert on any question.

It may be objected that I have been rather unjust to democracy which is not a mere form of government, but a way of life, having aspects which are valuable in themselves. For instance, it guarantees the rights of individual men and stands

for freedom and equality, and recognizes the unique value of human personality. And these are surely very valuable contributions of democracy to the modern world.

I have no desire to decry the valuable services democracy has rendered to humanity. My only difficulty is that I fail to see that the values which democracy subserves, or specially recognizes, are values of the highest kind or absolute values.

I think our duties are more important than our rights and an undue emphasis on the latter may not be quite wholesome. We should be earnest rather in discharging our duties than in demanding our rights. If everyone did his duty, then no occasion might arise for anyone to call attention to his rights.

As to equality, I do not clearly see that it is a fact or is desirable in itself. In some respect one may be equal to any other. As a mutable thing I am equal to the meanest lump of clay. The really important question concerns the respect in which one is said to be or should be equal to another. And I fail to see that in any important respect, there is, or can be, equality among all men. It is only from a superficial point of view that a judge and his hangman may appear to be equal. If we look to the range of their understanding or their spiritual depth, to the ideals which inspire their whole lives, wide differences will easily come to view.

Freedom no doubt is a very valuable ideal. In the religious as well as the political sphere, people have often become, almost literally, fanatical about it. But have we any positive conception of absolute freedom, i.e. freedom without reference to anything else? Absolutely, our conception of freedom appears quite negative, as mere absence of restraint or determination. Otherwise we understand freedom only in connexion with some function or other, e.g. I am free to talk, you are free to go away, etc. In the latter case, the value of freedom depends on the value of the function in respect of which one is free. Freedom to kill or to starve is not easily recognized to be quite so valuable.

On this question of freedom, it is well to recognize that man as a psychophysical organism or as a member of a social or political whole, can never enjoy absolute freedom. He is determined by so many factors. Physically he is absolutely bound by the laws of nature and his mind too is determined by his physical conditions.

True freedom is freedom of spirit. We can achieve it only gradually and partially. In a certain sense, we have freedom even now. We are free to will or to think. This freedom is highly valuable, not so much because of itself, as because of other higher values which require it as their pre-condition. We cannot achieve goodness or morality unless we are free; we cannot attain truth or knowledge unless we think freely. Freedom is instrumental to goodness and truth, which appear to be higher values.

I am a humanist in the sense that I believe all values are to be realized in and by human beings, and ultimately values do not exist anywhere else. But I do not see that any unique value attaches to human personality merely as such, if by human personality we understand no more than a centre of consciousness attached to a body. To me human personality is no doubt extremely valuable, not, however, in itself, but as the only possible seat for the realization of all spiritual values. Since human personality alone has the potentiality to realize all spiritual values, it may be supposed to be valuable in itself. But we should not forget that it has also the potentiality to be the very picture of the Devil's self on earth, an offence to God and humanity. Considering, therefore, his capacities for good and evil, I am disposed to regard man as valuable only when, and in so far as, he puts himself at the service of the good.

My denial of any ultimate value to human personality need not be considered outrageous; for in certain respectable systems of thought also, such as Buddhism and Advaitism, our clinging to personality is condemned as evil.

Moreover, we know that when a man proves himself to be a scourge to himself as well as to others by some unmitigated vice, we feel no qualms of conscience about putting an end to his life. People often sacrifice their lives for their country, for freedom and truth. If human personality were such an invaluable thing, it would not perhaps be sacrificed in this way. Every day, perhaps every minute, thousands are born and thousands also pass away. Such profuse production of unique values and wanton destruction of them would be staggering indeed. It would not be reasonable to argue that human personality, as human, extends beyond birth and death.

I may be altogether wrong in my view of democracy and of the values it subserves. My main point is whether it is

wholly rational in its ways. If, as a way of life, democracy is inspired, guided and controlled by reason, I can have nothing whatever to say against it.

Reason should be broadly conceived, not merely as a capacity for argument only, but as the principle of intellectual enlightenment as well as of moral inspiration, as both theoretical and practical. The most important thing is to make the rule of reason prevail in our individual lives as well as in the life of the community. If we can make reason dominate our life, we shall no longer be guided by unproved and unfounded beliefs, whether in religion or in politics, and shall never sacrifice higher values for the sake of lower ones. Dogmatic religions, with definite and conflicting creeds, which led to wars in the past, will be steadily at a discount.

It should not be supposed that I wish to eliminate all religion from a life of higher culture. Religion in the sense of passionate apprehension of spiritual ideals, and a sincere attempt to realize them in life, is itself the highest form of culture of which I can conceive. Religion as the best way of life possible for a man is bound to remain, at least as an ideal, as long as there is a spark of reason in man. But organized religion, involving particular beliefs that can hardly be justified at the bar of reason, can no longer be accepted by men who make reason the rule of their life. Religion, in the ordinary acceptance of the term, always involves a set of dogmas which are hardly credible, and enjoins certain practices which seem to have no moral significance. If we had just one set of beliefs and practices prevalent throughout the world, there would perhaps be no serious danger in them. But in point of fact there are different sets of beliefs and practices sanctioned by different religions; and when a person accepts one such set, as forming his religion, he is bound to regard it as the best and superior to all others. This leads to hatred and conflicts, especially when proselytizing zeal is added to religious faith. Religion has thus often worked as a divisive force in history, against culture and humanity. I therefore think that religion in this sense will be favoured less and less by men of real culture.

I do not however forget the services rendered by religion to culture in the past. Music and poetry, painting and architecture, flourished on the basis of religion. Philosophy was the pursuit of religious men; and medieval schoolmen, with their

religious zeal, were the spiritual forefathers of our modern scientists. In India, too, religion, philosophy and science were for long a combined interest. Morality everywhere drew its inspiration from religion, and many a barbarian was humanized by religion alone. But with the maturity of human reason, all these cultural forces, science and philosophy, art and morality, have broken free from religion, and are running their own independent courses and fulfilling, in their different ways, the cultural functions which were once performed by religion. The independent cultural value of religion now thus seems to have dwindled to a minimum. If one follows art and morality, science and philosophy in a religious spirit, i.e. with genuine devotion and sincerity, one need have no separate religion at all.

A word on science may not be out of place here. Science as the disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake is no doubt a thing of the highest value and should never be depreciated. But the prestige of science in the contemporary world seems to be largely due to the services it renders to militarists and industrialists. This makes it suspect in the eyes of all right-thinking men. Further, when we enquire closely, we find that the ideal of knowledge, which science pursues, is not pure or mere knowledge, but knowledge which is power. There is no denying the fact that power has a corrupting influence. When you pursue knowledge, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the power it brings you to dominate nature (and men), you have already started on a wrong path with a perverted mentality. It is therefore no surprise to find the great harm science has done and is doing to the spirit of man, as an ally of unholy powers, as an engine of destruction, as an instrument of exploitation and profit.

One cannot of course be blind to the wonders science has performed or to the obvious material advantages man has derived from it. But a man of reflection cannot also fail to note how little science has contributed to the higher and spiritual needs of man. All its triumphs are on the material plane. Spiritually man has not been made better than his forefathers. Peace and tranquillity, charity and justice as well as other virtues of mind and spirit, have not been quite as abundant in the scientific age as one would wish them to be.

There is yet another kind of unspirituality connected with

the spirit of science. It assumes that everything is knowable and is in principle sensible, that our intellect is sufficient to cope with all aspects of reality. I conceive it to be a moral duty of all intelligent persons to carry forward the work of intellectual analysis and understanding as far as it will go; and we cannot recognize any arbitrary limit beforehand. But this is different from supposing, as science seems to do, that there cannot exist any mysteries in reality which we may be unable to solve. This is likely to breed intellectual arrogance and lack of genuine humility.

However it is too late in the day to wish to stop the progress of science in the modern world. It has entwined itself too intimately with our present way of life. What we can do is to put it in its proper place. It is certainly a very useful tool in our hands, by means of which we can satisfy many of our physical or bodily needs, and it should by all means be preserved as long as we cannot deny our bodily self. But as body takes a subordinate place to mind and spirit, so the place of science is, and should be, lower than that of other disciplines, which are concerned with our mental and spiritual needs, such as art and morality, religion (in the best sense) and philosophy.

I should however admit that science in the sense of disinterested pursuit of knowledge for its own sake must always remain in the highest rank along with religion (in the best sense) and philosophy, with art and morality, as an essential form of culture. In all these spheres, our ultimate loyalty is to the ideal of reason, which speaks directly to the spirit of man, in the language of truth, beauty and goodness, without the aid of any extraneous revelation; which we may call by any of these names or by some other, such as "sweetness and light" or even love or God, but whatever the name, it always appeals spontaneously to our better sense (or reason) as alone deserving and demanding realization, absolutely, on its own account.

Culture is a way of life and thought, inspired by rational ideals. Education is the initiation of man into the life of culture. Its aim, as I like to conceive it, is to awaken the mind of man to a consciousness of worthy (rational or spiritual) ideals and to a lively interest in their progressive realization. It seeks, in Plato's language, to turn the eye of the mind towards light, the light which dissipates the darkness of ignorance and prejudice, that breeding ground of all the diverse ills of our life.

Theory and Practice of Education in the United States

by

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EDUCATION in the United States is not the expression of a single, coherent set of beliefs about the nature of man and society. Practices differ widely at all levels of education, in both public and private institutions, and these differences of practice reflect a variety of opinions and beliefs among educators and interested laymen concerning the nature and purposes of education. Conflicting theories concerning the responsibility of schools for providing vocational training, social experience, and religious instruction lead to wide differences in the scope of school activities. Conflicting theories concerning the roles of reason and emotion and the relative importance of reading and first-hand experience in education lead to wide differences in methods of instruction.

Conflicting principles, frequently in greatly simplified and incomplete versions of basic philosophic differences, lie behind the variety of vigorously opposed educational movements in the country. One movement would make the schools "student-centred" rather than "subject centred" by devising educational practices to fit the individual differences of students, rather than arranging curricula in accordance with historic departments of knowledge. Another would reform school curricula by analysing the particular "life needs" of students and reshaping or replacing conventional courses in accordance with specific activities in which students will engage after their formal schooling. Another movement would provide students with a common body of knowledge and competence in reasoned discussion in order to establish the basis of intellectual community for dealing with the basic common problems of our time.

As a result of these differences of opinion and belief concerning the scope, the nature, and the purposes of education,

students of the same age receive very different kinds of education in the United States. They may be given very considerable religious instruction, or none at all. They may be required to pursue a very precisely prescribed course of study, or they may be permitted to determine what they shall study and how they shall study it. Their education may be chiefly vocational, or include no vocational training at all. Much time may be given to books and to reading, writing, and arithmetic, or such study may be condemned as verbal and academic, and replaced by organized social and physical experience.

More fundamental than the conflict of theories which gives rise to this variety of educational practices—and more clearly indicative of the fundamental tensions in American life and thought which are observable in ethics, politics, and aesthetics as well as in education—is the controversy over “absolutes”, the debate concerning the validity and usefulness of timeless and universal principles of thought and action. Two concerns have frequently been in real or apparent opposition in the development of thought and activity in the United States. One has been the concern for finding effective ways of securing immediate and specific results amid rapidly changing circumstances as the people of the nation have swept across a continent which presented to each new surging group of pioneers both new possibilities and new dangers. The other has been the search for timeless general principles and criteria as guides for understanding and coping with the bewildering complexities of changing social and physical experience.

Religion, with its concern for relationship to an eternal and unchanging being and for absolute criteria of excellence, was central in the thought and practice of many of the founders of the colonies on both seaboard of the country; and it continues, even in secular forms and in fragments of theological beliefs surviving in secular thought, to exert an important influence. The concern, on the other hand, for survival and success under circumstances of life in a new land exhibited in the first of these traditions has deeply marked the ideas and institutions of the nation.

As between these two traditions, the people of the United States have undoubtedly been increasingly preoccupied with the latter; that is, with processes, with the ways in which sequences of events may be understood and the knowledge of

them applied under particular circumstances to the direction of particular means to immediate ends. And American philosophy has been increasingly interested in the processes by which things happen or may be brought about, increasingly disposed to formulate criteria of excellence in terms of concrete and temporal effects, and increasingly disposed to refer questions of the truth of opinions and theories to the consequences of holding them, or at least to view propositions so attested as more substantial and valuable than those otherwise established.

Preoccupation with process exhibits itself, moreover, in the kinds of study or research in the humanities, in the social sciences, and to a lesser extent in the physical sciences which have come to be most highly regarded in American colleges and universities. What seems most important to many scholars working in literature and the arts are the circumstances in the experience or opinions of an author, or in the life and particular ideas of his time, which may be construed as causal explanations of the traits of his work. The details of the life of a poet or the special practices and conventions of the stage at a particular period, or the development of popular interest in certain forms of the short story in America—subjects such as these, rather than the criteria of excellence in literature or their application to individual literary works, are the commonest problems of literary scholarship in the United States. This interest in untangling and clarifying particular causes in relation to particular effects in literary history is an aspect of preoccupation with process. A similar preoccupation is evident in scholarship in the social sciences when anthropologists describe in detail the habits of certain societies; when sociologists explore “empirically” the class structure of society, the formation of public opinion, the operation of mass media of communication, or the causes of failure in marriage; when political scientists analyse administrative structures and procedures; and when economists concern themselves with the operations of price, production, labour management, and money policies. In education itself, when made the subject of research, the concern is predominantly with problems of motivation, the steps of the learning process, teaching devices, and administrative procedures.

This preoccupation with process, with the particular ways

in which things come about or may be brought about, directs attention both in research and in teaching to the particular and the temporal rather than to the general and timeless. What is very generally sought in research, and what is presented in the classroom is the clarification of causal relationships among specific sequences of events rather than general principles of timeless significance. For a large and influential group the discovery of such sequences constitutes not only real knowledge, but the only real knowledge. Pursuit of timeless principles is regarded as both futile and impractical. No such principles exist, it is held; and if they did, they would be too remote from the immediate and concrete problems which require solution to be of any practical value. To look for them is to divert attention from the urgent problems at hand.

In this view the immediate problem of satisfactory relations with nations and peoples of other cultures is not to be solved by reference to some set of universal principles concerning mankind, to the potentialities of human beings as members of the human race, or to general principles of justice in human affairs. The feeling concerning the futility and even the positive danger of attempting to establish universal principles as guides for action is so strong and so generally accepted that to accuse a thinker of implying "absolutes" is sufficient in many quarters to cast serious doubts upon his ideas. The situation is illustrated by the handling in America of the commonest approach to the problems of intercultural or international relations through what are called "area studies". The subjects of such studies are the particular history of a region, its particular laws and customs, its particular social and political structure, its particular language, and its particular philosophy. Equipped with knowledge of these matters, the expert in an area is assumed to have at his command what would be needed to determine national policy with respect to the area, to function as an administrator of programmes of activity in the area, or to provide any assistance which the people of the country may seek or need.

The concern with process as an object of knowledge affects the methods by which knowledge is thought to be acquired and communicated. The method must be empirical in the sense of depending upon the acquisition of masses of specific data. It may be experimental by way of the formulation of an

hypothesis and the setting up of conditions under which observable fact may be expected to validate or disprove the hypothesis. The key to validity in this method of reaching truth is predictability. Truth has been discovered when it is possible to set going a sequence of particulars with confidence concerning the phenomena it will exhibit in its later stages, or, where the sequence cannot be manipulated, with confidence that once its initial stages have been observed, succeeding ones may be correctly anticipated. The experimental method may be supplemented by the historical, and the problem of history then becomes that of identifying separate cause and effect relationships in the developments of society, political institutions, and the arts.

It follows as a consequence of commitment to these methods of securing insight that the best to be hoped for in the study of human behaviour and institutions is a high degree of probability. Absolute knowledge is no more possible than the existence of absolute principles. Demonstration, as opposed to probability, is possible only in precise subjects, such as mathematics. Abstract reasoning, that is reasoning which does not rest upon observed fact, may be an interesting intellectual pastime, but like absolute principles has little practical value except in the sphere of mathematics where constructions of ideas may prove their value in providing the terms for precise predictability of physical events. That the knowledge sought in research and communicated to students does not rise above probability of success is, of course, not a matter of serious concern to those preoccupied with process. The end of knowledge, in this view, is guidance for action in certain complex circumstances, each cluster of which is to a degree unique. The pursuit of knowledge always begins with a specific problem. The solution of the problem is the end in view. Since the problem is particular and its solution involves the discovery of the way in which relevant special circumstances can be met or handled, probability is as much as can be expected and is as nearly adequate to the situation as knowledge can be. To seek timeless principles for application to the bewildering succession of unique problems which the individual and society face, is to court the danger of embarking upon actions inadequate to the peculiarities of the temporal situation.

The seeker after knowledge must, then, be an experimenter.

And he must be aware that he is, himself, embedded in the processes of history. The problems which it seems important to him to solve, as well as the solutions which suggest themselves to him, are consequences of his individual situation in time, place, and culture. The factors which have determined his outlook, his interests, his equipment of ideas, and his methods of dealing with his problem make all that he does relative to his personal place in history. Any attempt to surmount these limitations would, itself, be only a consequence of his situation. His reason is limited, if not determined in its content and operation, by these circumstances. Education must, consequently, make no pretence of developing a competence for the determination of absolute truth. It must be concerned with the student's social adjustment and the removal of psychological tensions. It must begin with the interests he exhibits, discipline him to avoid prejudice and dogmatism in favour of careful survey of empirical evidence, and teach him to regard his own and other people's conclusions as at best probable and as in all cases largely determined by his individual environment and temperament. It should be practical in its attention to the details of vocational training and, more inclusively, to the whole range of his particular life needs.

All this, however, is but one strain in American thought, and the theory and practice of education in America can by no means be wholly explained by it. The preoccupation with process has throughout the history of the American people been accompanied by a quite different concern, a concern not with sequences of particulars but with the relations of the temporal and particular to the eternal and universal. Theologians, such as Jonathan Edwards, have sought to determine in what respects and how far human beings as temporal existences participate in absolute being, in what respects and how far individual human lives coming into existence in time and place share in the being of that which must always have existed, the totality which itself did not come into being but simply is. The temporal beings which particularize its existence in time and place must, according to this line of thought, find their most important knowledge in insights concerning their relationship to it. For philosophers, such as Emerson, such knowledge is more important and more real than the

shimmering sensation of particulars or empirical determinations concerning the sequences of particulars. Poets of the school of Walt Whitman tend, on the other hand, to find the universal and the ultimate in nature, rather than in some being of which nature is the expression or projection or emanation.

It is assumed by these writers, and is fundamental in the tradition they represent, that knowledge of man's participation in universal being is possible. It could not, of course, be acquired by even the most precise insights into the sequences of particulars which constitute temporal experience. But even as mankind has a capacity for apprehending the particulars of sense experience, so it has a capacity for laying hold upon absolute being and absolute truth. The means of achieving such knowledge have been variously conceived of and named—the operation of discursive reason, the activities of poetic imagination, or the insights of common sense. The methods of securing knowledge of eternal being and a grasp of timeless principles may range from rigorous practice of abstract thinking to the cultivation of mystical experience, or the clarification of the ideas of common sense which are considered available even to the meanest human capacities.

It is in this tradition that much of the theology and much of the early political theory of the United States was developed. When the people of the 13 original colonies declared their independence of Great Britain, they began by announcing that certain general truths were "self-evident". All men, they declared, are created free and equal and have certain inalienable natural rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It would have seemed to the founding fathers of the country insufficient, unconvincing, and wholly inadequate to say that given the peculiar circumstances of life in America in 1776 and given the particular inheritance of desires, interests, and ideas, separation from the mother country was probably justified.

Both of these two strains of thought in America, the pre-occupation with process and the concern for participation in absolute being, have applied themselves to religious and to secular problems. While one wing of puritan thought, best represented perhaps by Jonathan Edwards, centred upon the possibility of spiritual union with God conceived as "Absolute

Mind", another, best represented by Cotton Mather, was preoccupied with the discovery of historical and contemporary activities by means of which human beings might become instruments or agents in the plan of operations formulated by the Deity. The second school held that the ultimate nature of the universe was beyond human comprehension, that the divine plan for its operations was beyond the power of human thought, and that it was presumptuous for finite human beings to inquire into ultimate ends. Religion for this school was not absorption in eternal being but adjustment to an eternal plan of operation. Virtue was not union with or participation in the divine and absolute, but willing activity as an agent or instrument of specific divine purposes.

As religion has been pursued along these two lines, so at the other extreme has the interest in nature. Man is understood to have reached what degree of perfection is possible for him by absorption in nature, by developing or yielding to what he shares with the natural world, by participating as fully as possible in nature, or as Emerson put it, permitting the currents of universal being to flow through him. The predominant thought, however, of the past few generations in the United States concerning man's relation to nature has centred upon the possibilities of human adjustment to the processes of nature or special devices for human mastery of it. The problem of human life has increasingly been envisaged as a matter of meeting particular and rare situations by particular and immediate processes of adjustment to them. General questions concerning the consideration of ultimate ends of nature, and attempts to operate on the basis of absolute principles, have from this point of view seemed futile and even positively dangerous.

Contemporary American thought and practice would be misrepresented, however, if it were pictured as a conflict of two schools of thought consistently and sharply opposed to each other. The universal principles which one school seeks have their value not merely in participation in absolute being and intelligence, but also as guides for immediate and specific activities. Religious men concerned about man's relation to ultimate being have, in the light of the principles they regard as universal, engaged strenuously in the construction of particular religious institutions and the formation of detailed

codes of conduct. The purely contemplative soul is rare in the United States.

On the other hand, the theory and practice of those preoccupied with processes have not been wholly divorced from general and even universal ends. Ends and values have often been implicitly assumed and permitted to remain inexplicit and unexamined. The earnest pursuit of particular knowledge and useful practice in biology and medicine, for example, has assumed that physical life and physical health are values for all men in all times and places. These assumptions can be challenged. Every suicide does challenge them. But they are not explicitly examined in our schools of medicine. In the case of education, the assertion that it is futile to consider absolute values and ends is commonly accompanied by a declaration of the importance of individual maturity and growth, and of social cohesion and strength. For these ideals of individual growth and social strength owe their significance to the traditions of thought necessary to the discovery of universal and absolute values and ends. So too does the very common term "adjustment", which means more than the mere absence of friction, and involves in an unexamined general way concepts of desirable relationships inherited or borrowed from the traditions of thought concerned with explicit formulation of universal ends and values.

One consequence of this situation is a certain embarrassment in many circles in the United States concerning talk about those ultimate values which our activities assume. In the tradition of preoccupation with particular processes, talk about absolute principles is regarded as futile and pretentious. Yet leaders of religious, political, or economic thought are in this respect granted a certain tolerance when they engage in public pronouncements and are indeed expected to enunciate general ends and values. The man of affairs who in his office or among his associates would be uncomfortable in the discussion of general principles of justice, for example, and wholly inexpert in pursuing or presenting a sequence of thought regarding them, is to some extent released from this embarrassment when he makes a formal public speech, and feels moreover responsible for declarations of general principles.

Concern for the spiritual as against the material is likewise not the exclusive property of one school of thought in the

United States. It has often been pointed out that despite the preoccupation with spiritual matters of important leaders and groups among the founders of the country, the practical activities of these men in the conquest of the continent and in the erection of a highly complex material civilization were tremendous. Conversely, the rewards sought in the most materialistic of American activities, the acquisition of fortunes, for example, seem often to have been satisfactions which were basically non-material.

It is not surprising that educational practice in the United States should present an appearance of confusion and conflict. The institutions established to induct the young into the life and culture of the country reflect the tensions between preoccupation with process and concern for participation in the universal. Despite these conflicts, the interest, on the one hand, of all parties in the immediate practical operations of education and the adherence, on the other hand, even of those who repudiate absolute principles, to certain unexpressed and unexamined general values, prevent the educational system from falling to pieces under the strains in American thought which it reflects. It should be added that the country's tradition of freedom of thought and discussion is of inestimable value in providing the possibilities for the reasonable resolution of educational conflicts.

The greatest need of American education is the clarification of the relationships of the various philosophies it expresses. What is required is the investigation, on the one hand, of unexamined principles and values which play their role in the determination of educational practices, and the fuller investigation, on the other hand, of universal principles, values, and criteria, with a view to more detailed practical application of them. These, too, may be among the basic needs for the development of fuller mutual understanding between East and West.

The Concept of Gradual Progress in Indian and Western Philosophy

by

HELMUTH VON GLASENAPP

6.

WITH the heavens above his head and the earth beneath his feet, man stands in the midst of the universe. Himself drawn to the depths by the force of his material body but at the same time raised to sublime heights by the lofty aspirations of his mind, since time immemorial he has tried to solve the three riddles about himself which Immanuel Kant has formulated in the questions: "What can I know?", "What shall I do?", and "What may I hope?". The answers that have been given to these questions since the time when primitive man tried to make out his position in the world, to determine what is good and bad and to solve the mysteries of death, have been very different and always provisional. For the particularities of space and time, of blood and tradition, as well as the peculiar inclinations and predilections of individual thinkers, have produced a countless variety of religious teachings and metaphysical systems which have all claimed to have removed the veil hiding the face of truth.

And yet, if we consider the history of man's endeavours to pin down the truth, we come to the conclusion that however much thinkers differ in their interpretation of the nature of the universe and that which is beyond it, nevertheless they all agree to some extent in the practical conclusion, in recommending a life which would in fact comply with the requirements of society and of man's own conscience. This insight has been expressed in the *Subhāshitārnava* in a beautiful verse which runs as follows:

Concerning sacred places, concerning God and concerning religious duties there is discussion among the wise, but there is full harmony with all systems in the commandment: do good to everybody and honour your parents.

It is clear that a high moral standard is not attained immediately, only gradually. It requires education to develop a child subject to various and conflicting impulses into an adult obeying the laws of ethics. It is one of the most productive thoughts in the history of religion and philosophy that man as he comes from the womb of nature has a long way to go until he reaches perfection, and that the highest level can be reached only step by step and by passing through many grades. This concept of the possibility of a gradual progress is not only a sound principle of secular and moral education; it plays an equally prominent role in man's endeavours to transcend the bounds of his earthly limitations and to advance to the realm of the divine. But how can man hope to attain so high a goal without knowing his true position in the world and among his fellow-beings? The practical side of life has always to be supplemented by theoretical knowledge. We have therefore also to deal with the concept of graduation in its biological and historical aspects. Finally, having considered the multiple views of scholars of many ages and countries we have to show one thing more. We have to ask ourselves whether all the conflicting statements on, and interpretations of, the world must be understood as forming successive steps leading to the metaphysical truth propounded by individual thinkers, or by a special school of thought.

Being neither a philosopher nor a theologian I do not intend to proclaim new truth or convert anyone to a particular system. As a historian, my task is more modest. All I desire is to show how the idea of graduation and of gradual progress is realized in all the essential domains of philosophy in so far as they are concerned with presenting a great ideal to man and raising him to a higher level of ethics and understanding.

In considering the world of today, we see that four great civilizations dominate the greater part of the globe: the civilization of the Far East, Indian civilization, Moslem civilization, and Western civilization. Each has produced a philosophy of high standing. In Europe, the philosophy of the Arabs was known as early as the Middle Ages, when Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) were studied by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. Chinese philosophy reached Europe in the seventeenth century, when Catholic Fathers translated the classical texts and Leibnitz and Wolff

sung its praises. The study of Indian philosophy was the last to be begun in modern Europe, though the ancient Greeks had some knowledge of it. Its pioneers were Anquetil Duperron, Charles Wilkins and H. Th. Colebrooks, its heralds Schelling and Schopenhauer.

It is to be regretted that after these promising beginnings Western philosophers of our times should give inadequate consideration to the metaphysics of the East. This must be deplored, for if it is the task of philosophy to occupy itself with the problem of the entire world and the whole of humanity, and to depict the achievements of thought universally, it cannot neglect what has been done outside of Europe and America. Today, when Asia and the West are connected by aeroplanes which make short work of space, today, when we can contact the scholars of the whole earth, there is urgent need for all philosophers to know about each other and to acquire at least some knowledge of the results of thought reached in the Orient. I shall therefore in this article compare the teachings of the Occident with those of the East. In referring chiefly to Indian philosophy, I do so for personal reasons. For, although I have visited Turkey and Egypt, China and Japan, and have read Islamic and Far Eastern philosophers in translations, I feel more familiar with the philosophy of Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism because I have devoted my life to their study. It seems to me also only right to deal in the first place with the thoughts of this hospitable country to which we are invited, whose wise men have, with indefatigable zeal, since the times of the Upanishads, of Mahavira and of the Buddha, devoted all their lives to philosophy and religion.

"The great ocean deepens gradually, but not abruptly and steeply. So there is also in good teaching and discipline a gradual instruction, a gradual practical application, and a gradual progress." These words of the Buddha give in a nutshell the principles of education applied all over the world, in the schools of ancient Greece where the boys received their physical and literary training after leaving their mother's knees at the age of seven, in the palace schools of Charlemagne as well as in the modern Western educational institutions, from the kindergarten to the grammar school and the university.

These principles were applied also in ancient India where

primary education began in the *pāthshalas* or in the monasteries in which the pupils learned the three R's and proceeded then to higher studies. The famous Chinese travellers Fa-Hien and Hiuen-Tsiang and I-tsing have left us remarkable pictures of the efficiency of the universities of Nalanda and other places of Buddhist learning. I-tsing tells us that the course of instruction for boys began with the study of grammar to which three years were devoted, followed by the study of commentaries and works of a more advanced character. He compares the stages of the student with the several degrees of the Confucian scholar.

The aim of Eastern and Western education has always been the same: the purposeful transmission of the learning and culture of one generation to qualified successors. The methods also have been identical in India and Europe. A celebrated verse attributed to Chanakya (Böhtlingk, *Indische Sprüche*, 2. ed. Nr. 5848) says that for five years one may fondle a son, for 10 years one may spank him, but when he has reached the sixteenth year, one may consider him a friend. This harmonizes with the theories of modern Western educationists, who say that during the first six years the child should be induced to good habits by coaxing, in the second period his character should be moulded by obedience, enforced by punishment if necessary, but that in the third period commendation is the principal means of training.

The fundamental goal of education is not only to impart knowledge, but to develop a moral character to lead the individual to the perfection of his abilities and powers: in a word, to give him a complete possibility of self-realization in the widest and truest sense of the term. For this reason, education should not stop at a certain age, when the course of studies is finished, but should continue throughout the whole of life. Every nation has worked out for this purpose its own ways and methods. The most original and noteworthy of these is to my mind the Indian system of *āshramas* that prevailed during the time of the Upanishads.

According to this, the young Aryan, i.e. member of the higher castes, was at the age of 8 or 10 years sent to the house of a Brahman to live there and be taught the *Veda*. There he remained for 12 years or more, his time being divided between the studying of the holy texts and the fulfilment of domestic and religious duties. When he had finished his

studies, he left the first *ashrama*, that of a *brahmacharin*, and entered into the *ashrama* of a *grihastha*, i.e. a householder. He married and founded a family, for it was considered a religious duty to beget a son "that the thread of his race be not broken" as the Taittiriya Upanishad I. 11 says. But when he developed wrinkles and grey hair and had seen the child of his child, he must give up all worldly pursuits and retire to the woods. As a *vanaprastha*, he lived, with or without his wife, free from almost all duties and sacrificial obligations, a religious life given to meditation. The last stage of the career of the pious Aryan was that of a *sannyasin*, a man who had "cast off everything from himself". As an ascetic, he wandered from village to village until death removed the last barrier that prevented his absorption into the Brahma, the universal spirit.

Later on this system of *ashramas* fell into disuse; today, as far as I know, it is little more than a survival. But the attempt it made to "transform human life into a preparatory school for eternity" (Deussen) merits the highest admiration. For it gave the *grihastha* all the possibilities of enjoying life and seeing its sorrows until he felt himself ripe to sever gradually the bonds of attachment to it. The system of the *ashramas* stands perhaps unique in the world and even if it has become obsolete now, it shows the lofty spiritual ideal of the ancient Indians who made the whole of life subservient to the conception that it is not the destiny of man to be submerged by worldly cares, but to raise himself above them to a higher sphere.

In many religious systems, from the secret societies of the Primitives to the modern Freemasons, there has been a number of grades which the adherent must pass through, from the state of the worldly to that of the fully initiated man. Members of the several grades are expected to possess a progressively more elaborate knowledge of the religious truth propounded by the individual system, these grades often being distinguished by their dress or by special symbols.

As these matters are closely connected with rituals, we cannot go into details here. But we may deal with another subject that is of great importance in every system of mystical philosophy, namely the different steps which are to be distinguished on the way to the transcendent truth. The Indian theists, e.g. the *Bhagavatas*, teach that there are five dominant emotions directed to the Supreme, and these are arranged in

ascending scale: (1) renunciation of the world; (2) obedience, *dasya*, servitude; (3) *sakhya*, friendship; (4) *vatsalya*, the tender fondness of a child; and (5) *rati*, or passionate love. The idea that man when he tries to penetrate more and more into the essence of God passes from the position of a servant to that of a friend, from that of a friend to that of a child and from that of a child to that of a lover, shows a parallel with Angelus Silesius and other Christian mystics.

In Indian works which expound a monistic doctrine of the identity of the individual spirit and the absolute, theories on the steps leading to the supreme goal have also been developed. I may quote here only the *Yogavasishtha Ramayana* according to which there are seven stages of *bhumikas* that mark the path to salvation. They are (according to III, 118): (1) *Subhechchha*, the striving for the good; (2) *vicharana*, philosophical reflection; (3) *tanu manasa*, small activity of worldly thought because of detachment from sense-objects; (4) *sattvapatti*, attainment of the true self-existent entity; (5) *asamsakti*, severing of all bonds to the world as a consequence of the *chamatkara*, or surprise felt at the union with the infinite Spirit; (6) *padarthabhavana*, the state when the perception of the plurality of objects has ceased; (7) *curyaga*, the state of objectless contemplation, which is the preliminary step towards the definite end of individuality reached at death only.

This ladder of mystic states and perfections has its counterpart in neo-Platonism, Moslem Sufism and Christian mysticism. Strenuous and prolonged self-discipline is in every case the precursor of active contemplation. This consists of a long process of internal quietude, of abstraction from sense and of absorption in the transcendent till the human soul is attuned to the divine. By this act of contemplation, the whole personality is raised to a higher level, in so far as "the abysmal depths of its existence are reached, the foundation or bottom of the soul which finds its repose in the infinity of God".

In Buddhism, we meet with similar methods. By a life in retirement and indifference to all worldly desires the disciple has to prepare the way for the contemplation of the truth: all is impermanent, all is without self, all is therefore full of sorrow. It is the salient feature of Buddhist philosophy that it acknowledges neither an immortal soul as the centre of the so-called empirical personality, nor a personal God who rules

the world, nor an impersonal absolute out of which the universe has developed. For this reason, the Buddhist method of reaching salvation cannot consist in the elimination of all elements which do not belong to the soul as the very nucleus of the individual, nor in the pantheistic merging of the individual spirit in a universal spirit. The way to truth has as its presupposition the knowledge that there is no substantial entity in this world of universal flux. Man is a complex of *dharma*s, of changing constitutive elements which arise according to moral laws in functional dependence on each other. The aim of the thinker consists in gradually realizing the truth, that there is no self. The Buddhist philosophers in contradistinction to the Vedantins and others' believe that the expunging of the idea of self is the necessary forerunner to the attainment of *nirvana*.

It is interesting to note how this doctrine that there is no ego has produced quite different effects in the history of Buddhist thought. In ancient Buddhism, it found its ideal representative in the *arhat*, in the saint who lives as a hermit or in a monastery entirely given to spiritual exercises. In Mahayana Buddhism, the negation of the ego is a call to greater moral activity, because the aspirant towards a higher life, understanding that there is no difference between himself and his neighbour, must develop the wish to do good permanently to others. According to the elaborate theories of the stages in the career of a *Bodhisattva*, an aspirant for future Buddhahood develops step by step all the eight cardinal virtues until he becomes a saint. This saint, having liberated himself from all egotism, in his turn frees other creatures from egotism and makes them mature for the cultivation of moral perfections which will lead them also to salvation.

The Buddhist doctrine of the non-existence of a self has no counterpart in Western philosophy, though we find also in Hume, Lichtenberg and Mach the conception that the ego is as transitory as the body. The practical conclusion from it would seem to be that one must not attach any importance to the ego, but by getting rid of this erroneous idea devote all one's endeavours to the welfare of other beings.

Orthodox Christianity teaches that man can perfect himself only in his existence on earth. When his life has come to its end, he earns the fruits of his moral behaviour either immediately

after death in heaven or hell by the special judgment of God, or at the end of time when the dead are resurrected. In India, the doctrine of transmigration is the basis of the systems of Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism. According to this belief, every individual after death enters upon a new existence. In this life, he earns the fruits of merits acquired in the past, and has to endure the consequences of sins previously committed.

We have not to embark here upon an explanation of the philosophical theories which try to define which is the factor that wanders from one existence to another or how the rebirth is effected. Hindus and Jains on the one side, and Buddhists on the other, disagree on this. The former believe in immortal souls and their reincarnation. The Buddhists deny the existence of immortal souls capable of survival but acknowledge a series of momentary entities or *dharma*s which pass from the dead to the being to be born. So the man who is reborn is not the dead one, on the other hand he is also not different from him because he originates from him. But there is conformity in all Indian religions in so far as they emphatically believe that "as a man sows, so he reaps". There is a moral and natural law, inherent in the universe, the outcome of which is that every act voluntarily done by man has its consequences in a new life which succeeds the present one.

According to Indian philosophers, this doctrine of *Karma* gives a plausible explanation of the diversity of human conditions and human fate. This teaching is eminently moral because it explains the whole world development as the necessary result of the combined acts of all beings taken together; and it includes the three possibilities which are necessary for the recognition of a moral order of the world: the possibility that man is responsible for his doings because he has a free will, the possibility that there is a just retribution for everything done by him, and the possibility that his insight and moral behaviour will ripen more and more, so that he may become perfect after thousands of existences. The doctrine of *Karma*, rightly understood, thus considers every existence as a stage on the way to perfection.

It is well known that this doctrine of transmigration has also found followers among the adherents of other religions, such as the ancient Celts and Teutons, some Jewish and Mohammedan mystics and some Christian heresies. Among ancient

European philosophers, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato and Plotinus were its exponents. In modern times, the doctrine of a gradual progress by the individual through many lives in succession was advocated by two famous German writers at the end of the eighteenth century: Lessing and Kant. Lessing says in his work, the *Education of the Human Race* (1780) that as a man cannot in one and the same lifetime pass through all the stages towards perfection, he has to experience many existences. Similar is the opinion of Kant in his *Critique of Practical Reason*. He argues that the "categorical imperative" demands of us perfect morality and perfect holiness. This cannot be realized in one life, and therefore presupposes that our personality lasts for an infinite time and that we have to reach the goal in a successive approach of infinite progression. It was Paul Deussen who remarked that this agrees with the verse of the *Gita* (VI : 45):

*Striving zealously, with sins cleansed, the disciplined man, perfected through many rebirths, finally goes to the highest goal.*¹

So far I have only dealt with the different conceptions of the gradual progress of the individual: now I shall speak about the theories that assume a collective gradual progress. The most important of these is Darwinism, the doctrine of evolution associated with Charles Darwin, who published his *Origin of Species* in 1859. According to this work, evolution in nature is the result of selection in the struggle for existence. Basing themselves on this theory, scientists have tried to establish a pedigree of the human race and to show that there is an ascending scale, beginning with the lowest types of living beings and ending with man. This doctrine contradicts both former scientific opinions upholding the invariability of species, and the beliefs of all the great religions. It had its precursors in some Greek, Chinese and Mohammedan mystics who anticipated the idea to some extent, but it is a modern Western achievement. It caused a change in all departments of Western knowledge almost without parallel in the history of thought. Its philosophical importance is that it eliminated the essential difference hitherto supposed to exist between man and animal and taught instead a gradual

¹ Edgerton's translation.

progress in the nature of species, an ascent from simpler forms under the stress of competition for the necessities of life.

The basic conception of Darwinism, that all life is one great entity, is of course not new to Indian philosophy. For already in the Upanishads, the Hindus were of the opinion that plants and animals have a soul like men, and the Jains had a presentiment of the modern theories of the existence of infinitely small living beings like infusoria and bacteria. It is therefore not astonishing that in the third century B.C. the emperor Ashoka built hospitals for animals. In the West, some Christian saints like Jerome and Francis are recorded to have cherished a brotherly love for the brute creation, but societies for preventing cruelty to animals have existed in Europe only since the beginning of the last century.

Theologians and philosophers in the countries west of the Hindukush have always tried to conceive of human history as a process beginning with the creation of the world and ending with the destruction of the present universe, the resurrection of the dead and the coming of a definite state of everlasting and immortal bliss. Zarathustra and the later Jewish prophets were protagonists of this theory of world history and Christianity has made this doctrine one of its chief teachings. Saint Augustine in his "*De civitate Dei*", has laid the foundations of a philosophy of history that considers the 6,000 years forming the term of life of mankind as being the progressive realization of the Kingdom of God.

In the nineteenth century, this idea was transformed into a philosophical theory of evolution. According to Hegel, the whole of history is a development teleologically conceived, for the end governs the process. As the germ carries within itself the whole nature of the tree, the flavour and the form of the fruits, so the first vestiges of mind virtually contain the whole of history. History is thus the necessary evolution of the immanent idea, the process being fixed in all its stages. Through human interests and actions the final purpose of history is carried out, but the purpose itself is beyond human interests and actions.

It is the heritage of the Christian philosophy of history that Hegel does not assume that evolution goes on for ever but that he thinks that a highest and absolute form may be reached. So he takes Christianity to be the absolute form of religion, as his own philosophy is the absolute philosophy. After having

passed from one phase to the other, the human mind at last reaches a sort of plateau where it will continue for ever on an elevated plane. The followers of Hegel split later into two groups. The idealists conceived history as an evolution of consciousness in an optimistic way, but with Eduard von Hartmann, the philosophy of history acquires a pessimistic trend. Existence is governed by a great unconscious which, as a universal providence, guides all issues to a predetermined end. The aim of the unconscious God is his redemption, a universal *Nirvana*, or evanescence of the total volition of the world into nothingness. Other philosophers starting with Hegel worked out a materialistic conception of history. For the Hegelian dialectic of the absolute idea, Karl Marx substituted a dialectic of economic conditions and development. The ideal elements in man's nature and life are reflexes only of the interplay of material conditions and economic facts. This materialistic conception of history is obviously hostile to all theories of a spiritual origin or destiny of man. Nevertheless the faith that in the future a new, just order will rule the world gives to the Marxian theories some similarity to the religious expectation of a renewal of the world that will last for ever.

It is a distinctive feature of the Indian religious and philosophical systems that they do not believe in a creation out of nothing, in a world-process that happens but once and in an ultimate state of bliss which will never end. According to the Jains and to some Mimamsakas the world is without beginning and without end; according to Hindus and Buddhists, there are innumerable worlds which are produced and again destroyed, so that there is a cycle of creation and annihilation which has gone on since time immemorial. Here too the cosmos as a whole has ever existed and will always exist. On our earth there is also a continuous succession of good and evil ages. There will never be a period of absolute perfection enduring for eternity. For this reason, Indian philosophers never cherished hopes of a final and everlasting state of beatitude to come. The individual soul may reach perfection undergoing the purgatory of many births, but the world itself is not changed by this, for the number of living beings, to be born and to die because of their *karma*, is infinite. The Indian idea of *yugas*, *kalpas*, *avasarpinis* and *utsarpinis*, etc., reminds one of Oswald Spengler's theory propounded in the *Decline of the*

West: every civilization is like a plant, it has its origin, its time of blossoming, its decay and its annihilation. When it has passed, another kind of civilization may take its place.

Because of these divergent views on the destiny of the world and of mankind, the importance ascribed to history is quite different among the Hindus and among peoples brought up to believe in Islam or Christianity. Because history does not repeat itself and everything that happens is a unique event on the path of time from creation to perfection, it is worth while to write it down and to fix exactly the year when it happened. Therefore, Christian and Moslem scholars have always been much interested in historical dates and facts.

In India, on the other hand, the pundits have never attached any importance to these matters. In the everlasting cycle of time and in the endless succession of reincarnations, it is quite meaningless to know when something occurred; only the fact itself and its moral implications are important. It is for this reason that we do not know when the Indian texts were composed, and are equally at a loss concerning the dates of the great Indian poets and philosophers like Kalidasa, Shankara or Ramananda, because of the inexactitude of tradition and the conflicting views of Indian writers.

The difference between Western and Indian ideas in this respect may be illustrated by the following simile: the Westerners see everything through a sort of magnifying glass, or as in a slow-motion picture, while the Hindus see it *sub specie aeternitatis*. It is evident that both ways of seeing are one-sided, one has to be complemented by the other. We may quote in this respect a verse of the celebrated German mystic Jacob Boehme who wrote:

*Wem Ewigkeit wie Zeit und Zeit wie Ewigkeit,
Der ist befreit von allen Streit.*¹

After these remarks on the gradual progress of the individual and the conceptions of a gradual progress of humanity as a whole, let us turn now to our third and last theme: is any gradual progress to be discerned in the veracity of the many religious and philosophical doctrines to which the different peoples of the earth have adhered?

¹ He to whom eternity is as time and time as eternity is freed from all strife.

According to modern science our earth has an age of 2,000 millions of years, the human race is said to have existed for 600,000 years and our knowledge of human history covers a space of time not exceeding 6,000 years. It is known that during this time man has embraced very different forms of belief till he reached the present state, where five great religions with millions of adherents and some lesser religions, claim 90 per cent of the population of the globe, estimated today at 2,400 millions. It is comprehensible that every religion or philosophy, or every sect, denomination or school thinks itself in the possession of the entire truth, and yet they may be asked to explain two facts:

1. That today only a minority of the human race professes belief in any particular church, sect or school.
2. That the greater part of the 600,000 years of human life have passed without the existence of present-day religions and philosophies.

The view generally put forward by dogmatic religions is that other forms are, so to speak, preparatory stepping-stones leading to the truth. Thus Christian philosophers speak of the original primeval monotheistic revelation given to all peoples and thereafter enriched by the special revelations of the Old and New Testaments. The other religions are said to contain a germ of truth but this nucleus is mixed up with ideas produced by the imperfection of human understanding or by degenerative tendencies to which humanity fell a prey. In a similar way Hindu and Buddhist sects like the *Shaiva-siddhanta* or the *Shingon* school try to show that the doctrines of all other religious communities are substrata of the universal truth through which man may pass during his reincarnation till he reaches the final goal. The idea that there is an ascending scale of religious and philosophical systems has also been propounded by European philosophers like Hegel and Eduard von Hartmann and by Indian metaphysicians like Madhava in his *Saravadarshanasangraha*.

In a secularized way we meet similar ideas in modern Positivism: according to August Comte, the human race, considered as a great organism, must pass through the stages of theology and metaphysics till it reaches the scientific or positive stage of which Comte is the prophet. In the first of these stages men attribute the phenomena of the world to the

actions of gods moved by human passions, in the second stage conceptual entities take the place of divine wills, and in the third stage man contents himself with discovering the order in which events occur and trying to give a scientific interpretation of them. All these attempts to arrange the teachings of the different systems agree more or less that there is a truth common to all mankind, that this truth is already known and that it is to be expected that after a certain time the majority of the human race will individually or collectively adhere to it.

Many Indian thinkers take another view. According to them, there is no hierarchy of systems but every teaching is an adequate expression of the spiritual needs of an individual. Just as the varied tastes of men of different countries, climates, extractions, age and intelligence require different types of food and clothing, with nobody expecting uniformity in this respect, so also the religious and philosophical views of men are conditioned by a multitude of factors and it is neither to be expected nor even to be hoped that they will ever agree in this matter.

When Mahatma Gandhi spoke to me on religious questions, he said that the multiplicity of religious and philosophical opinions is not only a fact but that it is also a blessing, because every metaphysical thought is only an imperfect interpretation of the world and of the transcendent which is beyond it. In a famous simile Buddha illustrated this truth by comparing the different individual views of reality with the blind men of Shravasti who tried to explain what an elephant was. As each of them was able to touch only a part of the animal's body, their views differed very much; the correct comprehensions of reality would only be possible for a being that had freed itself from the natural blindness innate in man. This parable had an enormous success, for we find it not only in India with the Jains and the Shaivas but also with Mohammedan mystics like Al-Ghazzali, Sanār, and Jalal-ud-din Rumi and even in modern Western textbooks, as in E. S. Robinson's *Readings in General Psychology*. Since time immemorial every system of dogmatics has been a compound of error and truth because the transcendent lies beyond the capacity of men to express it. It is therefore not the outer form or intellectual garb which is of importance, but only what man makes of it to become wiser and better.

Nagarjuna and Shankara were aware of this when they distinguished two kinds of truth: the provisional *samvriti-satya* or *vyavahara-satya* and the higher or *paramartha-satya*. The former embraces all systems which try to decipher the riddles of the universe by the help of logic in inference, tradition and revelation, the latter can be realized only by meditation, to which man may resort by gradual progress.

The concept that there are two kinds of truth which, like the two storeys of a big building of thought, lie one above the other, has its counterpart in Western philosophy, in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For according to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the ideas of the dogmatics are only ideas to regulate our reason, heuristic fictions, symbols of an unknown and inscrutable reality of which we are unable to know what it is in itself and of which we can only know what it means to us.

The East and the Problems of Education

by

HUMAYUN KABIR

I

BEFORE we can answer the question as to whether there is any absolute distinction between East and West in their concept of man or philosophy of education, we must try to understand what we mean by East and West. Obviously the distinction is in terms of geography, but even geographically the terms East and West are, and must be, relative in a global world. Every region of the world is both East and West, depending upon the location of the person who refers to it. The description of Asia as East, and Europe as West, dates back from the time when men thought of the world as flat and limited. The popular description of philosophies developed in Asia as Eastern, and of those in Europe as Western, is a relic of the same habit of thought.

The use of the plural in referring to the philosophies that developed in Asia is a recognition of the great variety of such systems. The philosophical concepts that developed in China are often different from those that developed in India or Western Asia. Each region developed systems that have affiliations, parallelisms and contrasts. Let alone an area so vast as Asia, Indian philosophy includes systems which hold that the Brahman alone is real, and others for which sense experience is the only reality. Sankara and Carvaka have each a place in any history of Indian philosophy, though this fact is not always remembered.

For various reasons, into which we need not enter, many scholars have come to regard Vedanta as the main type of Indian philosophy; and of the many interpretations of Vedanta, the one associated with the name of Sankara as the only valid one. Consequently, to many scholars, both Indian and foreign, Sankara's views have been regarded as Indian *in excelsis*. At the same time Sankara's position has not always

been correctly understood. Even today, critics are not agreed about what Sankara meant by the concept of *maya*. Is *maya* illusion or mystery? What again was Sankara's relation to Buddhist metaphysics? Did he not, with the Buddhists, deny the transcendental reality of the world as we know it? Many today regard Sankara as a confirmed critic of Buddhist thought, but in his own age he was often held to be a disguised Buddhist.

Even if we accept the conventional view about Sankara's philosophy, there are other orthodox Indian schools which give greater recognition to the reality of the individual and his acts. In addition to the six orthodox schools, there are many heterodox schools of varying degrees of insight and influence. These systems—orthodox and heterodox—exhibit among them almost all possible variations of human thought. Furthermore, divergences between them are at times wider than those between a particular Indian and a particular European system.

The same remarks apply to the concept of man put forward by different philosophers who have lived in what we call the West. Even within the comparatively limited field of Greek philosophy, the attitude of Heraclitus and Parmenides to reality and man are sharply opposed. Human thought in Europe, as elsewhere, exhibits two main but contrary attitudes. Some thinkers have stressed permanence and regarded the flow of things as only a process distorting the hidden reality. Others have regarded change as fundamental and identified process itself with reality. Philosophers have also differed about the importance of the respective contributions of sense and understanding to our knowledge. To some, the essence of man is his rationality. Others have identified man with the stream of sense perceptions. Naturally, their concept of man has differed. These differences however cut across geographical barriers. We find exponents of either school in both Asia and Europe. Just as there is no single concept of man which is typically Asian, there is none which is specifically and exclusively European.

It is true that the Greeks had divided mankind into the Hellenes and the barbarians. Indians drew a similar distinction between the Aryans and the Mlecchas, and the Hebrews between the Jew and the Gentile. The self-chosen race had in

each case a sense of its own superiority, mixed with a feeling of patronising contempt for others. It is however doubtful if the ancient world had articulated the distinction as one between East and West. This latter distinction is a later growth, and is largely the result of military superiority which European nations achieved after the Renaissance through the application of science to the art of warfare.

Military superiority led to political domination by Europe, in particular by the nations of Western Europe, and encouraged the growth of a superiority complex that at times degenerated into arrogance. The Greeks, in spite of the sense of their own importance, recognized the superiority of the Egyptians and some other Eastern nations in certain fields. Hindus had similarly acknowledged the contribution of the Greeks to sculpture, military science and astronomy. Europeans till the Renaissance had admitted the excellence of the Saracens in various arts and sciences. Western Europeans of the post-Renaissance period however developed a tendency—sometimes formulated but more often tacitly assumed—to regard all human excellence as their special prerogative.

Europe, Africa and Asia—and these constituted the then known world—influenced one another from the beginning of recorded history. What is today described as the West is based mainly on a synthesis of Greek and Hebraic elements while the East contains traces of Hellenic art as well as the impact of modern science. If a distinction is to be drawn at all between East and West, it would not perhaps be incorrect to say that the spiritual equipment of the West was furnished largely by the East, while the intellectual content of the East was partly derived from Western sources. Christianity, which has profoundly influenced Europe, originated in Asia but returned there in a European garb. The only valid conclusion is that no concept of man can be described as exclusively Eastern or Western. In other words, the world of philosophy cannot be divided into water-tight cultural blocks.

II

One may well ask, if this be so, why should men have ever thought of East and West as distinct if not contrary manifestations of the human spirit? One answer is that human thought

is largely influenced by environment, and this differs in different regions. Man does not think in a vacuum. The content of his thought must be derived from his experience and his experience will be largely shaped by his natural and human environment. To take one example: the desert, with its vast brooding skies and the vast unbroken span below, tends to blur all distinctions and to impress upon the mind a sense of the unity of the universe. From this sense of unity, it is only a step to think of one God and one law. This helps to explain why the most intense expression of monotheism is found in the semitic religions.

Though we do not always see the connexion, the forms of production, and the relation of the different classes to the productive forces, also influence the prevalent thought of a community. The longer one particular social form lasts, the stronger is its impact on the mentality of the people. It is common experience that men following the same avocation develop a similar mentality. Agricultural communities all over the world are inclined to be tribal and parochial. The unit of life is the village community. In such a social setting, the individual's claim to independent life tends to be ignored. On the other hand, social co-operation is restricted to the members of the village group. The individual rarely if ever thinks of his relation to his country or his nation. His loyalty is more to the family or the clan than to the nation or the country. India, with her dominantly agricultural economy of 4,000 years or more, offers an example of how this principle works. The form of her economic life, with its emphasis on the village community, retarded the growth of individualism and nationalism alike.

Let us take another example of the way in which economic organization influences outlook on life. The peasant—especially before the discoveries of science and technology—depended for his prosperity on factors over which he had no control. He could prevent neither drought nor excess of rain. A peasant economy thus fostered an attitude of fatalism. By contrast, communities which were commercial or industrial developed in the individual a more self-reliant, empirical and adventurous outlook. We find such differences between agricultural and commercial communities in both Asia and Europe. Medieval Europe, which was largely agricultural, was nearer

in spirit to contemporary agricultural communities of Asia than to the industrial Europe of today. Here we have another indication that differences in outlook between peoples are due not so much to geographical location as to the stage of their social and economic development.

The influence of the social structure can be traced in some of man's most abstruse speculative efforts. It is sometimes said that what distinguishes the Indian concept of man is belief in the doctrines of *Karma*, and transmigration or rebirth. These are not two doctrines, but two formulations of one fundamental principle. This principle is the application of the law of causality to human destiny. It holds that what happens to man is neither accidental nor due to the vagaries of any non-human factor. Each man is responsible for his own fate. As he has sown, so has he reaped till now and so will he reap in the future. The consequences of his action are not exhausted in one life, and hence he must be born again and again. The doctrine of *Karma* and rebirth is thus an attempt to assert man's independence of God or any other superhuman agency.

We may find parallels to the doctrine elsewhere. Some elements in the thought of Socrates present a close analogy. The doctrine as fully articulated is however peculiar to India. One reason why it flourished here may be found in the organization of Indian society as it unfolded itself in the wake of the Aryan immigration. The Aryans came to India in dribblets, and faced a people or peoples who were inferior in a military sense but perhaps their equal in other respects. The Aryans conquered and subjugated them, but allowed them to survive as inferior classes in the social hierarchy. Caste developed out of this social stratification. Inequality was perpetuated by giving it an institutional basis. We may condemn caste from a humanitarian point of view, but historically we must recognize that it offered the conquered, though under conditions of privation and disability, a chance to survive.

The survival of the conquered under conditions of humiliation and misery posed difficult social problems. A hierarchical society always tends to concentrate privilege at the top. The denial of rights to the conquered leads in course of time to the denial of privilege to the less fortunate among the conquerors. Such societies must, therefore, constantly face the risk of revolt

by the underprivileged who constitute the majority. Such risks are minimized if the majority are persuaded that (a) they are themselves responsible for their sad plight, and (b) can hope to improve their status in an after-life by patient submission to present misery. The doctrine of *Karma* satisfied both these conditions. It inculcates in the mind of the majority the belief that their misery is due to sins in a former life. It offers them the hope of future betterment through present performance of allotted tasks.

The doctrine need not be and most probably is not a conscious attempt to justify existing social practice, but there is no doubt that it fitted in with the requirements of the dominating class in society. Such a class by the very fact of its status tends to be more intelligent and enterprising. Its beliefs tend to set the tone for the whole of society. It is therefore not surprising that principles acceptable to the privileged class should in course of time determine the outlook of the society as a whole.

The use of gunpowder in warfare offers an example of how a scientific discovery influences the course of social development. One of the bases of European feudalism was the superior military power of the knight. With his coat of arms, he was largely immune from the attack of the common foot-soldier till gunpowder destroyed his immunity. Gunpowder thus directly contributed to the overthrow of the feudal system, and indirectly helped in the growth of a spirit of democracy by establishing equality of risk among all combatants. The decay of feudal institutions created conditions for the emergence of new ideas more suited to the new social set-up.

The conclusion then is that differences in the concept of man in different countries or times are not intrinsic, but are functions of differences in their social organization and development. That such differences should come to be regarded as intrinsic or immutable can be explained only by man's tendency to identify a thing with its name. Nominalism is no longer a fashionable mode of thought, but its influence persists in unexpected ways. Without names, man would not be able to use concepts, and without concepts he could not organize his experience. Human energy is limited while the objects that claim man's attention are many. He must therefore classify and label so that he may bring an unlimited number of instances under a single rule. Since he can do so only by

the use of names, he thinks that he has understood a thing when he is able to name it.

It is not surprising therefore that the name is often taken to be the reality. In ancient forms of philosophy, whether Eastern or Western, we find a tribute to the power of words in phrases which identify the word—*sabda* or *logos*—with the reality itself. In course of time, men discovered that the value of words is mainly instrumental, but the power of names could not be so easily shaken. If we want proof of this, we need only refer to the slogans which dominate human attitudes and actions.

The fact that ancient societies developed in isolation from one another helped to perpetuate the nominalist fallacy. Owing to difficulties of communication, societies in different regions were often unaware of one another's existence. Absence of contacts made the co-existence of different stages of civilization, and hence of different kinds of world outlook, possible. It was also natural that these outlooks should be described in terms of the regions in which they flourished. Once an outlook or attitude was given a geographical label, it was an easy step to identify it with the region.

III

On general grounds we may therefore say that no concept of man is peculiarly Eastern or Western. We come to the same conclusion if we consider philosophical traditions which are regarded as characteristically Eastern or Western. It is often said that the Eastern philosopher tends to give an important, if not the central, role, to intuition as a way of knowledge, while the Western philosopher is more inclined to bring all cognitive claims to the test of rational and empirical evidence. This statement is true only with large qualifications. No Indian school of systematic philosophy—whether orthodox or heterodox—accepts a theory which fails to satisfy the test of logic. Some of the greatest names in Western philosophy, such as Plato and Kant, give intuition a central place in their philosophical systems. Again, it is said that the Western philosopher is more concerned with thinking about, and the Eastern philosopher is more concerned with realization of, reality. This may be true in some cases, but there are also Eastern philosophers whose main concern is to think about and Western philosophers who regard knowledge

as only a *means to the realization of reality*. Similarly, if there are Eastern philosophers who regard the highest knowledge as not amenable to verbal expression and communication, there are also Western philosophers who, like Wittgenstein, regard true knowledge as inexpressible.

The degree of control over the force of nature has also influenced man's outlook in different countries or ages. In all primitive societies man is subject to forces which he can neither understand nor control. Such societies tend to think of man as a plaything of fate. Agricultural societies show some increase in man's control over nature, and bring with it an increasing sense of man's importance. Without the art of irrigation, agricultural man was still subject to the vagaries of the weather, and hence fatalism was an important element in his mental attitude. With the advance of scientific knowledge he gains in power over nature, and develops greater self-assurance. He is no longer content to be a victim of fate, but seeks to become master of his destiny. There is a corresponding change in his attitude. This is due to a change in the state of his knowledge but in course of time comes to be regarded as an intrinsic characteristic of the society to which he belongs.

Even man's discontent with things as they are varies with changes in the degree and extent of his power over nature. Driven by an urge for progress, he always seeks to improve on the present. When his control over the surrounding world was limited and he understood little of the secrets of nature, his discontent often expressed itself in a mood of philosophical pessimism. Hebrew prophets and Hindu sages spoke alike of the transience of life and the impermanence of earthly pomp and glory. With the progress of scientific knowledge, the same "divine discontent" found a different expression among the philosophers and scientists of Renaissance Europe. Their dissatisfaction with the existing world led to an attempt to wrest the inmost secrets from nature and mould the world nearer to the heart's desire.

This attempt to master nature released hidden energies which enabled a handful of Western Europeans to dominate the world for more than two centuries. This domination was not only in the political field, but also in all activities which we loosely describe as spiritual. Europe's adventurousness and initiative, her faith in human reason, her quest for truth and

her endeavour to alleviate suffering wherever it exists are all based upon the power given by superior knowledge. These achievements are a proud heritage for all men. If, then, in recent times there has been a revolt against European leadership, this has been on account of the tendency to make superior knowledge the basis of political domination and racial exclusiveness. It must however be pointed out that the revolt itself owes much to the work of some of the finest spirits among the European peoples.

It is thus only in recent centuries that we find a difference in outlook, temper and energy of man in Europe and elsewhere. To conclude from this that there are intrinsic differences between East and West is not justified. The eclipse of non-European countries was due to their dependence on agriculture and their lack of scientific knowledge and technical know-how. The spread of scientific knowledge is however tending to obliterate these and other disparities. Regions which were isolated, and developed along different lines, have now been brought close to one another in space and time. Such proximity brings with it the risk of conflict, if not disaster, unless gross inequalities between individuals and societies are removed by the establishment of a common outlook and common standards.

The physical conditions for such a development have been established. In the past, man's knowledge of the world was limited and attempts at establishment of unity were also limited in nature and scope. This was generally between adjoining regions and confined to the elite who found a basis of co-operation in common intellectual and spiritual interests. Today the co-operation must be among all men in all regions. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the known world and the geographic world were co-extensive. The conquests of science made men in distant regions one another's neighbours. Political and economic relations have thus been established between peoples who have no consciousness of common ties. Science has at the same time placed in their hands a power that is capable of destroying the world if not wisely used. Increasing power with growing unification of the world makes man's action and its repercussions literally global. Unity to be effective must therefore also be global. The modern world must prosper or perish as one unit.

Technologically, industrially and economically, the world has been unified through the achievements of science. Psychologically, emotionally and politically man has not however yet attained unity. Intellectually, he recognizes that he cannot harm others without harming himself and that when he does good to others he does himself good. Intellectual recognition has not however been accompanied by a comparable change in his conduct. He still fights his fellows in the name of human reason and the social good.

This paradox is due to the fact that his knowledge of the world outside is not matched by his knowledge of the inner self. Passions sweep over him that he cannot understand. When in company with his fellows, he often behaves in a way unimaginable to himself when acting alone. The mass hysteria which sweeps over him reveals in his nature a potentiality for evil of which he was quite unaware before the event. Never has the realization been so poignant that there are unplumbed depths in human nature that man can ignore only at his peril.

The nineteenth century was the age of militant rationalism. The triumphs of science led men to believe that the education of the intellect would lead to a change of the heart and allow all men to meet on a common level of rationality. That hope has not been realized. This has induced in some a curious sense of helplessness and an attitude of fatalism reminiscent of days when man had no control over the forces of nature. Increasing knowledge of external nature helped man to overcome his primitive fatalism. It may be that increasing knowledge of man's inner nature will help him to conquer the fatalism of the modern age.

IV

Education seeks to give the individual knowledge of himself, his fellows and his environment. Knowledge of the inner as well as the outer world is thus a function of education. Since man cannot live by himself, the aim of all systems of education, whether of East or West, is to help individuals become better members of their community. Systems of education have therefore varied with differences in social organization and have placed a greater emphasis on one or other element in human nature.

Differences that are at first only in emphasis lead in course of time to the neglect of some vital element in man's nature. To take one example. In ancient India, education sought to achieve the four-fold goals of *Karma*, *Artha*, *Dharma* and *Moksha*. So long as Indian society was healthy and vital, all the four aims had their due importance. As the nation's vigour declined, there was a shift in emphasis, and gradually an ascetic spirit became dominant in society. It sought to glorify the spirit at the expense of achievements on the worldly plane. As the social outlook changed, the character of Indian education also changed. The emphasis shifted from an active to a contemplative life. Conformity to traditions and reverence for authority were regarded as higher values than intellectual curiosity and independence of outlook. Submissiveness and contentment were dignified as spiritual values forgetful of the fact that they are sometimes indistinguishable from passivity and quiescence. One curious result of this so-called spirituality is seen in a tendency to withdraw within oneself and shun all manifestations of external activity. As a result, Indian education tended to glorify exercise of the intellect—perhaps not even of the intellect but of the memory—at the cost of the other human faculties. Emphasis on the mental induced an attitude of indifference to, if not contempt for, all manual work.

The experience of Europe offers a contrary example of how undue stress on one element leads to a distorted view of education. Plato believed that education should lead to a harmonious development of mind and body and placed equal emphasis on mathematics, music and gymnastics as educative media. This ideal was never consciously challenged, but in course of time the emphasis shifted to the development of the intellect. The astonishing triumphs of science since the beginning of the Renaissance encouraged Europe to apply the methods of scientific enquiry to the problems of human personality, without enquiring whether such methods are always applicable. The essence of the scientific method is its indifference to the particular instance. The essence of personality is that each individual is a distinct centre of self-consciousness.

A theory of education formulated under the influence of science tended to treat the individual as an instance of a law or a unit of a standard series. Human society was regarded as a conglomeration of such units. Social relations were explained

on the analogy of physics. It was even thought that individuals and their contractual relations corresponded to atoms and their gravitational relations. From this it was deduced that competition was the principle governing social progress. It was held that if each individual pursued his own ends, the ends of society would be served automatically. Social good was regarded as the resultant of the pursuit of enlightened self-interest by the individual.

While the aim of science is to establish universal laws, these are thought to be based on the facts of concrete experience. Education in Europe was influenced by both the rationalist impulse and the practical bias of science. The rationalist impulse expressed itself in an emphasis on abstract apprehension. The practical bias is seen in the constant effort to improve the material conditions of life. This humanitarian element in the European concept of education was reinforced by the growth of the biological sciences. As a result of these developments, theories of social contract were gradually replaced by the concept of society as an organism.

The recognition of the organic character of society did not however have an immediate influence upon the principles or methods of education. Even today we do not fully recognize that co-operation has been as potent a factor as competition in man's survival. An organic conception of society has led to a change in our concept of the individual and has helped us to appreciate his infinite complexity. It is therefore increasingly recognized that education which aims at the development of personality must allow for the unfolding not only of his intellect but also of his feelings and imagination.

V

We therefore need a reorganization of education which will cater to the needs of *homo sapiens* as well as *homo faber*. This does not mean that educational methods and standards must be the same for all. It only means that they must be comparable. The application of science and technology to the field of production has proved that the prosperity of nations depends upon the state of their knowledge. It has at the same time created conditions in which the good things of life can be made available to all. Mechanical devices can remove much of the

drudgery of life. The world can today look forward to an economy of plenty in place of the economy of want which has ruled till now. Among individuals, the rich and the poor do not make good friends. This is equally true of nations. Comparable prosperity of different nations is therefore a condition of international understanding and the key to such prosperity lies in comparable educational standards.

The condensation of the world as a result of advance in technology thus demands a greater approximation in the ideals and methods of education. Such approximation must not however be at the cost of suppressing individual variations and needs. Within national systems of education, we have realized the need to provide more diversified courses to suit the tastes and aptitudes of individual pupils. It is equally necessary to provide for diversity among different national systems. While scientific progress tends to reduce economic and political differences among peoples, it encourages greater diversity in the cultural field by releasing energies from the bare struggle for existence. The greater the margin above want, the more varied are man's tastes and interests. Scientific progress does not therefore connote standardization of culture and still less cultural imperialism. All that we need, and ought to strive for, is to ensure that the values achieved by man in the course of his long history are available to all.

The lessons of history impress upon us that to be fully effective, education must be for the whole man. It must offer scope for the development, simultaneously and in proper balance, of his body and mind, of his intellect and his imagination. This is what educational reformers have been trying to do for the last 100 years or more. Many Western educationists have pointed out the importance of activity as an element in training the very young. Theories which identified education with the imparting of information have been and are yielding place to the idea of education as an active drawing out of the best in the individual. About 50 years ago, Tagore said that true education must allow the child freedom to develop in close association with nature. Gandhi sought to give to the activity of the child a socially useful end. All these experiments, Eastern and Western, stress that education should not be regarded as a mere intellectual discipline, but a discipline of the whole man.

In the past, education has sometimes ignored the relation of the individual to society. This made education abstract and comparatively unreal. It also failed to evoke the interest of the young. A concrete situation is more easily grasped by a child and helps to bring out his qualities of feeling, imagination and thought. When dealing with abstract entities, the child often falls back on his power of memorizing. That is why the new educational experiments in the West, and those of Tagore and Gandhi in India, lay such emphasis upon activity. Learning by doing arouses the child's interest and also makes him realize the consequence of what he does.

Society must, from its nature, be served by different individuals with different abilities and different functions. Emphasis on the social character of education (a) helps to develop a spirit of co-operation; (b) leads to the recognition that differences in function cannot be equated with differences in value and importance, and (c) softens the rigid distinction between intellectual and manual discipline. Technical education was once regarded as a craft, or at most an acquisition of skill in a particular trade or industry. Today, technical education is being recognized as education in the fullest sense of the term, provided the social significance of the craft is kept in view. In a country like India, this new conception of education is bringing a new recognition of the dignity of labour.

New education must also emphasize, as perhaps never before, the intimate inter-relation of individual societies to the larger society of mankind. Never before have nations been brought so close to one another. Today whatever happens in any part of the globe immediately affects all. A nation can ignore what happens outside its borders only at its peril. Gone are the days when a society or nation could withdraw within its own frontiers and pursue with greater or less success the course of its own development. Education throughout the world must therefore pay increasing importance to international affairs.

Men and women of one country must seek to know and understand the problems of their fellows in other countries. The first step towards this is the removal of misconceptions. One source of misconception is the concept of race. Anthropology tells us that there are no innate differences between races and many anthropologists regard the very concept of race as

a myth. All anthropologists however agree that differences that have evolved over long stretches of time in response to different requirements in the situation have led to the emergence of distinct ethnic groups. Two things follow from this. So-called racial differences are not absolute or immutable and can and do change in course of time. On the other hand, any attempt to deny or suppress them abruptly is fraught with grave risks.

Another source of misunderstanding is defective teaching of history and geography. Till now they have generally been taught from a narrow, national point of view. History has often meant a glorification of one's own country. Geography has tended to regard one's own country as the centre of the world. This has often been accompanied by a corresponding underestimate of other peoples or lands. If we are to avoid the danger implicit in such practice, we must revise our conception of history and geography. History must no longer mean a mere knowledge of the political relations of different peoples, which are in any case full of the record of conflict and struggle. We must now recognize that more fundamental than the tale of wars is the story of the long and far-flung co-operation by which man has attained his present state. No one knows who discovered fire but its use is one of the basic facts of human life. The names of the men who discovered paper and printing are unknown but the results of their discoveries belong to the common inheritance of man. We have no knowledge of the individual or the people who first discovered the art of agriculture or of navigation or of transport. But who can deny that these discoveries have made a far greater difference to the quality of human life than the most far-flung conquests of the most famous kings?

In one of his most exquisite stories, Anatole France tells us how Pontius Pilate dwelt on many cherished memories of his governorship of Judea but could not remember the name of Jesus, an insignificant visionary who had been crucified to appease the orthodox Jews! This is perhaps an extreme case, but can we deny that we have generally failed to give proper value to the achievements of peace? There are thousands of instances where a discovery—by accident or design—by some individual or group has led to a permanent enrichment of the human heritage and yet found no mention in the annals of

man. Once an insight has been achieved, it becomes in course of time the possession of all minds. Once a technique has been discovered, it improves the quality and volume of production throughout the world. Such achievements and discoveries constitute the real story of man's co-operation with his fellows and must form the basic material of history.

Our knowledge of the nature of man is still inadequate but we have repeatedly seen how ideas influence men and shape the course of history. The problem of education in the modern world is to develop in men attitudes which will lead them to work for the common good. They will not, perhaps cannot, do so unless they are at peace within themselves. There can be no integrated society without integrated individuals and no peace for the world without integrated societies. Individual and social integration depends upon the formulation of common ideals. It is only through education that these ideals can become a part of the mental make-up of all men.

Even in a well-knit and homogeneous community, individuals differ from one another widely. Such differences do not however lead to conflict as there are certain assumptions which are common to all members of that group. Societies must evolve a similar basis of common ideals. They can be indicated only in very general terms, but must among others include the following values: (a) Physical well-being for all; (b) economic sufficiency guaranteeing the conditions of survival to all; (c) freedom from domination in economic, political, social or cultural matters; and (d) the freedom of each individual or group to develop to its full capacity without infringing upon the rights of others.

Since human attitudes and aptitudes are not immutable and fixed, they can be changed through a proper educative process. Education can therefore create the conditions for, and serve as the medium of, co-operation between the prevalent cultures of the world. In addition, education must in the modern world serve as an agent for bringing about progress without violence. There is no society which is not in a state of continual change. External events and internal processes are continually transforming the character and composition of individuals as well as societies. The vitality of an individual or a society can best be measured by its capacity to respond to external and internal stimuli. To live is to change. Too abrupt

a change can however lead to disruption of unity. In such cases, individuals and societies not only change, but disintegrate.

It is the function of education to develop an attitude which will facilitate progress without violent upheavals or abrupt breaks. In the past, man's inheritance was often limited to the achievements of his own forebears. Today, the unification of the world has made him the inheritor of all that has happened to man in every age and clime. He is able today to survey the rise and fall of societies through centuries, and learn from history that willing acceptance of change is a condition, not only of progress, but of survival. Education in the modern world must therefore foster in man a spirit of toleration and resilience: toleration which seeks to integrate all values achieved by all civilizations into one common heritage for man, and resilience which enables him to meet the challenge of each new situation with a new and creative response.

The Friction and Fusion of Domestic and Foreign Ideas in the Formation of Japanese Culture

by

YENSHO KANAKURA

IF we look upon the history of Japanese culture lasting for more than 10 centuries, we can clearly perceive that its remarkable development has always been due to the strong stimulus given by the introduction of foreign cultures. But this development of Japanese culture has by no means trodden a smooth path without vicissitude. Every imported foreign idea has conflicted with the Japanese temperament. When two of these opposing forces have attained a certain balance, there has grown a new basic idea of culture. And yet again, this newly-born culture has been shaken by another imported culture, and a higher synthesis has been once more required. This repetition of strife and reconciliation is the fundamental characteristic of the formation of Japanese culture and this, too, is one of the difficult problems now facing Japan.

Taking the motive of its development in the acceptance and digestion of foreign cultures, Japanese culture differs from those of India and China, although it belongs to the same sphere of the Orient. India and China had their own civilizations highly developed in ancient times and exerted a broad influence upon other races. They took too great a pride in their own cultures to accept open-heartedly any heterogeneous one. Even when these countries were obliged to set themselves under the political control of other races, the culture of the conqueror was finally assimilated to that of the conquered.

In Japan the situation is quite different. As you will see more fully in the following pages, ancient Japan had no highly developed culture but a primitive one, nurtured by the imported Chinese and Indian cultures. In spite of its changes and vicissitudes, it has generally accepted and digested other systems and cultures, Oriental and Occidental, whenever they were introduced into Japan.

Thus from ancient times the Japanese have taken in various cultures of the East and the West successively, and among them, those of India and China at least have been almost completely digested, their extracted essences being adapted to the Japanese national character. In other words, those two cultures, metamorphosed, became the creative element of Japanese culture.

At this critical juncture when the fusion and intermixture of the East and the West is a great problem, and there is a strong demand throughout all the nations on earth for harmony between, or reconciliation of, the two opposing worlds, does it not suggest to other nations a partial solution to the problem that they reflect upon this process of the assimilation and development of foreign cultures in Japan? Granted that the current problem cannot be discussed in the same light as culture, perhaps a brief review of the development of Japanese culture might constitute an experimental test-tube report on some urgent present-day problems.

Primitive religion in Japan was based on nature-worship and ancestor-worship, with a tendency towards animism and a strong tint of Shamanism. At its earliest stage religion was not distinguished from administration. Later, a simple myth making the imperial household as its head family of the race was formed, while the political unity of the country was in the process of being built up with the emperor as its centre.

In the latter half of the third century, Chinese culture was introduced into Japan through Korea, in the form of Confucianism and Buddhism. With the introduction of Confucianism people began to pursue knowledge and to learn letters for the first time, and they awoke to a sense of ethical norm.

The introduction of Buddhism through Korea came a little later than that of Confucianism, but it was diffused among the court and nobles in a very short time. This was the underlying cause of the rise of two powerful sects which waged a bloody struggle for supremacy—one the progressive pro-Buddhist and the other the conservative anti-Buddhist. Finally, progressivism won, and a brilliant flourish of culture resulted led by the famous Shôtoku Taishi (Crown Prince Shôtoku).

With the importation of Buddhism the Japanese for the first time acquired religion in the true sense of the word; their ancient religion, Shintoism, could not be said to be such, since

it had no creed and did not preach a future life. The highest forms of art were brought in from China together with Buddhism. The so-called fine arts of the Suiko dynasty deserve our appreciation even today. Thus, the Japanese people came to know an ideal world beyond reality—a world of beauty above the practical one. Shôtoku Taishi (A.D. 574-621) annotated the Sûtras of Mahâyâna, thus giving a guide to the future of Japanese Buddhism, and enacted the 17-article Constitution, with peace as his political ideal. He was the first and greatest statesman Japan has ever produced, as a patron of culture.

Some 90 years after the coming of Buddhism, a great political reform took place. Its leaders were the students of Confucianism and the conservative followers of Shintoism. As worshippers of Chinese civilization, they strove for national centralization along the lines of the institutions of T'ang. Many students were sent to T'ang to study and bring back with them various kinds of learning, which resulted in a magnificent efflorescence of culture in the Nara dynasty (A.D. 708-780). At this time Buddhism became almost a state religion, the creeds of Hînayâna and Mahâyâna being studied separately. Great temples were erected with many wall-paintings, sculptures, etc., and the influence of these original designs can be traced today in the remote areas of Central Asia, Persia, Greece, and Rome. In literature the "Mannyôshû", an anthology of poems and songs peculiar to Japan, was compiled, displaying a sublime and unsophisticated national spirit.

At the beginning of the next period, Heian dynasty (A.D. 794-1191), two priests Saichô and Kûkai went over to T'ang. On returning to Japan they founded two sects of Buddhism, Tendai and Shingon, respectively. Saichô's Tendai sect was a new synthesis of the systems of four Buddhist sects in China, based on his own experiences. Kûkai made esoteric Buddhism the first independent sect, interpreting the universe itself as the *dharma-kâya* of the Mahāvairocana, and teaching the theory that our body can immediately realize the *dharma-kâya* of the Vairocana. These two sects, unlike the academic Buddhism of the Nara dynasty, contributed directly to the progress of Japanese culture, in that they had secular tendencies and social merits. In this period also Kana-letters were invented and widely used. The *Tales of Genji*, a literary

masterpiece, in which are interwoven the pessimistic views of life based on Buddhism, were the product of this period. Generally speaking, the main characteristic of the current view of the world was aesthetic eudemonism and naturalism affirmative of this life; pantheistic Buddhism also played a part in affirming such realism through the medium of magnificent Buddhist rituals composed of incantations and prayers.

However, the aristocratic culture of the Heian dynasty which attained the very height of prosperity revealed signs of gradual corruption. Insurrections and rebellions followed successively; social insecurity and unrest increased. Consequently, pessimistic ideas denying this world gradually became popular. Thus we come to the Kamakura era.

In the Kamakura era (A.D. 1192-1333), under military government, the rise of Bushido or chivalry and the establishment of the new Buddhism were the most notable developments from the point of view of cultural history. Bushido, or the customs naturally formed and exercised among the samurais—a newly-risen class and the bearers of culture in this period—attached special value to loyalty, self-denial, and temperance. Characteristically it attached great importance to steadfastness of mind and strong will, despising every enjoyment. Bushido was primarily a doctrine based on practical experiences, but as it absorbed Confucianism and Buddhism, particularly the culture of the *Zen* cult, it became purer.

The new Buddhism which followed was merely a reformation resulting from the secular degradation of the old Buddhism and from social insecurity. Although they have always inherited the tradition of Buddhism in India and China, these new Buddhist sects, based on the religious experiences of each Japanese founder, are quite different in their character from the older ones. This new religion might be called the true Japanese Buddhism, for at this period great Buddhist priests—Hônen, Shinran, Eisai, Dôgen, Nichiren, etc.—appeared one after another, and taught new doctrines. Contrary to the former Buddhism which had centred around the nobles, their goal was to reach the common people, and they all gave importance to precise practices, rejecting complicated doctrines.

Eisai and Dôgen went to Sung to study, and introduced the *Zen* sect to Japan. In particular, Dôgen (A.D. 1200-1253) produced great books founded on his own keen experiences

and profound thinking. Even today he is highly esteemed as a great philosopher. The *Zen* sect, not depending upon any Buddhist scriptures, teaches that one must return to one's heart, to behold the Buddha-nature within oneself, and exert oneself to realize it. Its main characteristic consists in an earnest *dhyāna*—meditation. At this time not only did many Japanese priests visit China for study, but a great number of Chinese *Zen* priests came to Japan to introduce several *Zen* cults and set up various institutions.

Hōnen and Shinran were master and pupil. Both of them preached the teaching of the *Jōdo* sect that, through intent faith in Amitābha Buddha, one could be reborn in the Buddhist elysium. Shinran (A.D. 1173-1262) intensified his master's teaching and concentrated all Buddhist precepts in the sole penance of praying to Amitābha-Buddha. His profound consciousness of guilt, and his pure, undefiled belief in Buddha's mercifulness had great influence upon many people.

The invasion of Yüan in the Kamakura era, encouraged the national consciousness of the people so greatly that it was reflected in a new trend of Shintoism as well as in the writings of Nichiren. And this national consciousness, influenced by the new Confucianism of the Sung era, was expressed even more strongly in the Yoshino era (A.D. 1333-1392).

When we come to the next period, the Muromachi era (A.D. 1392-1568) we notice a new growth of literary accomplishments which are represented by the no-plays, the *kyōgen*, and the tea-cult. In their background lie Shintoism, Bushido, and Buddhism. The art of tea-making, in particular, combined with the spirit of the *Zen* sect, symbolizes the culture of this period, displaying its quiet, plain taste.

In the meantime, powerful clans in various parts of the country became influential as the central political power declined, and a renewal of national solidarity was urged. Some of the powerful local clans associated directly with the Portuguese, through whom they came into contact with Western culture, and even tried to send their envoys to Europe. It was at about this time (A.D. 1549) that St. Francis Xavier introduced the Roman Catholic Church into Japan. The Catholic belief spread throughout the country like wild fire, but it was only a temporary phenomenon. Soon national unity was

achieved by the Oda and Toyotomi families, who were succeeded by the Tokugawa family.

The 250 years of the Tokugawa era (A.D. 1603-1866) was in general a period of seclusionism, varying in degree. It was an era in which medieval feudalism was centrally established. Confucianism was most esteemed in learned circles and the Christian faith was banned. At the same time, the study of Japanese classics grew gradually, and achieved a system of its own, accompanied by a trend towards anti-Buddhist agitation. On the other hand, Buddhism, taking advantage of the current peace, penetrated the mind of the common people more deeply. Benevolence and gratitude became the cardinal ideas of the practical morals of the time. However, the study of Japanese history and Shintoism encouraged the idea of restoration, and the rejection of the Shogunate government which gave impetus to the nation-wide cry for direct Imperial rule. When the demands of Western countries to open the country for foreign trade became urgent, the Tokugawa Shogunate could no longer cling to seclusionism and finally collapsed, yielding to the new era of Meiji.

While seclusionism or the national isolation policy of the Tokugawa government surely hindered Japan's progress, nevertheless it gave the nation a chance to readjust, reflect upon, and mature its time-honoured culture. The unique riches of its fine arts, industrial arts, and literature in that period bear witness to this fact. For example, we might mention Ukiyoé as a typical representative of the pure Japanese arts produced during the era.

Finally, we might consider the period starting from the Meiji era (A.D. 1869) as the present age. It was a great shock for the Japanese, long accustomed to feudalism, to take up direct and frequent intercourse with modern European countries, the Meiji Restoration being a turning-point. Yet it is owing partly to its geographical position and partly to a precious sense of nationalism and a genius for adapting foreign institutions, that Japan has been able to maintain her independence, unlike India and China which have succumbed to exploitation by strong Western colonial powers. Thus by following the example of Western art, science, and administration, Japan multiplied its national resources in a short time and rose suddenly as a strong power in the world. Nevertheless

it is very doubtful if we, with our long-cultivated Oriental mode of thinking, could fully appreciate the European rational spirit. Had the Japanese understood this spirit perfectly, they surely would not have been involved in the reckless World War II and would have been spared the consequent misery of defeat. Here lies an important subject of introspection for the post-war Japanese and a valuable hint for their future orientation.

In present-day Japan, in addition to ancient Oriental ideas and religions, we have Greek philosophy, German philosophy, American pragmatism, French literature, and so on: Christianity alongside Marxism. It is not an exaggeration to say that every idea in the world is whirling around us. Moreover, there have arisen a great many new religions in post-war Japan. The most important problem imposed upon Japanese thinkers is how to adjust and embrace these thoughts so that an entirely new outlook on the world can be arrived at. Dr. Kitaro Nishida (A.D. 1864-1945), a learned student of Oriental and Occidental ideas, set up his own system of philosophy, which, however, cannot necessarily be considered as a leading influence in post-war Japan. It remains for a wholesome new culture to be born from the throes before Japan can make its contribution to the welfare of mankind.

This is but a very rough summary of the inter-relation of Oriental and Occidental ideas which have served as a background to the formation of Japanese culture. It demonstrates, at least, that before heterogeneous thoughts and traditions can be reconciled, a very close contact and a considerable lapse of time are necessary. The Japanese are primarily flexible of mind, keen of intuition, and very tolerant. Therefore, they have absorbed various ideas and thoughts, and digested them well; but in doing so they have spent many years. Of course, I do not mean to say that they have disregarded their natural progress. On the contrary, there has been a strong underlying desire to improve their national culture, by keeping old ideas in harmony with new ones and by uniting them. And this respect for harmony is one of the Japanese characteristics from ancient times. Moreover, this, backed by the philosophy of Buddhism which teaches the universal equality of men, has become an ideal of the Japanese. In truth, we have seldom

ousted any foreigners or foreign cultures as a whole because of racial prejudice, though it cannot be denied that a few instances of this occurred, which proved to be against the ideal of peace in the ups and downs of Japanese history. The part Japan played in the last World War is one of the greatest blunders she has ever committed. However, a close study of Japanese history shows that it was only a rare and temporary digression from the characteristics and ideals peculiar to the Japanese.

I believe that real world peace can be attained only by mutual respect for each nation's independence. There can be no lasting peace where one race or nation, on premises of racial superiority or inferiority, justifies its own acts, but not those of another. True conciliation can be realized only in a world where there is no discrimination, except between good and evil. Any outlook on the world, which consists in regarding oneself as standing against the other, always brings the latter under the former's rule, and a distinction arises between the judge and the judged. In such a world no complete principle of equality can exist. In spite of the fact that many years have elapsed since the liberty and equality of men were first advocated throughout the world and in spite of the fact that it has become a hackneyed motto of modern politicians, is it not because of such an underlying sense of discrimination conceiving the self as versus others, that even today there are cases of the restraint of liberty and the unequal treatment of men everywhere? Liberty and equality can never be realized merely by an outcry for them. We maintain that the new humanism should be established on the view of mankind which postulates that all human beings are equal.

National and International Values

by

IBRAHIM MADKOUR

THAT East and West exist is self-evident; and the differences of geography and climate between the two halves of the world are obvious to all. But are we to assume that there are psychological and mental differences as well? That is an assumption sometimes made, as when distinguishing between the analytic or Semitic mind on the one hand, and the synthetic or Aryan mind on the other. Renan also spoke of the monotheist instinct characteristic of the Semites; and some people even go so far as to attribute different hereditary psychologies to the various different races, asserting, for instance, that the yellow races live in the past, the black races in the present, and the white races in the future. Theories such as these, it seems to me, are superficial and extremely risky.

Despite all the conflicts and dissensions which, down the ages, have admittedly divided East and West in the political and economic field, cultural exchanges have always been maintained. I do not wish to go right back to ancient times, and speak of the intellectual contacts between the ancient Egyptians and the Persians, the Greeks and the Romans; nor shall I refer to the age-old role played by the Mediterranean in serving as a bridge between the cultures of East and West. But I would point out one thing—that Christianity, however Western it may appear, was in fact born in the East.

I should like to dwell for a while, nevertheless, on Moslem civilization. It is a great mistake to think of this civilization as the product of the Arab peninsula alone. On the contrary, the Moslem world was subjected to a wide variety of influences: Manichaeism, Mazdeism and Sabeism were all expounded and discussed in Moslem countries. Persia bequeathed to the Arabs many of her political and administrative institutions;

nor must we forget the influence of India, which is very evident in Moslem culture and traditions.

For their part, the Arabs borrowed, likewise, from Greek civilization. They were acquainted with most of the works of the great philosophers and scholars of ancient Greece, from Plato to Plotinus, Hippocrates to Galen, and Euclid to Archimides, which they translated into their own language; though Renan was doubtless exaggerating when he remarked, some 100 years ago, that "all the Arabs did was to adopt the whole of the Greek encyclopaedia". The fact is that Moslem civilization is a meeting-ground for the ideas of both East and West.

On the other hand, Moslem civilization, in the Middle Ages, exercised a great influence on the Western world. From the twelfth century onwards, we find Europeans translating into Latin, directly or indirectly, Arab works on theology, philosophy, medicine, mathematics and astronomy. These translations played an important part in Christian scholasticism, prepared the ground for the Renaissance, and contributed to the development of modern philosophy and science.

A few examples will suffice to illustrate this point:

Saint Thomas, as is known, criticized certain Arab doctrines as though they were those of his contemporaries, so much so that people even spoke of Latin Avicennism and Latin Averrhoism; and Arab medicine, particularly the theories of Razi and Avicenna, was taught in the schools of Venice and Padua up to the sixteenth century. Ibn Sina expounded the theory of the earth being round long before Copernicus and Galileo, and refuted the "science" of alchemy and the doctrine of the transmutation of metals long before Lavoisier. These and other Arab ideas filtered through to the West. And, finally, certain rules relating to observation and experimentation, rules on which modern science is based, came to the Latin from the Arab world.

It is thus clear that though, geographically and politically speaking, there was a sharp distinction between East and West, this in no wise prevented the exchange of intellectual ideas, in ancient and medieval times, between human beings of whatever creed or country.

The Modern Age has witnessed the continuation of these exchanges, which have developed still further owing to the

tightening of the links between East and West. Need I point out that every person round this table has, in his make-up, something that partakes of both East and West? The time has, I think, come, particularly in view of what aviation and the radio have achieved, when we can indeed speak of one world.

Another distinction must, however, be made—the distinction between what might be called national and international values. In every age, each nation or community has had its own set of dogmas, laws and traditions—in other words, its own code of moral and material values. Even today, chauvinistic nationalism sometimes pushes national characteristics and peculiarities to extremes; but even so, it may be said that national values are coming more and more to be coloured by the common heritage of human civilization as a whole—by what I would call “international values”.

It is these latter values that must be stressed. They are the creation of no single people, nor of a single country. Who, for instance, would maintain that freedom or tolerance were ideas invented by any one nation? On the contrary, they are the outcome of a world-wide process that has continued in time and space throughout the ages. And it is our duty to further and develop this process, for it is in it that our true wealth and strength lie.

These international values must be taught to every citizen of the world and imprinted on his mind. They must be the basis of any ideal education. It is not enough to know them; they must be firmly believed and religiously respected. It is for the leaders and the great thinkers to shoulder the heavy task that this involves.

Today, these international or, rightly speaking, human values are not always accorded the respect they deserve. They sometimes remain a dead letter, and are often treated not as ends, but as means. Many conflicts, and much human suffering would be avoided if they were professed sincerely. If we wish ever to attain world peace and tranquillity, they must reign side by side with national dogmas in the minds of the younger and coming generations.

Before such values can be genuinely accepted, however, they must be defined in full and generally agreed upon. This is admittedly no easy task; but Unesco, which speaks for man, will, if it succeeds in this, have a fine achievement to its credit.

The Buddhist Point of View

by

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WE stand at one of the great turning points of human history, oppressed with problems, irresolute and uncertain of our way. None of the riddles which face us, demanding answers, is more urgent than that of preventing the ruinous recurrence of war. The fate of the world trembles in the balance. Mankind has yet to decide whether there will be a future war, more disastrous than anything we have had so far, or whether war will be ostracized for ever. There seems to be no other solution.

All around us are conflicting national interests, racial prejudices, rapacious greed, class- and group-animosities, conflicting creeds and ideologies, struggling in a mad scramble for priority and advantage. A sense of futility, even despair, seems to overshadow man's endeavours in the search for happiness and peace. We seem to have plunged from the nightmare of war into the even worse nightmare of peace. Meanwhile, our destiny is being determined by so-called statesmen, trained more in manipulation and cold sagacity than in insight and imagination. They pay lip service to justice and democracy, while manoeuvring for positions of advantage and superiority for themselves and those whom they seemingly represent. Behind their smooth façade of words, there goes on all the time bitter haggling, accentuated by bland international blackmail and power threats, euphemistically called diplomacy. The simple, common cause of humanity is forgotten. Almost forgotten also seems the grisly reality of war, with its senseless slaughter, savagery and the imponderable losses of economic destruction.

Such is the basic problem that has to be recognized. Is the world to have war—cold war is as bad, if not, perhaps, worse than hot war—or shall mankind enjoy peace, which is the

common need of distraught humanity? For without peace there can never be happiness, and happiness is the goal of all human endeavour. But what do we mean by happiness? Looking down the ages and at what is happening around us, it is clear that men's ideas of happiness differ; they evidently depend upon the kind of philosophy, the sense of values, which influence them. Not that all men are philosophers, but we all have our attitudes to life and that, broadly speaking, is philosophy.

It is his philosophy that gives to man a feeling of stability and of confidence. It furnishes him with a purpose for his life. To be really useful, it must also furnish him with a way of life, not merely theories about life. The way must mean more than just mere living, an occupation, a profession, or a job. These are just modes of life, not life itself. The way of life must be such that it can actually be lived, experimented with, experienced. A practical philosophy must, in addition, provide the man who accepts it with convincing reasons as to why he should follow a particular way of life in preference to others. Besides these conditions, it must either actually give him the answers to the questions which inevitably arise in his mind about life and the world around him, or, at least, point out the means whereby the answers can be discovered.

In the case of most men, their religion purports to provide them with such a philosophy. True religion, like true philosophy, is a practical thing. It recognizes, for instance, that such affairs as the building of roads and houses, growing food and changing external circumstances, are not the only practical things; that it is equally practical to change one's own inner behaviour, to discipline oneself in family life and social relations, to steer one's desires from material to spiritual goods, to develop the mind so that it can become a far more potent force than the body.

Religion is thus a way of life, but life cannot be lived without reference to the facts of life, and the facts of the world in which we live and have our being, the world of physical and mental things. A doing, a behaving, an attitude, must be in relation to a given state of affairs, here and now; and where an ideal is contemplated, such ideal must be capable of being translated into a plain fact. Man should be, and is, one of the facts of the most primary importance in any religion or philosophy,

and in as much as religions and philosophies differ from one another, it is inevitable that they should differ in their concept of man as well.

Now, the ideal concept is one which is shared alike by all who are concerned. It must possess a syntactic community of meaning whereby people using it can employ it in regard to problems that concern all of them and reach results which are coercive to each. Is it possible to discover such community of meaning in the different philosophies of the East and the West regarding the concept of man?

It must be remembered at the outset that, in their attempts to arrive at ultimate truth, East and West, generally speaking, do not adopt the same methods. The West relies mainly on the deductive and inductive methods of logical reasoning, the principles of non-contradiction and empirical verifiability. The East, on the other hand, gives the crucial role not to logical method but to a supra-rational intuition, consisting of subjectively variable mental processes not recognized or trusted by the West. Both, it is true, employ the analytical method, but in widely varying degrees and not necessarily for the same purposes. There is, thus, a big gulf between the two kinds of system, which at first sight seems almost unbridgeable with regard to fundamental facts. But much can be achieved to bring them together. Here, as elsewhere, free and equalitarian co-operation will succeed in establishing a harmonizing synthesis which, however, in the nature of things, will be an orchestral rather than a single instrument harmony.

What can Buddhism contribute to such a synthesis? What is the concept of man as found in the Buddha's teaching?

It is inextricably bound up with the Buddhist concept of the world. Buddhism studies nature; the principles governing the make-up and course of specific, concrete facts. It has its own cosmology, and philosophy of nature, although these are not its main concern. It is concerned with this world as a given fact, with its manifold of things and relations. But it does not stop there. It wants to get a picture of reality, if only in order to see the ultimates beyond or deep within the world. It does not seek knowledge for its own sake but for the attainment of the Good. The Good is not to be found in particular events of nature's course, in the moment-to-moment happenings of life. Nor is it to be found by reorganizing the world with all its

complexity, in remoulding human society or in reforming the State. The Good is to be attained by the realization of ultimate truth, by the understanding of "things as they are".

When such understanding comes, says the Buddha, we shall see the world as a scene of misery, not because the things of the world are intrinsically bad, but because of our wrong attitudes towards them. The cause of misery is attachment, craving. Pleasure is not in itself sorrow but it leads to sorrow because it is fleeting. We want the pleasure to last, but it will not obey our behest. Recognition of this fact is not pessimism, it is wisdom. It is because we expect and desire a permanence which is not possible that we are sad when our expectation is not fulfilled. The teaching of the Buddha that there is nothing permanent in the physical or the psychical, no lasting substance or perduring ego, is a statement of fact and not a lamentation.

So also is the Buddhist teaching as regards time. There is nothing called time, in the sense of anything static. Time is but a process, a continuous process of coming-to-be and passing-away. The Buddha does not say, as some would have us believe, that everything perishes as soon as it is born. What he does say is that there is neither birth nor death but only a *becoming*, a coming-to-be, a process of change. It is not just destruction or death but also a constant renewal, a new upsurge of life all the time. To try to perpetuate the world would be merely folly, because there is nothing eternal except the present, the now, which is always now.

The fact that everything is in a state of change should fill us not with despair but with joy; it is precisely because everything changes that there is even the *possibility* of perfection and betterment. If there were no change, how could the bad ever become anything good and the imperfect become perfect? Progress, improvement and increase are possible only because of this fact of change. Change means not only destruction but also continuous construction. Becoming is synonymous with growth, but growth can be either into a better or into a worse. The perfect, in Buddhism, is not what is everlasting, but what is beyond time, a-temporal. It is not by trying to make the fleeting pleasure or joy permanent that one can get happiness. It *cannot* be made permanent, because apart from the fact that a pleasure must inevitably pall if it lasts for ever, it is not in

the nature of things to have permanence. When, however, we realize that change is inevitable, and understand the cause for it, we cease to regret the transience of things and are unaffected thereby. Sorrow consists not in the impermanence of things but in our attitude towards that fact. To say that progress requires a perduring entity is a fallacy. Identity, yes, but not perdurance. There can be identity without permanence. This is what the Buddha means when he says that a man is neither the same nor another from day to day, from moment to moment. There can be continuity of identity without a permanent entity as substratum thereto.

We cannot realize the truth about the world if all the time we are completely immersed in it. Hence the need for turning away from the world, the cultivation of detachment, in order to get a right perspective. This is not the same as running away from it, an attempt to escape, but merely a withdrawal, temporarily, till the truth about the world is understood. The saints and the mystics, the ascetics and the *Bhikkhus*, are those who have voluntarily renounced the world in order to get a clearer vision which they then invite others to share with them. Such detachment is necessary in order to secure equanimity, which is one of the requisites of happiness. Happiness is not in external things but within ourselves. It is a state of mind, the fruit of complete understanding. Equanimity is not possible, however, especially to sensitive natures, if all around one are suffering and misery. No man can be happy by himself, for himself. Hence the Buddhist ideal of the *Bodhisattva*, the being who ultimately becomes a Buddha, who will not cross the threshold of Nirvana till he can bring also others thereto.

The world is full of misery; the wise man will recognize this fact and he will do all he can to alleviate this misery himself and persuade others to do so too. The misery is partly physical and due to ignorance and wrong kinds of behaviour, behaviour influenced by motives of greed, and ill-will, the delusion that selfishness pays dividends, and that money and power can secure happiness. There is sickness in the world and discomfort, destitution, oppression, hatred and prejudice. These can and must be minimized in every possible way. The Buddha declares that good health is among the greatest of the good things, and that there must also be sufficient food. To attempt the good life on an empty stomach would be mere folly. The

needs of men regarding food and clothing, shelter and relaxation are, according to the Buddha, primary and essential needs and must be satisfied. Man has to live, before he can live spiritually; his physical body is the seat of all his endeavours, including those that relate to morality and the higher life. It must, therefore, be tended and looked after. Buddhism does not insist on the suppression of those desires and emotions which well up from the human heart, except by those who feel a special call for their sublimation. To the others, marriage and the founding of a family are considered helpful in that they make the individual less egocentric and selfish. But domestic happiness is not regarded as the goal of human life. It is only a stage in spirituality.

In the satisfaction of one's desires, as in all else, the middle way is considered the best, that which avoids extremes. Unthinking and unnecessary gratification of the body creates newer and ever greater appetites and consequent dissatisfaction. Life becomes a state of slavery as soon as we make of it a search for comfort, as soon as simple physical needs are developed so as to grow into physiological greed. Never are desires satisfied by indulgence; they flare up like the fire to which fuel is added.

A man is a member of a community of beings and without the community he cannot live. This community is not of living beings alone; the whole world is his kin, animate and inanimate alike. The bifurcation in nature between living and non-living is only apparent; what we have in the world are merely ordered systems of many magnitudes, expressions of the life-field. Buddhism recognized this fact many centuries ago and anticipated the discoveries of modern science. But it is with other human beings that man is primarily concerned and his immediate relationships are with them. Whatever the community does affects him and, conversely, whatever he does affects the community. An individual is like a wave in the ocean; ocean and wave mutually affect each other.

This conception of the individual and the community as being interdependent also means that there are mutual obligations. The community must look after the individual and provide him with a sense of security. On the other hand, the individual has certain duties to the community to which he owes his very existence. The most elementary of these duties

are expressed in what in Buddhism are known as the Five Precepts, which form the basis of man's morality. A man must hold life sacred and not harm in any way the progress of any living being. He must have regard for the sanctity of what legitimately belongs to others and thus not only refrain from deliberate theft but also from exploitation of every kind. He must exercise restraint in his desires and not be greedy in gratifying them. He must be honest and truthful in speech, avoiding harsh words and slander, malicious or false propaganda, and speech that creates discord. He must refrain from all things that rob him of his power of reason, his powers of judgment and his balance of mind.

These obligations he must honour in the interest both of himself and of others. On the positive side he must assist all enterprises that increase the happiness and well-being of humanity, by his thoughts, words and deeds. Above all he must seek enlightenment by broadening and deepening his mind, by the pursuit of truth and beauty and goodness. The practice of goodness and the appreciation of beauty are not ends in themselves. Goodness is necessary because there can be no happiness without it; it is absolutely essential for that peace of mind without which there is no real happiness. The saying that there is no peace for the wicked is quite literally true.

The individual is in debt to the community for supplying his needs and he should seek to discharge his debt by service to the community. All men are his brothers, not because they are the sons of the same heavenly Father but because they are all of the same flesh and blood as himself—the Buddhist conception of the brotherhood of man has a wider embrace than that of theistic religions. In order that he may be of service to others, the individual must make himself efficient in every possible way, developing all his skills, all his powers of body and mind and intellect, his feelings and emotions and the aesthetic side of his being. Goodness is that which promotes happiness. The definition of goodness, in Buddhism, is also that which develops "efficiency" in oneself and in others. All evil hinders such efficiency. It is not the nature of the contribution a man makes to the progress of the community, the kind of work he does, that matters chiefly, but the spirit in which he makes that contribution. It should be informed with love and devotion, selflessness and wisdom.

The world and everything and everyone in it are governed by certain laws, says the Buddha, which are inexorable. As long as men live in harmony with these laws, they will be happy. In fact, the word used in Buddhist texts for unhappiness (*dukkha*) has among its many meanings, that of "disharmony". When man attempts to "dominate" nature, or as is commonly expressed, to wrest from nature her secrets, if he thereby upsets the workings of these laws, he does so at his peril, unless he can restore the balance in some way. Among the laws that govern the world and man, the most important, according to Buddhism, is that known as the law of *Karma*. Briefly stated, it means that everything that is, is the effect of a cause and is itself the cause of another effect. *Karma* means "deed" and the "result of deed". The law applies to the realm of morality, the principle of cause and regulated course of things. There is thus nothing capricious or chaotic. As we sow, so we reap. What we are and what circumstances we find ourselves in are dependent on what we were and what we did. Similarly, what we shall be will depend on what we do now. Nothing is lost which has been earned by work, and nothing comes which is not deserved. Every action has a double effect; it brings its appropriate reward and also affects character. The reward may be reaped either here or in a hereafter, either in this life or in a later one. Nothing and nobody is exempt from the law of *Karma*, not even the God mentioned in theistic religions. It is inexorable and unfailing.

It is necessary to state that the Buddhist doctrine of *Karma* has nothing in common with fatalism or predestination, for in the Buddhist teaching *Karma* is a continuous operation. The present is the result of the past but the future will depend entirely on the present. Over past *Karma* we have no control but the future is absolutely ours, because the issue depends on ourselves. *Karma* is self-operative, no god or devil can interfere with it, except the deed itself. Events are impelled by preceding conditions, causes that man could by intelligence and good will, study and govern, suspend or intensify. If everything is the effect of a cause or causes, the happiness and misery of the world must also be the result of causes. Change the causes and we can change the effects thereof. Thus the freedom of man is proclaimed in the highest possible degree. He is not merely a partner with God in the work of creation, but the

creator himself. War and peace, poverty and wealth, are ours to decide; we ourselves are solely responsible. Progress is not inevitable but it is completely possible. We can begin the control, deliberately, now, for every moment provides our opportunity. We do not have to wait upon anyone else. Far from denying the values gained in momentary existence, Buddhism finds value in the developmental changes in existence. In order to fashion the future, the past does not need to be destroyed; indeed, it cannot be destroyed. But we can build upon it, change it, improve upon it. There is nothing to prevent it from being an incremental change, not hopeless but positively hopeful. Life has every opportunity to make of itself an outgoing spiral, positive, coercive and good.

To achieve this, purposeful thinking is necessary, thinking over all possible ways, reviewing the causes of unhappiness, and formulating the details of the upward path. Reason and logic should not be given the exclusive right of decision, though they should not be excluded. Science has its uses for a fuller and wider life but science alone, by itself, cannot make mankind perfect. Inasmuch as, according to the Buddha, ignorance is the root-cause of unhappiness, happiness is to be sought through knowledge and wisdom, and insight. Knowledge is to be acquired in every possible way, through study, through discussion and through contemplation, contemplation being the best. Such contemplation is not glassy-eyed gazing into vacant space but purposeful activity of mind where knowledge and understanding are co-ordinated. The way thereto is reflection, directed to the discovery of ultimate truth. That is the best kind of reflection, but all kinds of reflection are to be encouraged. They provide, at least, much-needed breathing space from physical activity. Now, more than ever before, is such periodical reflection necessary to those who live in this age of speed, when much else, besides time, hurtles along. It is often useful to slow down the tempo of living, even to practise occasional inaction.

Knowledge gives power but it is understanding that directs the wise use of that power. Through knowledge men can delve into the very depths of cosmic power, as they have done already, but unless god-like power is coupled with god-like understanding and insight, the power that men have obtained will recoil upon themselves to their destruction. What is

important is not to discover how men can destroy each other but how they can live together for the common good. Understanding is reached by experiment and investigation, by practical living and by constant awareness. Great emphasis is laid by the Buddha on awareness or alertness of mind. It is an essential concomitant of understanding.

The path of self-development, though often spoken of as a road, is not a progress in space and time. It is rather an ingress into our own nature, so as to comprehend it wholly. Learning, science, art and philosophy all give us some kind of insight into truth, but they are only aspects of truth. All these aspects must blend into a single harmony. This is possible, according to Buddhism, only through right understanding. Understanding is not just knowledge, for knowledge is of facts, whereas understanding is of causes and, therefore, ultimate. It is the lack of this harmony which is responsible for the disintegration that characterizes modern life, whether we think of ourselves as individuals, citizens of a country or members of the world-wide family of mankind. The causes of this disintegration are the chasms of prejudice, ignorance and fear which divide mankind into fragments. The world has already shrunk into such small proportions that no significant event can take place anywhere without the effect being felt everywhere. But men have failed to realize the import of this, and persist as though individuals and nations can find happiness through means that only promote selfishness. A wave is not just a part of the ocean; it is the very movement of the ocean and cannot be separated from it. When men realize this, conflicts will cease.

One of the ways of developing such a "world-consciousness" is the search for the basic concepts and the underlying principles from which men of various races and creeds draw their inspiration in the pursuit of the higher life. These concepts almost invariably deal with the structure of the universe, the nature of life and the goal of human endeavour. They serve as the common roots from which the various branches of the human family draw their vitality. Such a search is most likely to end in a sharing of our beliefs, and shared beliefs have a great validity in promoting friendship. Mere morality is not enough; nor should morality be restricted to the cultivation of the sterner virtues. The gentler qualities should also be practised, civilized conduct and generous behaviour, the

spirit of tolerance, of live and let live, of trying to understand the other man's point of view, of diffidence, which leads to humility. These are often overlooked and are in need of constant reinforcement.

The Buddhist doctrine of *Karma* has as its corollary the doctrine of rebirth. Man thus inherits the results of his actions in past lives. He is also, in addition, heir to the past of the human race. Thus, according to Buddhism, men are not born equal but the inequalities are individual and have no necessary relation with race or caste, creed or place of birth, or colour of skin. Every man has value and is due both to give and to receive justice, mercy and kindness. No individual or group has any right to dominate or exploit other human beings or groups, and differences of race and the like afford no justification for such domination. There is no justification, either, for dividing human beings into Orientals and Occidentals and to maintain that there are perceptible differences between them in physical ability, intellectual capacity, virtue or creative action. They react to similar emotional influences, are subject to the same diseases and show the same signs of restlessness, suspicions and psychoses. In other words, they show a common humanity. Racial segregation and discrimination are evil. There is no such thing as original sin in Buddhism; on the contrary, man's nature is declared as having been originally pure and later become polluted by evil association.

The potentialities of man are unlimited. It is a man that becomes a Buddha, an Einstein, a Mahatma Gandhi. Men must therefore be given every opportunity to develop their personalities to the fullest possible extent, for their gain is the gain of all mankind. No man is beyond redemption, no man should be shunned or treated as if he were beyond the pale of human fellowship. The light burns within everyone, however dimly, and can be fanned into flame. The Buddhist books contain the story of the brigand Angulimala who had committed 99 murders when he met the Buddha. The Buddha preached to him the way of the Good Life and Angulimala became an *Arahant*, a Perfect One. Perfection is not already present within us, but the seeds are there and will grow and blossom if the requisite effort is put forth and the conditions are favourable. It is false to say that human nature will not change, although it may not necessarily change overnight.

In Buddhism there is no place for a Saviour; men must solve their own problems without waiting on the agency of some external power. If they do not make up their minds to be good and wise, they will not be able to escape the results of their ignorance and their evil actions. There are two aspects of life, the material and the spiritual. Happiness comes only when these two are synthesized. Buddhism does not despise material welfare but it demands that the things of the flesh must not receive undue attention and that they should be brought under the subjection of the spiritual. It insists on personal discipline and the simplification of personal life so as to reconcile one's demands with the needs of all mankind. In the human family no responsible member will consume more than his share and this, too, must be reduced to a minimum. The good man, in Buddhism, is the one who is *subhara*, easy to support, without being a burden on the community.

There is no intrinsic value in poverty. Wealth is not a curse if it is kept under proper control and given no more than its due place in the scheme of things. Wealth has its value, which consists in the use made of it. If a man thinks he can buy his pleasures and reliefs indefinitely he is bound to be disillusioned. Such desire only creates an endless multiplication of appetites and wants, resulting in his unhappiness, because physical appetites are never completely satisfied. The Buddha, far from discouraging the acquisition of wealth, gives suggestions—the Buddha never lays down laws—about the proper disposal of one's income. It should be divided into four portions, he says; one should be used for personal needs, two should be invested and the fourth laid by for a rainy day. He does not say what amount should be spent in good deeds, for that would depend on the degree of one's spiritual development. Earning is not for hoarding but for spending, in the service of oneself and of others. Generosity is extolled as one of the basic virtues. The Buddhist view of property is that it should be held as a trust.

Wealth must never be earned by unrighteous means, by exploiting the misery of others, their greed or their folly. Money obtained by such methods as the sale of liquor and drugs, of animals for slaughter or captivity, by following professions which involve loss of life or limb, or the rights of others, or by the manufacture and sale of armaments, is expressly condemned. The Buddha is perfectly certain that vio-

lence can never be overcome by violence. "Hatred never ceases by hatred but by love" forms part of the bedrock of his teaching. Violence in any shape or form, on any pretext or excuse whatsoever, is unjustifiable. There can be no such thing as a "righteous war". Anyone who believes in the efficacy of violence helps to perpetuate conflict and to make war inevitable. The total abolition of war is undoubtedly a very difficult problem but Buddhists believe that it is not incapable of solution. What is needed is a spiritual revolution, a change in the human heart, and such changes can be brought about if men have sufficient faith in themselves. The example of the great emperor Asoka who, having once been a ruthless warrior, later became the gentlest of men, is a case in point. The eradication of war is a moral responsibility devolving upon every single human being. Mankind will not renounce violence as a whole until we have renounced it within ourselves as individuals. We cannot shift the responsibility upon others. It is we who as individuals contribute to the mass hate of the world. The militarists exist only by the sanction of the people, who are their principals. War will never bring happiness. Total disarmament must come if such be the genuine and determined wish of the majority of mankind. It must come through a world-wide spiritual renaissance. The generality of men and women now abhor war more than ever before, because, with "progress", wars have become more horrible and disastrous. War no longer possesses the glamour of chivalry. It is now conducted as a grubby and laborious business by proletarian robots most of whom are not in the fighting forces at all. We must of necessity ostracize war or make up our minds to perish entirely.

But, like everything else, war has its causes. These must be eradicated if war is to disappear. As the Buddha declares in the *Kevaddha Sutta* of the *Digha Nikaya*, men are virtually certain to rebel violently against gross oppression and intolerable suffering. No peace is possible as long as conditions of obvious social and material inequality exist. We cannot cure troubles, whose real roots are to be found not in some ostensible criminality in men but in the unresolved problems of daily existence, by the mere introduction of fine principles of law or by uttering platitudes. As long as men and nations are governed by the desire of making money and "getting on", we must

expect social inequality, greed, imperialist domination, dehumanization of life and, consequently, war. Men must learn to escape from the "brutal utilitarianism" of material things. The only solution is the cultivation of spirituality. The Buddha declares emphatically that there can be no substitute for *dhamma* or righteousness.

The name given by the Buddha for religion is also *dhamma* because, to him, religion is synonymous with righteousness. Religion is, above all, the understanding of spiritual values. It is not the name that is given to religion which is important but the search for the supreme good. That is why throughout history all the vital changes in civilization which have spelt human happiness have been linked with religious beliefs and ideals. If the chaos of present-day civilization is to be remedied, there must once more be a resuscitation of spiritual values in place of the materialist values of the stock exchange and the market-place which now dominate the human scene.

But, if religion is to be really effective in promoting our happiness, it must inform every aspect of our lives, the social and the economic, the political as well as the domestic. It must not be confined to the church and the temple, to Sundays and Sabbath days. It must envelop our being like the air we breathe. There cannot be one code of righteousness for individuals and another for the mass. One of the greater tragedies of the modern machine age has been the emergence of the anonymous mass-man, with no cultural idealism, disinclined to follow any other course than that dictated by his own obstinate self-interest. The establishment of universal media like the radio, the cinema and national newspapers, by which the mass can be influenced and controlled, has greatly aided this calamity. Religion, if it is true religion, must find some kind of meaning for mankind and the cosmic process as a whole, compatible with and related to its meaning for the private individual.

It is the responsibility of human beings to find the solution. The good way of life must be followed regardless of expediency. This is possible only if there is a metaphysical basis for moral obligation. Morality which does not spring from a cosmic motive, from the conception of a fuller life, can have no solid foundation. A man must first have self-knowledge, i.e. a conception of himself. That will depend on his conception of

reality, the nature of the world in which he lives and the principles that govern life. Good conduct is called in Buddhism *dhammata*—the acceptance of and acting in accordance with, reality, things as they are, *yathābhutā*.

Education that will fit man for the good life must provide such a convincing metaphysical basis. The attainment of happiness is the goal of mankind. But, what is happiness? The Buddhist word for supreme happiness is *Nibbāna* (Nirvāṇa). It is difficult to describe it in positive terms, because none of our concepts quite fit in. It is without attributes, but not "characterless". All that can be said about it, perhaps, is that it is complete emancipation. It cannot be attained except by one who is trained to look upon others as upon himself, to identify himself with the whole world. This supreme happiness must be attained in this world and not after death. That should at least be the aim.

In the Buddhist way of life, freedom is of the essence of happiness. It is not merely political freedom, economic security and the guarantee of social rights that are required, but freedom which is felt as a living power within and around oneself. Men cannot be free merely because they are told they are free. Freedom is very largely a matter of attitude to things, our relations with them. The ideally free man is in Buddhism the *Bhikkhu* (or monk) who "spends his days in contemplation, pondering over the mysteries of life, wandering far and wide, as the spiritual sentinel of the human race". His very striving for perfection, and his experience of it when he attains it, are a great blessing to the whole race. He has no private ambitions or desires. Pleasure and pain, poverty and wealth, success and failure, make no difference to him. When he has achieved the supreme goal, he has no need for the things of the world. He beckons all to share in the indefinite happiness which has become his, though few will follow him.

That is the ideal freedom, but meanwhile the sense of relationship that will result in freedom can best be established in the field of education. Education must fundamentally be a training in the art of living, the art of putting all things in their right order, so that our every function, interest and activity may find its appropriate place. It will make due recognition of the great differentiations existing in the world, the natural levels of higher and lower degrees of development

and achievement. It will ultimately succeed in evolving a universal culture, a culture which will make allowance for the fact that "men are ever pursuing the same truth on different landings". It will not, however, be a "mercantile culture", watered down to suit everybody. It will be a culture of unity, rather than of identification, of integration rather than of cohesion. It will take account of the qualitative achievements of man in the past and preserve all that is valuable in them. But it must have its vision in the future.

The sight that greets us when we peer down into the Gehenna of the warmongers is terrifying. But let us not lose courage. In many parts of the globe there are men and movements seeking the happiness and peace of the world, attempting to integrate the clash of bias and interest. Perhaps, nay probably, religion will provide the surest basis for such integration, for the word itself means "binding together". A new age is in the making and we are witnessing its birth-pangs. A united world is no longer a dream belonging to an irreducible, infinite future, but a vision almost within grasp.

*Somewhere beyond the railheads
Of reason, South or North,
Lies a magnetic mountain
Riveting sky to earth.*

Let us seek it.

Towards a New Humanism

by

ANDRÉ ROUSSEAU

o

"THE major problem of today is probably that of bringing the East and the West into harmony." This recent statement by Mr. René Grousset seems all too topical, to judge by certain events in the history which is being written before our eyes.

But the more troubling this disharmony, the clearer it becomes that we shall only overcome it by a reconciliation which rises above it. And if we go to the bottom of all the misunderstandings by which the East and the West seem to be divided, we shall have to ask ourselves whether they do not proceed from a maladjustment of our respective moral responsibilities. Thus we shall see that the problem of the relationships of East and West possesses this remarkable aspect: that the political and economic factors are not only bound up with the spiritual, but are dominated by them. There is perhaps no question racking the world today in which the "primacy of the spiritual" is clearer or more imperious. None of our great human problems is more essentially a spiritual and moral problem, both in its data and in the solutions it calls for. Thus when "intellectuals" take a hand in it, they can feel that they are in an element where their activity, far from being an intellectual luxury, may be extremely effective.

Let us first define the relative importance of spiritual causes in the difficulties through which the relations between East and West are now passing.

In the last century, these relations were based on the domination of Eastern life by Western activity. The point to emphasize here is not so much the mere historical fact of this domination as the spirit in which it was imposed by one side and to some extent accepted by the other.

The West posed as the representative and the master of a

civilization which it brought with it, which it taught, which it bestowed, if need be, with condescending generosity, on passive recipients. It was moreover convinced that it was offering to these backward civilizations its own progress: an intellectual progress directed towards scientific development and a progress in the sciences directed towards their practical application. When it built railways or electricity stations it thought that by so doing it was winning, for itself and for its subjects, a higher level of civilization. And it is doubtless true that indisputable physical progress, from which every human being could physically benefit, was made in such fields as that of material comfort, of hygiene and of certain living facilities. But these benefits, stamped as they were with the materialist outlook, did not go beyond the category of techniques. They brought no spiritual message with them. On the contrary, they turned the minds which concentrated on them towards a specialized form of intellectual activity, cut off from that general human culture which the West has long called humanism.

There was thus a fundamental error in mistaking for progress and for the uplifting of man what was at bottom a blow at his unity and at his real greatness. The West was to become aware one day that this error was at the root of its own misfortunes; it was also to poison its relationship with the East, and through this relationship, the evolution of Eastern life itself.

In all the Eastern countries where the West extended its conquests, its technical superiority began as the instrument of its domination. It was this superiority that secured the triumph of its arms, of its equipment, of its institutions of every kind. But above all, it was this that placed it, in relation to the dominated lands, in a position of superiority whose principle was, at bottom, admitted. For the East tolerated with ill grace, and ended by not tolerating at all, the military conquests, the foreign laws, and the enforced governments that the West brought with it. But it did not resist—with few exceptions—the locomotive, the dynamo and the telephone. The West, which was not able to win acceptance of itself as a conqueror, was at least able to win acceptance of the instruments of its conquest, and to obtain for them as much respect as it gave them itself. So that finally, at the close of the tale,

when the conquerors had been sent packing and the conquered had been freed, human liberty and dignity had to outward appearance won all along the line, but in fact, there was nothing left but slavery. For the West, the slave and accomplice of a soulless intellectualism, had succeeded in betraying the East into an analogous slavery to the modern idols, worship of which has subjugated the world.

And this is not all. The East, which imagined itself to be gaining through this development, is in danger of losing in it a spiritual treasure which was its very own. When its peoples bowed to the Western conquest, they were for the most part in a somewhat dormant phase of their civilization. It might well be asked, indeed, to what extent their spiritual life was not really passing through a period of lethargy. (Here there is obviously room for distinctions between spiritual positions that must have varied with religions and peoples.) On the other hand, it is possible that the outward show of a purely ritual fidelity to somnolent religious customs was strengthened by the conviction, which the West brought in with its intellectual imports, that the progress of civilization led in the opposite direction from these customs and rites. At a certain period, the West included the temple and the mosque in its shop-window of picturesque properties, decking them out with the heart-breaking magic of objects in their death-throes: this was not simply because of a positive taste for certain purely aesthetic aspects and a certain silent poetry, but because these dead or dying beauties were all it had preserved of things that its intelligence had emptied of their content.

The awakening of the East has come. Has it taken the form of a return to its own spiritual sources? That has occasionally happened, and in an impressive fashion. But it has to be admitted that, generally speaking, the East embarked on its renaissance with the idea that progress for men and for peoples lies in the direction which Western intellectualism taught it. The political freedom it has won does not prevent it from maintaining its dependence on resources which it continues to ask from the West. These resources take the form of what the West has in greatest abundance and what it produces best for itself—techniques. The West has allowed the spirit and the principles of its own civilization to become obliterated in the sovereignty of its own civilization to become obliterated in the sovereignty of techniques; its successes are machines and mechanical

skills; it is these successes which it holds up as an example and which it is capable of teaching. And the East, which prides itself on having made up its lost time (lost by reference to this conception of progress) believes that these successes are really what makes a nation civilized.

But once the sovereignty of techniques has been established in the material field, there is too little either of highmindedness or of disinterestedness there for the propagation of technical civilization not to turn the tables on the tyros who had believed in it too wholeheartedly. Dissensions of a materialist kind are then seen to be at precisely the opposite pole from the spiritual union for which we are seeking. An Iranian writer, Mr. Rashid Yassemi, has given a convincing demonstration of how Eastern peoples go astray—if “fascinated by European technique”, they become the victims of “an inferiority complex which dooms them to imitation”.¹ This is the vicious circle in which the East allows itself to be imprisoned once it has yielded to the mirage of technical civilization.

The West is guilty twice or thrice over of this calamity. For, first, it made technical supremacy a criterion of civilization for itself, then it passed on this false lesson to others, and finally it claimed that its own superiority in this field was unapproachable—not to speak of the interested motives which were at the bottom of this reasoning. As for the East, it has every right to wonder why the West should deny it the opportunity of doing what it puts forward itself as most worth doing. But in so far as the East itself succeeds in this direction it will catch up with the West in the state into which the latter has got itself today, the state of a civilization in danger of death.

More than one modern thinker has perceived this evil which has been disseminated throughout the world by the contagion of an error. We may quote in this connexion the following remarks made by Lord Portsmouth in his book *Alternative to Death*.²

“We have committed a crime against the Oriental countries by the arrogant super-imposition of doubtful alien techniques and ideologies. . . . Spiritually we have been iconoclastic . . . and for that, far more than the fact that we have appeared as conquerors, we shall not lightly be forgiven.”

¹ *L'âme de l'Iran*, Paris 1951.

² Lord Portsmouth: *Alternative to Death* (1944).

Must we then look for a complete reversal of this state of affairs, that is to say a resurrection of spiritual life which would demand the abject capitulation of technical civilization? The question is not so simple as that, for here we are concerned not with abstract values but with a human problem. It seems to me to have been admirably stated by Dr. Thérèse Brosse in the following lines:

"The most urgent problem of our times is the foundation of a science of man which shall not be only a science of the *human animal*, but a science of the *complete man*, with all his spiritual values studied both from the individual and from the social point of view. Man has just wrested from matter the secret of its universal forces. Unless he simultaneously turns the same zeal for discovery on himself in order to mobilize in his consciousness all his potentialities of understanding and of love—or if this power over matter only falls into his hands to sow terror and death—then it is the end of humanity."

The problem is therefore a universal one, not a mere question of settling an opposition or finding an equilibrium between East and West, considered as two antagonistic worlds. It is indeed for both of them, united in the same danger and face to face with the same destiny, the same problem of the reconquest of a real and complete humanism. If they are to succeed, East and West must take the same road, in the direction opposite from their common error.

Let us start with the East, which should be the less committed to the error, since it was attacked more recently and by contagion. It must in any case cease to revere as unquestionable principles of civilization certain formidable elements that go to make up political and social power in our times. It would be hard to find a more pertinent comment on this than the warning given to one of the great civilizations of Asia, that of India, by Aurobindo in his message to the University of Andhra on 11 December 1948:

"There are deeper issues for India herself, since by following certain tempting directions she may conceivably become a nation like many others evolving an opulent industry and commerce, a powerful organization of social and political life, an immense military strength, practising power-politics with a high degree of success, guarding and extending zealously her gains and her interests, dominating even a large part of

the world, but in this apparently magnificent progression forfeiting its *Swadharma*, losing her soul. Then ancient India and her spirit might disappear altogether and we would only have one more nation like the others and that would be a real gain neither to the world nor to us. There is a question whether she may prosper more harmlessly in the outward life yet lose altogether her richly massed and firmly held spiritual experience and knowledge. It would be a tragic irony of fate if India were to throw away her spiritual heritage at the very moment when in the rest of the world there is more and more a turning towards her for spiritual help and a saving Light."

A warning like this holds good for other peoples and other civilizations of the East. And the last words of the quotation show the healthy current which is stirring nowadays, from India first of all, but also from the whole East, towards Western minds—not merely the tide of erudition on which the science of the Orientalists has so long lived, but a current of active philosophy, propitious to a fruitful intercourse leading to common spiritual progress.

If I talk here of intercourse, it is because the time has come to point out that the West has more to contribute to this spiritual revolution that beckons to us than mere penitence for its errors and submission to an Eastern spiritual supremacy which it had failed to appreciate. Once more, let us set aside any antagonism and seek for points of convergence. The error the West committed struck first of all at itself. That error was committed at the expense of resources which it possessed, which it has neglected, not to say compromised, but which could none the less be brought back to honour. Since the West bears the prime responsibility for the ills of the modern world, the question how it can rediscover itself is one of the most important we have to examine.

Let us first make it clear that what has been argued above gives us no warrant for summarily setting up a West that is all materialism against an East that is all spiritual. We have been obliged to simplify things a little. We should come closer to the truth by saying that the Western spirit which imposed itself on the East was that of the nineteenth century, and was that aspect of it furthest removed from the very significant spiritual renaissance which the West, and France in particular, has experienced in the twentieth.

Today, then, the dramatic conflict between the materialism that leads to death and the spirituality that saves is being played out, in accents of tragedy, in the very heart of the West. There is more than one important work in the most modern French literature to bear witness to the fact: Bernanos' *La France contre les robots*, for instance, or Simone Weil's *Enracinement*.

When the Western mind attacks this problem, moreover, it does not throw itself headlong into the naive solution which consists in disowning the conquests of science and declaring them incompatible with the life of the soul. It calls the attention of thinkers to the observation, never made before, that these intellectual conquests were achieved in contempt of the life of the soul, with which the conquering intelligences did not deign to concern themselves. It remarks that the harm which these conquests can do to men springs from their neglect of what is essential in man. And the problem set is that of such a reintroduction of the spiritual into material progress that it will cease to be overtly or covertly inhuman.

The point is very well made by Albert Camus in his recent book *l'Homme révolté*:

"It is useless," writes Camus, "to hope to go back on technique. The age of the spinning wheel is past and the dream of a handicraft civilization is vain. The machine is only evil as it is used today. We must accept its benefits even if we refuse its ravages. The lorry which the driver drives day and night does not humiliate him, for he knows it to its last screw and uses it with affection and efficiency. The real, the inhuman, exaggeration lies in the division of labour. But by very reason of this exaggeration, the day will come when a machine performing 100 operations, supervised by a single man, will turn out a single object. This man will have to some extent rediscovered, on a different level, the creative force which he had as an artisan. The producer will thus draw nearer the creator."

This is, however, a somewhat timid hope, which relies principally on the evolution of machinery for the liberation of man. Is there nothing better man can do on his own initiative to reconquer his autonomy and dignity? The soulless matter under whose tyranny he has fallen only exerts this domination over him because he has erroneously animated it with an intellectual force which is soulless too. Just as God created

man in His image, so man, who has set up as the god of the modern world, has built in his image the machine to which he has delegated as much as he has been able of what he believes to be his divinity. The robot, whose formidable power has finally turned against the man-god from whom it derives, is in this sense comparable with the angel Lucifer, whom God had made His chosen creature and who turned against his creator.

Behind the present-day drama of the West there therefore lies the fact that Western intelligence has gone astray, has lost its soul or has at any rate overlooked it. But once we come to examine this aberration, we shall be forced to face the fact that what we are calling in question is nothing less than the civilization on which the West has lived for four centuries, that is to say the humanist civilization.

This fact has already begun to be perceived by certain thinkers who have set forth the present-day problem of the West in all its implications, and in particular by André Malraux, in his latest books, *Psychologie de l'Art* and *Saturne*. Seen from this standpoint, the birth of humanism, at the period which arrogated to itself the name of the Renaissance, was the birth of the man who dreamed of reigning over the world by his own unaided faculties, and in particular by the supremacy of his intelligence. Thus Leonardo da Vinci was hailed by Michelet as the man who was "all-powerful in all things". This was the first step on a path on which one more step was taken in the eighteenth century, when man relied for the exercise of his supremacy on abstract and disembodied reason. It is no doubt true that the humanist West did not lose its soul straight away. What it did do straight away was to break with everything there had been of spiritual force, and of expression of that force, in previous civilizations, for it set up the principle of a progress which derived its inspiration and all the potentialities of its development from human reason alone. With this principle, Western man introduced into the world—which has not yet got rid of it—the idea that everything that is early is "primitive" and everything that is modern represents progress. By so doing, he dated the beginning of civilization from the moment when human reason began to exercise itself and relegated into a world of artless stammerings everything in earlier times that was not or did not appear rational.

Immense spiritual civilizations were jettisoned in this way for the simple reason that once the sovereignty of reason had been thus established, the kingdom of the soul was closed.

A remarkable example of this aberration is provided in an observation by Aurobindo, whom I shall quote again here. This observation, which is to be found in the introduction to *Hymns to the Mystic Fire* (Pondicherry, 1946), relates to the misunderstanding of the Vêda by Western rationalism, and it demonstrates excellently the extent of this misunderstanding.

"The tradition of a mystic element in the Vêda as a source of Indian civilization, its religion, its philosophy, its culture is more in consonance with historical fact than the European scouting of this idea. Nineteenth century European scholars, writing in a period of materialistic rationalism, regarded the history of the race as a development from primitive barbarism or semi-barbarism with a crude social and religious life, full of superstitions, by means of the growth of civilized institutions, manners and habits thanks to the development of intellect and reason, art, philosophy and science and a clearer, sounder, more matter-of-fact intelligence. The ancient idea about the Vêda could not fit into this picture; it was regarded as rather a part of ancient superstitious ideas and a primitive error. But we can now form a more accurate idea of the development of the race. The ancient, more primitive civilizations held in themselves the elements of the later growth but their early wise men were not scientists and philosophers or men of high intellectual reason but mystics and even mystery-men, occultists, religious seekers; they were seekers after a veiled truth behind things and not of an outward knowledge. The scientists and philosophers came afterwards; they were preceded by the mystics and often like Pythagoras and Plato were to some extent mystics themselves or drew many of their ideas from the mystics."

These remarks are so fair and so penetrating that they will help us finally to find our way to the solution of the crisis thus defined.

It is, in a word, a crisis of humanism.

Modern man, who has lost control of the inventions to which his brain gave birth, has been compared to the sorcerer's apprentice. The comparison is wrong. Modern man is neither sorcerer nor apprentice. It was he himself who drove to its

logical conclusions a mastery which he craved and claimed: that of a strictly rationalist and materialist science which he had developed in a field severed from all spiritual roots. By so doing he showed up the insufficiency of the culture of which this science was the crowning glory, a culture too narrow, too sweeping in its claims to absoluteness in its domain, to deserve the title of humanism which it assumed.

What Western man has been calling humanism for four centuries has been the urge to become master of himself and of the universe by the exertion of his intellectual activity isolated from the rest of his life. He has thus asserted simultaneously his claim to universality and his capacity for achieving it by a deliberately limited selection of his faculties. What he has called the domain of the complete man has been the contemplation of the entire world by man restricted to a part of himself. We must relinquish this error if we are to set humanism right and widen its meaning.

There is no question of destroying it, any more than there is of disowning the achievements of science, which can indeed be set to its credit. Western humanism has been, at certain periods and in certain places, the field of those human achievements which retain their outstanding value. But what we can no longer allow it is an exclusiveness which limits the conditions of man's future to the domain which it has arbitrarily elevated into the kingdom of man. If the word *humanism* connotes the homeland of the human spirit, then humanism does not date from the sixteenth century. Mediterranean Europe is not its sole and permanent seat, nor is its only source a certain idea of Greco-Roman antiquity which, particularly as concerns Greece, corresponds less to the total reality of the classical world than to a picture of which Renaissance man saw the lineaments in his own mirror. On the other hand, once present-day Western humanism is placed back inside the boundaries which must beset it, the crisis which confronts it today will cease to appear either as unexpected or as an inevitable catastrophe. The calamity would only be absolute if we persisted in regarding the prestige of human reason as absolute too. But man today has turned from this inordinate and outdated claim, to a complete consciousness of his truth and of his energy.

After four centuries of man's efforts to break down everything, and first of all himself, by analysis, he is coming back to

a synthetic approach to being reanimated by the soul. With that approach, every value, in every part of the world and in every period of the world's history, recovers not only its use but its place in an ordered hierarchy. Whether such values come from the East or the West, they are no longer rivals, but converge towards this new humanism which leads towards universality not in virtue of some questionable claim, but of its own inner logic. That comes out clearly in the passage from Aurobindo quoted above. What he says of the Vêda agrees with what Simone Weil says of Romanesque art, with what Alexandre Varille has discovered of the religious philosophy of ancient Egypt, and with what Marcel Griaule has revealed of the religions of Negro Africa.

There is no question of confounding these various spiritual civilizations in a hotch-potch of improvised equivalents. The impulse that is needed today is one that will free the life of the mind from the limits within which the Western outlook has so long confined it. The essence of the new humanism will be that in it the methods of life and of work that Western intelligence has been able to master will be employed in the rediscovery of long-abandoned spiritual domains. Thus intelligence, instead of exposing mankind to the risks that result from its presumptions and its encroachments, will need all its alertness and its strength to serve the cause of a man who will be really complete this time; not a man sidetracked into the material by the cerebral, but a man who will be united, body and soul, in the bringing of his own mystery before his consciousness.

We believe that if a humanism such as this were to become a reality, East and West would find that much that separates them would disappear and everything that unites them—and unites the whole human race—would emerge. All the grounds of the disagreements and misunderstandings which we discussed at the beginning of this paper would be done away with. It would then be seen that the necessary condition of any real liberation of the Eastern peoples was the general liberation of the spiritual nature of man—a liberation which is no less necessary for the West.

In conclusion, let us face the fact that what is in question is a profound revolution. The West—through the French genius in particular—was already committed to it in the first half of

the twentieth century by the significant direction which the most outstanding and original of its writers, poets, artists and scholars had taken. It is none the less true that certain habits of thinking are not too easy to disturb and that certain re-classifications of values may come as a shock. That is perhaps a further reason why international, inter-continental and inter-confessional leaders of thought should unite their efforts with a view to reaching together the spiritual bases where the common truths merge.

The Conception of Man: East-West

by

JACQUES RUEFF

WHEN embarking on a comparison of the different conceptions of man, as between East and West, the first question that arises is: is there a difference in kind between Western man and his Eastern counterpart, particularly as regards their thought-processes?

All Westerners who have worked with Orientals will reply without a moment's hesitation that, save for a few minor details, the mechanism is the same. Given identical educational and cultural conditions, the Oriental will react in precisely the same way as the Westerner. His "reasoning apparatus", in particular, exhibits the same characteristics and produces the same results.

Are we then to conclude that there are no differences on the spiritual plane between East and West? That would, in my opinion, be making a serious mistake.

It is my belief that there is a profound difference of approach towards certain basic questions—a difference due not to any divergence in the mental process, but to the fact that "idea groups" on which the two civilizations are based have, from a common point of departure, evolved along different lines.¹

By "common point of departure" I mean the basis for the meditation of man who, before discovering the physical world, discovers the world of his own thought.

It is, I think, indisputable that ancient civilizations, for all their brilliance, concentrated more on the inner being of their thinking man than on the external world. The thinker, wholly absorbed in his own thought, closes his eyes to the outer world in an effort to wrest from the immutable essence of reality the only true knowledge, the knowledge of the suprasensible

¹ I have borrowed the notion of "idea groups" from the mathematical and statistical sciences, and in particular from *L'homme Microscopique*, by Pierre Auger (Flammarion).

world. The matter of his knowledge is derived from divine revelation, or from the "ideas" the Creator has made accessible to his intelligence.

Was it not Aristotle who described thought as "the thought of thought", and Clement of Alexandria who said that "perfect knowledge appertains to that which is outside the cosmos, that which is apprehended by the intelligence alone, and to things even more spiritual than these"?¹

The philosophical and metaphysical systems of both West and East—and also, to this day, of all primitive peoples as well²—rest on this basis, of things directly apprehended.

The resulting mentality, elaborated and systematized, attains its fullest expression in the West, in the theories of Aristotle and the medieval scholastics.

"The Aristotelian physics of medieval scholasticism," writes Gilson, "give an exact description of what the universe would be like if our sensory and emotional impressions were concrete objects; they represent a systematization of the error of our early years, in assuming that our confused mental impressions, just because they are neatly named, described and classified like concrete objects, are in fact real forms or real qualities."³

It is thus that the theory of the ego akin to the cosmos, and sometimes even identical with the cosmos, is elaborated; and this skilfully developed theory, based on strict logic and rational metaphysics, seems, alike to West and East, to answer their questions and allay their anxieties.

But as time passes, Western thought, almost unperceived by its proponents, undergoes a measure of transformation. For on the rich soil of scholasticism has been sown (tentatively by Judaism, then triumphantly by Christianity) the seed of a new theory, the theory of human independence and responsibility.

The seed sprouts and develops into the conception of man as being one, indivisible and immortal, distinct from the surrounding universe, claiming his identity in, and even as against, that universe (or rather, against its temptations), and accountable, for his actions, to God.

It is in St. Thomas Aquinas that the fullest expression of free

¹ VI, Strom 68.

² See Lévy-Bruhl: *La mentalité primitive*.

³ *Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien* (p. 170).

and independent personality is found. "That being is called free," he says "who is his own cause." We are acting freely, therefore, when we act of our own accord—obeying the dictates of our will. It is in this way, he adds elsewhere, that "God invests his creatures with the dignity of cause".

Since he was distinct from the world and invested with "causal" influence, it behoved thinking man to take thought for the mechanism of his judgments and their effect on the "things" on which they were brought to bear. There thus originated the "double current" leading to Descartes and Bacon, the first completing the mechanism of the reasoning-machine, and the second gearing it to the external world so as to render man powerful and capable of effective action.

With Cartesian philosophy the detachment and liberation of the human personality are accomplished.

The reasoning faculty is not something acquired or apportioned, it is inherent in human nature: "The power of judging well and of distinguishing between the true and the false is something that all men possess, in equal degree."

This power is not something that man has learnt from the world. He brings it with him, he alone can exercise it: "No one," said Descartes, "can understand, save I."

The glorification of reason is the vast and wonderful harvest reaped from the scholastic age.

But this was not merely an end; it was also a beginning. While the reasoning-mechanism was slowly developing, thinking man was gradually ceasing to look within himself alone. "Another error," says Francis Bacon "arises from excessive respect for, and a kind of adoration of, the human intellect, leading men to abandon the contemplation of nature and experience, and to wallow instead in their own meditation and the fantasies of their own imagination."¹

With Bacon, the reasoning-machine begins to be geared to tangible phenomena. It discovers that it can deduce them from a few simple principles, which it takes as the premises for its syllogisms. Thus, unbeknownst to the scientists of the day, modern science assumes its true character.

Reason represents, in fact, a supreme effort to provide a logical explanation for all the phenomena apprehended by

¹ *De Augmentis*, I par. 43 *Novum Organum* I. 48-71, 79-124 and Preface of *Institutio Magna*, p. 130.

our senses. It does not discover causes; it invents them; and, by so doing, it substitutes causation for succession in the world it presumes to call external.

From that point, man's position in the world undergoes a complete change. He can now, on the basis of a few simple propositions, definitions, axioms and postulates, deduce the entire system of tangible phenomena. And the fact that the premises were originally elaborated in an effort to deduce cause from effect considerably facilitates the inverse process of predicting effects from causes.

Working with premises such as these, man is able to predict the interaction of tangible phenomena, and so to control and utilize it. Though he still sees the world as 'external to him, it is now subject to his will; from being its slave, he has become its master. The device of experiment has given him power over the world such as he formerly exercised only over his own thought.

And man, looking in amazement at the extent of his power over the external world, is so overwhelmed with the material results of his triumph that he forgets the nature of the methods whereby he attained his ascendancy.

The age of "science triumphant" has been ushered in. Man, in the flush of his newly-won power, forgets that the underlying causes were invented by him, and for his own purposes. He persuades himself that he "discovered" those causes, and that they furnish an exact description of the world around him. He forgets, in his intellectual pride, that the premises of his syllogisms will convey reality to him only in so far as the tangible phenomena of the physical world are interlinked, as the propositions in his mind are interlinked. He assigns absolute and universal value to explanatory devices that are, in fact purely man-made.

This is the epoch in which the young Renan wrote that "science is useful only in so far as it investigates truths claimed to have been communicated by revelation".¹

Thus, the era of "science-mongering" and "materialism" was to mark a deep divergence between Western and Eastern thought, such as might have reflected in some sort the great dispute about "universals". The West, in its rational imperial-

¹ *L'avenir de la science*, p. 39.

ism, displayed a naïve, absolute "realism" akin to that of a child who attributes reality to myths, quite forgetting that they are of his own making.

Yet this very naïveté was a source of strength; and for nineteenth-century man the rationalist illusion proved the most fertile of human errors.

It is true that the heyday of the youth of science was short-lived. It was not long before the genuine scientists, reflecting on their science, discovered its limits; and very soon, Western thought returned to its sources.

Listen to the words of Emile Bréhier, one of our foremost historians of philosophy: "I had the good fortune to embark on my career as a philosopher at the end of the nineteenth century, a period of lively intellectual activity. It was the time when the cramped notions of science were being discarded together with a bankrupt spirituality compounded of pious hopes and high-flown phrases; a supreme effort was being made to revert to fundamentals in all activities of the mind—in science and art, religion, action and contemplation alike. It was the age of pragmatism, modernism and the philosophy of action; and of the revival of an intellectualism meditating on man's practical activities. This movement was dominated by the thought of Bergson, who taught me, along with all my contemporaries, to 'realize' spirituality, and to understand it not merely as a set of conclusions deduced from experience by a process of not wholly valid reasoning, but as the expression of a life *directly* apprehended."¹

Nor was this return to methods of the direct apprehension of knowledge confined to philosophy.

Henri Poincaré who, as a mathematician, was at that period making a study of space and time, expounded a sort of philosophy of the "continuous", concluding: "This shows that logic alone is not enough, that the science of demonstration is not the whole of science, and that intuition must still act as a complement, I might almost say a counterweight or antidote, to logic."²

This is the period when art is throwing off the shackles of classicism, and Marcel Proust is experimenting with a new

¹ *Comment je comprends l'histoire de la philosophie*, Emile Bréhier, in *Études philosophiques*, Presses universitaires de France, August 1947.

² *La valeur de la science*, p. 25 (Flammarion).

language, trying to suggest rather than describe the unbroken continuity of the psychic life of his characters.

To speak, therefore, of a conflict between Eastern and Western civilization, the former resting on profound spiritual values and the latter living by the arid light of reason in action, seems to me to be an oversimplification.

The Westerner knows that, if science confers power, the reason is that it was created to do so. He no longer believes, however, that it reveals the real underlying nature of things. He knows that, if things exist, it is only their reflection in the mind of man that he is able to apprehend; and that the nature of this reflection depends on the mirror as much as on the object reflected.

Thus the West has proceeded from its raw, young and (because of its youthful self-assertiveness) ill-informed science to a science that is better informed. It has reverted to intuitive, direct knowledge, from which the East had never departed.

Western civilization has added thereto, of course, scientific discovery and creation, which feeds on its own power and is expanding constantly before our eyes.

But the East also desires to possess the power of science; and the methods we have applied to achieve it can equally well be adopted by the Orient.

Thus there is a place for science, at once humble and majestic, in the new system of human knowledge in the East as well as the West.

There will still be differences of shading between Eastern and Western thought; but there is no longer any dividing gulf. The two are linked together, and now advance side by side—each retaining its own inherent characteristics—building the road towards the great horizon of a real civilization.

The East and the West

by

HILMI ZIYA ULKEN

EAST and West are two entities, in which, within the familiar frameworks, there is a whole variety of manifestations, each of which has evolved sometimes on parallel and sometimes on diverging lines. The basic backgrounds are, however, so different that it is the coincidences that strike us when we see them; and one is tempted, indeed, to say that there is no such thing as "common types" of humanity. Their existence is, nevertheless, attested when we look at social life or at the ideals of communities. It is therefore not only in human ideals but in life as it is lived that the bases for a *rapprochement* between East and West must be sought.

It was the sense of moderation and precision that underlay the fine reputation of the West; but the latter abused its powers. The East, for its part, was inclined towards meditation and took refuge in an escape from reality. The result was that the two halves of the world became indifferent to each other, and this state of things has lasted for centuries. There is admittedly a certain tendency of the two worlds to "come together"; but it has remained, in a number of respects, only a tendency. There are certain ways in which they do understand each other; the East is aware of what it lacks, and wishes to modernize itself by adopting European civilization. Although various interpretations of modernism have been suggested, we can say that all Orientals aspire to the benefits of present-day civilization; they want to initiate themselves into the scientific outlook of Europe. And the movement has not been "one-way" only. The West, in seeking the reason for the present moral crisis, tends to look for it in the training which present-day man receives. We find a fairly strong movement against the debasing of culture, and this movement enables us to discover points of contact between various forms and aspects of man.

This tendency, which is sometimes aided by a taste for what is foreign to our normal environment and by a measure of attraction to cultures other than our own, entitles us to hope that within a comparatively short space of time there will no longer be any real tension between East and West, or two mutually incompatible aspects of the human race.

II

There was a moment in human history when no such distinction existed. At that time there were three separate circles, each with its own civilization—India, China, and the Middle East. Of these the third, based on Egypt and Mesopotamia, expanded into Greece. These three worlds developed along parallel lines; they each had their great genius—Buddha, Confucius and Socrates; and they arrived, by the same processes, at the same results. They had passed through the stages of mythology, hylozoism, sophism, and the discovery of the conscience. Conscience had meant, for India, delivery from pain through mortification; for China, the practical ethics of “filial piety”; and for Greece, rational ethics transformed into a metaphysical system. The Greek civilization, then, moving away from the other two, gave birth to Western civilization, collaborating with Christianity; while Islam, a “delayed” religion which came upon the scene some six centuries later than Christianity, became one of the first manifestations militating in favour of a bringing-together of East and West.

III

A century ago, Turkey was making the first experiments in *rapprochement* with modern civilization. For the eclectic “Tanzimat”, in the first place, the distinction between East and West was a distinction between soul and body, quality and quantity. The outlook of the Tanzimat, which was a reformist movement, reflected, with us, the “dualist thought” of the nineteenth century. Was this a fortunate circumstance? It is very definitely open to doubt.

For other quarters, the West merely represented the materialist outlook; it was the East that held the keys to the world of the spirit. The Western outlook, it was held, originated in an

ambition to conquer nature; the East was regarded as given to mystical thought, that thought gradually detaching itself from the tangible world through its own particular symbolism. This "dualism", a more or less reactionary conception, was followed by powerful evolution in a more Western direction.

The new outlook drew the distinction between East and West by suggesting that what was dominant in the West was the "human personality", its social order being based on the behaviour of free men who exercised personal initiative, whereas in the East the individual was absorbed by the community. This distinction was based merely on the different forms of training received by the two types of social man; although it was simply a question of different natural factors, man could influence the circumstances of his environment and transform his position by dint of social research and of education (Prince Sabaheddin).

Dualist thought finally led to an attempted reconciliation between Islam, nationalism and the West. Underlying this attempt was the drawing of a distinction between culture and civilization. Culture was of Eastern origin, whereas civilization was seen as the aim to be attained—in fact, the West. The distinction corresponded to that between content and form. Dualism—the difference between the two worlds—was thus reduced to "culture and civilization" (Ziya Gökalp).

The last available means of finding a solution consisted in the radical adoption of European civilization. This meant that there was only one dominant civilization, about which there could be no discussion. Culture and civilization were one and the same thing. If one was baptized into a civilization, that meant adopting all its virtues and all its vices. No discrimination was possible, nor could any compromise solution between East and West come about. For the Eastern peoples, Westernism was an inevitable development. This was the revolutionary movement initiated by Atatürk.

IV

We are now faced with the following problem. Science, in the past century, claimed to regard man as an animal; but in fact man, instead of adapting himself to his environment, creates his own world. He needs a long process of education in order to

assimilate the experience accumulated by past generations. From this stems his capacity to acquire experience—his “historic” being. He becomes a “social” being only after a long period of education. Thus, man may be defined as an educated being, and hence as a being who has not only mastered but actually created the world of values.

Throughout this period, man’s activity is the complete opposite of that of the animals; (a) he projects himself into the future, and evolves his ideals; (b) he projects himself into the past, through the constitution of his memory and his personality; and (c) he projects himself into space and reality, evolving his tools and his concepts. The stage of *homo sapiens* precedes, therefore, that of *homo faber*. Attitudes translate themselves into activities whereby his individual personality is formed; these attitudes are, in ordered progression: escape from reality; the discovery of values; and the creation of techniques. There are several techniques, each of which corresponds to a given value: aesthetic technique for aesthetic value, vital technique for vital value, and so forth.

An essential feature, if not *the* essential feature, of man is the battle against himself; it is seen, in every civilization, as self-sacrifice. There is no single anthropological type that does not possess this feature. Man may therefore be defined as a being who creates himself by sacrificing himself. On this point, it seems to me, East and West are agreed. It is not the intellect and free choice that distinguish man from the animal, since their origins can be traced to the animals. Man’s nature has its roots in a principle at variance with life and its evolution—the spirit. Man lives, not in a local environment, but in the world. “Human” attitudes come from right within the individual; they take shape when some propensity or other is restrained. This notion must be supplemented by that of man’s “concrete unity”. The notion of duality has served to signify, in some sort, a battle between two universal principles, in which man is the setting for a regular inner drama.

It is certain, however, that the human being’s consciousness of restlessness goes, or comes, before axiological duality. Instead of seeking for sublimation in the struggle between opposites that are stronger than man himself and in regard to which, therefore, he is heteronomous, it is better to start from the restlessness that the concrete being, man, feels as to his

destiny and his existence in the world—from which we are led to his resistance against himself, and hence to the two aspects of his being which we call body and soul.

We thus arrive at a conception which first of all postulates man's autonomy in his unity and then proceeds to what is "bivalent" in him and to the ways in which he is, physically and spiritually, externalized.

Man's concrete unity, with its indefinable properties, distinguishes him from other beings not by the evolution or the combination of those properties, but by his own progress towards autonomy, as compared with other beings.

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V

Let us follow out the stages through which man has passed throughout his history.

Primitive man lives, not apart from other forms of creation, but within the whole, projecting his troubles and inner conflicts into it. His mentality is "pre-logical", in all its primitive purity; later, it will be invaded by reason and conscience.

The three "circles" of civilization evolve in the same way; Greece aims at what is intelligible, logic being regarded as the key to all problems. Man is distinguished from other beings by his intellect. This is the period of humanism and of the intelligence. The sovereignty of man is born but, at the same time, his servitude. Aristotle's *Organon*, which begins by being the means, becomes, later, the end.

India has discovered conscience, with a view, not to "rationalizing" nature, but to unfolding the world of the spirit. Christianity and Brahminism are alike concerned to save man, who has fallen from his supernatural state, and to deliver him from his sin, through sacrifice of self; they establish the same conception, based on the Trinity and the incarnation, to find the union of the natural and the supernatural worlds in the miracle of man. But Hindu mysticism finds expression in over-emphasized, concentrated spirituality, whereas with Christianity the effort is in the direction of moral authority. With the Yogis, union with God—the control of the body through breathing—leads them back to their primeval origins.

The mysticism of Islam and that of India have certain common features. Islam concentrates on collective ecstasy,

the mystical practices which lead to the communion of souls, detachment from self and union with God through an increasing process of spiritualization—the dialogue between the soul and God. This dialogue ends in a union (*vusla*) in which the two entities are fused and become one. Real spiritual union is achieved.

China, reaching the stage of a feudal empire based on the supremacy of the “patriarchal” family, had discovered the ideal of “unchanging” man, within the framework of submission by the inferior to the superior.

Greece enthroned the intellect, identified it with the supernatural world, and substituted it for the mythical gods. She evolved what was known as the sage, who lived in harmony with the natural order of things, subjecting passion to reason. The influence of this type of being was most felt in the reconciling of his thought with what Christianity had to offer. The conflict between the Greek *Logos* and the Christian *Verbum*, between reason and conscience, between justice and charity is resolved, in European civilization, into a synthesis—though reason and faith cannot always adjust themselves to each other completely, and one or the other will be subject to some measure of constraint.

Islam, coming some six centuries after the development of “religious” man, formulated a universal law, based on submission to the divine will and shorn of all anthropomorphism. Here, man possessed only that conditional freedom accorded to him by divine grace. Iconoclastic Islam concentrated on the purification of the soul; it proclaimed itself the saviour at once of the conscience and of social life, through its legislation (*Sharia*). The prime feature of Islam was that it reconciled life on earth with the supernatural. It therefore drew rational arguments from Hellenistic thought. The ascetic was the “perfect man” who linked the visible world (*alam-al-shahada*) with the invisible world (*alam-al-gayb*). The important point is, however, that the “*fana fi al-haq*” (annihilation in God) is not, for the Sufi, a conclusion, but a transitory stage to the *Baqi bi-Allah* (“perennialization”, or everlastingness, in God) and to a return to the world. The Sufi is not merely a man who seeks his own salvation; he has a teaching mission, and is therefore akin to the Fathers of the Christian Orders. All these ideals—except that of Greece—were based on the conception of *sinful man*, expiating his sin through sacrifice.

VI

In Europe, despite various attempts at synthesis, the anti-synthesis between man of the *Logos* and sinful man created an unstable position for the soul. In it, we can see the beginnings of the West's loss of serenity. By what it erected artificially, the West departed from nature; accordingly, it began to look longingly back towards primitive man. Western man retired into himself, where he had dwelt for so long; he therefore lost all contact with other men, or made contact with them only on the purely conventional plane. As a result, he was driven towards the "man of the mind". Modern man finally ended by becoming an egoist without ideals. Thanks to the development of natural science, he created the type of man who is a "denier". First he denied or renounced his past, his position in the world, and his destiny. He destroyed the scale of values; he gave himself up to ambition, through which he thought to discover the remedy for all the evils afflicting him. But this negative attitude merely led him, by way of reaction against his negativism, to regard himself as the creator of values. From this he presumed to treat others, not as human beings, but as instruments. This conception of man, which is only justified to the extent that man degrades values, and is proclaimed by materialist régimes at the expense of every human ideal, is today in a social and ideological *impasse*; and the result is an ever greater desire to discover "total man" by supplementing what is lacking through drawing on other types of humanity, hitherto ignored and despised. Since the human being's dominant feature is his *historicalness*, present-day man can look back on past human experience, experience gained in varying situations by different civilizations; and he can take as his ideal "total man", partaking alike of the deep thought of the East and the technological power of the West.

VII

History records several attempts to close the gap. The first was Greco-Buddhism, the second was Manichaeism, and the third was Islam with its effort to reconcile the "eternity" conception of Greece with the "creationist" conception of the Semites. Finally, both Japan and the Ottoman Empire sought

to bring about a fusion of European civilization with the mind of the East.

Today, Turkey and certain other countries of the Middle East have rejected all compromise. They stand out resolutely for modernism, and do not see how they can become modern, independent nations unless they adopt Western culture. The reforms involved are all essential to any people on the threshold of modern civilization. No satisfactory solution will ever be found through the adoption of out-of-date compromises. The Eastern nations however, having modernized themselves by the necessary reforms, must resuscitate the values of their past and bring them into play in their contemporary life. They need not adopt out-dated habits and customs; what matters is that the spirit of a nation should make its mark on modern civilization. True nationalism can only come about through an original interpretation of the civilization adopted. Clashes of national pride, however, instead of creating new values, prevent the cultures of the nations involved from exercising a mutual influence upon each other. The Eastern are just as capable as are the Western peoples of imposing on the modern world their ways of feeling, thinking and acting. The diversity of these interpretations is not merely the foundation of the nations' independence; it is also, for the ancient civilizations, the "spiritual serum" that will rejuvenate them.

The true reasons for the lack of interpenetration between the two worlds are to be found in an endless series of prejudices. To these obvious obstacles may be added the views so often expressed as to the multiplicity of closed cultures—the impossibility of penetrating them, the clash of patriotisms, belief in the decadence of ancient peoples, etc.

Cultures, however, are not closed circles. They are brought about by interaction between different human societies. The greater the scale of such relations, the more comprehensive the civilization tends to be. If the ties slacken or are broken, the civilization becomes static, and a scholastic period is ushered in.

Every cultural area seeks an outlet for its spiritual and material produce. But the countries that purchase that produce imitate the others' creations only for a period of apprenticeship; they end by becoming skilled creators themselves. The cultural centre of gravity shifts, the limits of the culture

expand, and the supplying country itself becomes an outlet. Many inventions are reviewed; some become obsolete, but many others are maintained. The rivalry set up between the supplying nation and the client or customer nations takes on in some sort the form of a conflict between totalitarianism and liberty. The supplying country resists, so as to remain the centre. The ancient system withdraws into itself; it becomes a tradition without progress, pride in the past bereft of all sense of reality.

Ancient civilizations can spread (a) along the great natural channels of communication; (b) by movements of population, on the occasion of wars and migrations, and (c) through the growth of world religions.

It is not only that modern civilization *permits* the various nations' tendency to rely on their political and cultural autonomy; it actually *facilitates* that tendency. Our present civilization not merely consolidates nations, it also creates them. It brings them to birth by both positive and negative means: (a) by the need felt, on the regional level, for technological improvement; (b) by the spreading of democratic ideas, which inspire not only the privileged but also the under-privileged to claim their independence; (c) by the development of public education, and the cultural emancipation of native languages; (d) through romantic and nationalist movements, inspired by their European antecedents; and (e) through a reaction against domination by the powerful. European civilization, itself a product of democratic ideas, brings to birth other nations similar to its own.

The human being is the product of education; and education, likewise, is the surest means of bringing the East and the West together.

Education, in our view, means two things: to draw instruction from the treasure-house of culture, with a view to succeeding in life, and to live in harmony with our being, and in close association with our fellow man.

Each civilization has evolved some plan whereby these objects of education can be achieved. Our own period, which is that of a world civilization consisting of the original cultures of all nations, needs an education that will be national in character. This must be based not merely on Greco-Latin humanism but on a wider type of humanism, compounded of

understanding between all the cultures of the world. Each country, as an independent member of this world civilization, will contribute its characteristics and view of life to the "symposium" of nations. What is of interest to us is to note the varying but also the complementary features of the peoples concerned. If cultures are isolated, certain exaggerations result; one culture or the other may become hypertrophied or atrophied, as the case may be. But the educationist must observe such undesirable developments, so that the necessary improvements may be made to the educational system. Very occasionally, also, the two aspects of education that we have mentioned change their relationship, the first one becoming dominant, if not exclusive; and that is the symptom of a crisis in culture. Such is the crisis we are now witnessing; some consider it is merely a temporary crisis, while in the view of others present-day civilization must seek for remedies outside itself.

In the East, education was based on the development of the inner life—on spirituality. In India, the Yogi sought it through the practice of meditation and concentration. In the case of Islam, the Sufi identified it with the acquiring of mystic virtues, so as to consummate union with God and to return to daily life with a teaching mission. Hence the process—with Ibn Arabi, for instance—of *Urûj* and *Nuzul* (ascent and descent). The object was simply to abolish the ego and egoism by means of the alter-ego, in communion with the spiritual realm, through a process of auto-suggestion.

In the West, education was based on development of the intellect—that is to say, simply on instruction. But the reaction against scholasticism gave rise to the experimental method, and then to the active method. In this system, the dominant factor is the will; what takes place is a consciously directed effort, brought to bear on the outer world.

Auto-suggestion acts through the subconscious, and by means of the nervous system; in the case of will and effort, the muscular system is involved. It is a case of two complementary yet opposite processes of the human organism; to the extent that we use our will, suggestion is thwarted, since an imposed effort, instead of leaving the field free to auto-suggestion, produces a counter-suggestion. Similarly, if we relax so as to let an idea take root in the unconscious mind, our will is never called into play. Yet will and suggestion, so far from

replacing each other, complete each other, in our make-up, by their mutual activity. Action unaided by suggestion will lead to fatigue and exhaustion, which will destroy soul and body; suggestion unaided by will infects the mind and renders the body abulic and ineffective for the purpose of any human activity.

In an "autonomous" man, these two activities complete each other and make him into a "person". Any abuse of his autonomy, on the other hand, impairs the functioning of one or the other process, as the case may be. Yogists and "activists" continue to uphold opposite theses, each of which, by itself, is inadequate. Despite its exaggerations in the one specific direction, the West has discovered the laws of auto-suggestion; it has tried to apply them, and has admitted the drawbacks of its tradition whereby the mind is directed towards the conquest of nature. The East has practised auto-suggestion and its accompaniments for tens of centuries, and has even abused them, to the detriment of its own material success. The educator, without stooping to a compromise, can take man as a whole and suggest a form of education embracing at once the heart, the reason and the will. The Cartesian method, though seemingly irreconcilable with the finely intellectual method of Pascal, must have its place in the education of the future.

Eastern education leads us to the "authentic" being; its aim is, therefore, identification with the spirit, not external manifestation with regard to others. The mystic is led by his "inner dialogue" towards the abolition of his superficial self and towards the discovery of his deeper self, his *huvviyya*. Western education, on the other hand, leads to what *appears*, and therefore seeks a form of expression that can be understood by others.

In passive education, there is no fusion between being and appearing; being, in man, requires certain things that his appearing cannot provide. Such education is accordingly apt to create false personalities; its consequences are despair, hypocrisy and morbidity. Under a process of active education, on the other hand, the individual at once enters into relationship with the world; he penetrates into its innermost corners; he creates it. Because others cannot penetrate his conscience, modern man has to form a contractual association with them. An open conscience brings about spiritual reciprocity. This fact was noted, from the purely sociological standpoint, by Le Play and Tönnies; but if we look at it from a wider point of

view, we see in it the two complementary aspects of human existence.

In the philosophy of education, two separate conceptions must be noted: (a) education that has to do with ideal values, that is designed to implant in children the ideals of man; (b) education that has to do with social realities. Every period, every social group, has its real types of man. These types, however, are not all provisional or variable under differing conditions. Given types, though stemming from different civilizations or cultures, have certain common features. There are craftsmen, warriors, priests, traders, peasants, town-dwellers, neighbours and relations in every group, whether it be large or small, primitive or developed, ancient or modern—in short, in every form of society. Though the human groups themselves may change, these types retain their essential features. The education of a craftsman, a priest or a peasant is conducted on basic principles which are common to almost every civilization. There is nothing, therefore, to rule out the possibility of an "autonomous" science of education, and of its use, even subsequent to a change in social conditions. The types in question are so many that it is impossible to calculate the number of subdivisions existing within a given caste, or within a given group bound together by ties of blood or material interest. It will be the educator's task to study, in the first place, the essence of a given social type; it will be the task of the sociologist to explain the variations that flow from differences of time and place.

In his detailed study of social groups, the educator will enlist the aid of the sociologist. No educational method can be applied effectively without a clear idea of the structure of the society involved. Education of the future can be based on an understanding between East and West only if a thorough study is made of each human group existing within that general framework.

ADDENDUM: INTER-CULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

I should like to make a brief reference to the cultural and philosophical relations that have existed between the two

worlds in the past. I have already mentioned the influence of Alexandrine Hellenism on Hindu thought. Greco-Buddhist culture in the first place (at the time of King Asoka) and then Greco-Bactrian culture, had produced works that were a cross between two civilizations; and Pali-Buddhism had been accepted more widely outside than within its native area. The archaeological excavations of Van Le Coq, Müller, Grünwedel, Aurel Stein and the like, have revealed, in regard to this civilization, information most of which has not yet been properly studied.

Through these scholars we have been acquainted, since 1914, with Manichæan Buddhist and Brahminical manuscripts that reveal to us the origin and expansion of these religions in Central Asia. Manichæism, the successor to Babylonian syncretism, embraced in itself all Middle and Near Eastern beliefs except Judaism; it comprised the ideas of the Christian Trinity, the Incarnation, Brahminical transmigration and the duality of Mazdeism. Its ideal of man—Burkan—spread, during the fourth and fifth centuries, from Turkestan to Abyssinia and, appearing within Christianity as a dualist heresy with the Paulicians, Bogomils, Patarins and Catharists, infiltrated by way of Byzantium to Rome and throughout the whole of Central Europe.

Augustus, during the first half of his life, was subject to the influence of this religion. Islam, calling it *Zindîqa*, condemned it, though under Islamic principles all other celestial beliefs were respected; the early Abbassid Caliphs however, who were free-thinkers, tolerated all opinions and sought to bring about an Eastern Renaissance; the Manichæans therefore, together with the Syriac and Jewish divines, were protected in the palace of the Caliphs, but this generous tolerance was soon to be followed by the condemnation of the *zanâdîqa*. For Islam regarded Manichæism as its enemy by reason of the latter's denial of the one, universal and creator God, and because of its tendency towards communism. But the influences exerted after Alexander by the Syrian and Jacobite schools paved the way to the century that was characterized by deep interest in the translations and commentaries of works, and the interpretation of thought, emanating from Greece and Hellenism. Here, Hindu influence should be mentioned, though it was comparatively feeble.

The period subsequent to the ninth century saw the flowering of Islamic thought. Hellenic thought continued to be an influence, but there was added to it a blending of religion with "peripatetic" philosophy. The theologians, however, very soon rejected all these "conciliating" tendencies. Islamic thought reached its apogee with its scientific and philosophical production between the ninth and eleventh centuries; this activity spread well beyond Baghdad and established itself in such distant centres as Samarkand, Al-Kâhira (Cairo), Seville, Toledo and Sicily. Arabic, in the early Middle Ages, was the only language of the humanities; and, apart from the nation of the Prophet, Persians and Turks also took part in the scientific work. Westerners, too, visited the Islamic institutions in Andalusia, North Africa and Sicily, to imbibe knowledge. Thus was ushered in the period during which were translated, from Arabic into Latin, many of the Greek works—with their Arabic commentaries—and original Islamic works as well. We may mention the names of Albatagni, Alhazen, Alrazes, Albubatur, Alkhorasmi, Algorithmi, Avenzoar, Avenbator, Avicenna, Alfarabi, Gazali, and so forth. This tide had reached full flood by the thirteenth century, when the Christian renaissance of the Middle Ages began.

The two worlds, despite the hostility engendered by the Crusades, maintained their cultural and intellectual relations right down to the fourteenth century. H. H. Schaefer seeks the origin of Ibn Arabi's "perfect man" in the "Burkans" of the Manichaeans; for Corbin, the genesis of illuminist thought (*Ichraqiya*) lies in the thought of Mazdeism. M. A. Palacios traces the influence of Al Gazali down to Pascal, by way of Ramrom Marti, the Spanish priest who was inspired by Gazali (though he did not quote him) and who inspired Pascal in the same way. When Frederick II, Emperor of Germany and King of Naples, asked certain questions with regard to Greek philosophy, Ibn Sab'in replied to him in a well-known book—*The Sicilian Replies*. Finally, according to Palacios, Dante found the model for his *Divine Comedy* in Ibn Arabi's eschatological description of the "mystical ascension" (*Futuhati-al-Makkiya*).

As for India, the Persian influence was felt throughout that land through all the ages; Islam's influence began with the invasion by Mahmud Gaznavi (1175-1240). Under the Turco-

Mongol emperors the régime, so far as religion was concerned, was extremely liberal, and Shah Akbar and Akbar-Nâma were responsible for the construction of a temple, each part of which was designed to be devoted to a separate faith. There was, initially, considerable resistance to Islam in India; the polytheism and idolatry current there rejected Islamic monotheism. The iconoclastic outlook of the Moslems, and their aversion to the caste system, created an unbridgeable gulf between the two worlds, and Islam's real influence in India only began with the introduction of the Moslem Orders there (the Naqchiya, Nurbahchiya, Ruchaniya, etc. had found adepts not only among the Moslem Hindus but also among the Brahmins). Al-Birunî's book on India (*Kitab malil-Hind*) bears witness to this influence, where it speaks of Patanjali. No human type was so close in appearance to the Yogi as the Sufi, whose asceticism postulated the annihilation of self and the love of the divine. Once it had come under the influence of Sufi'ism, India discovered in it one of its own ideals. In practice, the *fanâ* of Islam and the *Nirvana* of Buddhism coincided. This current of inspiration was reflected in its last representative; Mahatma Gandhi, in the pantheism informing his *Saotyagraha*.

Christianity infiltrated very slowly, and conversions were very rare. The Hindus regarded the West as the parent area of the "invading missionaries". Even the modern reformers, Tagore and Gandhi, crossed swords with the West and tried to instil into India attachment to native culture and the sense of a spiritual vocation. Today, however, modernism combined with the conservative Hindu outlook—though there is an irreconcilable difference between them—hold out the prospect of a national synthesis for the future.

The West, after Alexander's initial attempt at "cultural invasion", made another effort subsequently—and vainly—with the crusades; but much later on it discovered vast continents and outlets and conquered the entire world, with the result that European civilization became world civilization. Had the tendency towards invasion not been followed by a desire to acquire knowledge, the spread of European culture would have had no point. As it was, however, the sciences of man were born and the natural sciences developed.

In its intoxication with victory, the West let its judgments

be coloured by pride. The result was a variety of poisons in the shape of prejudices as to the inevitable collapse of ancient cultures, over-estimation of the social ego, race superiority (or superiority of part of a race), the inevitable evolution of humanity in a single direction, the denial of all values (by regarding them as out-dated), a reversal of the scale of values, and the substitution of the values of hedonism for those of the mind.

All the same, it is the love of knowledge, the pure scientific outlook—the fruit of so many cultural ties, and the only valid heritage of past periods as a whole—that is best fitted to deliver the world, all the world, from its moral crisis.

The most radical stage in man's evolution is the transition from ethnic (national) religion to universal religion. The establishment of "celestial" religions is the root of the individuals' autonomy, as of secularization (the transition from the closed system of the sacred to the profane and to the pagan); it ushers in the sages, the prophets, the saints, laicization and the examination of the conscience.

In this way the ideas of equality, brotherhood, justice and human freedom develop throughout the two continents. We find the origin of our tetralogy in the world religions, and this opens up the prospect of a universal faith, transcending all regional differences of form and ceremony in worship. This ideal can be made a reality, and placed on solid foundations, by the nations themselves, who are the creators of their own cultures. That will never bar the way to world co-operation. For humanity at its sanest will consummate this task by aiming, not at some form of abstract unity impervious to social diversity, but at unity *in* diversity, leading the nations to one single ideal of man, and to one single method of education.

The Concept of Man and the Philosophy of Education in East and West

by

A. R. WADIA

THE basic document prepared by the Unesco Secretariat is actuated by the desire to evolve a philosophy of life which could serve as the basis for the One World ideal which lies at the back of the UN as well as of Unesco. To its credit let it be said that it does not gloss over the differences between the East and the West and yet sees in the political and economic developments of today the possibility of "the one civilization of tomorrow" and seeks for guidance towards this end in the discussions it is intended to initiate at a high philosophic level.

Before raising any philosophical issue it is desirable to be clear about the exact significance of the terms used—especially as they are apt to be so misleading, both in what they denote and what they connote. As mere geographical terms East and West have a quite simple significance. But when they are opposed to each other as cultural units, there is inevitable confusion. Every sociologist knows the effect of geographical and climatic factors on the development of peoples in particular countries, and we find characteristic differences between the different nationals of Europe as between the nationals of so vast an area as Asia, comprising the Semitic Muslims, the Aryan Iranians and Hindus and the Mongol Chinese and Japanese. In recent years it has become fashionable to contrast the philosophies of the East and the West as if each stood for a simple entity. The basic document does not commit this fallacy of taking for granted that the civilizations of the East and the West are just two different things. It is alive to the fact that the culture of the Latin world is different from that of the Slavs, and that the Chinese culture is markedly different from that of India, while Japan, borrowing its religion from India and its culture from China has evolved yet another culture of its own, which neither China nor India would care

to recognize as theirs. The Middle East, predominantly Islamic, has again evolved values of life markedly different from those of its neighbours to the East or West. To the average Westerner the East stands for both India and China which are regarded as a cultural unit, though the attitude of China has far more points of kinship with the traditional West than with her next-door neighbour, India. Even eminent Indians are apt to look upon China as Buddhist when the Chinese themselves have looked to Confucius for inspiration rather than to Buddha; and the degree to which they accepted Buddha was due to the ethical content of Buddhism rather than to its metaphysical content.

The so-called contrast between the East and the West really boils down to the contrast between Europe and India, for India has produced a metaphysics, unique and unseen anywhere else. While saying this, let it be clearly understood that it applies mostly to Advaita Vedanta or Sankara; and not to all schools of Indian metaphysics. If in the future evolution of one culture we have to make room for the contrasting philosophies of the West and Advaitic India, it is necessary to be clear as to how far and how deep these contrasts go.

Western philosophy has always aimed at knowing the universe in itself and/or the reality behind it. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge has been its motto through the ages and that is why till two centuries ago it made no distinction between science and philosophy. In India, on the other hand, since the days of the Upanishads there has been an emphasis on the *jnan* that leads to liberation (*moksha*) and that *jnan* is concerned solely with the knowledge of the reality: one, abiding, unchanging. Naturally the flux of ordinary life came to be looked upon as of no importance, or only of passing importance for the day-to-day world. It has produced a sense of superiority to the world around, and even an attitude of indifference, so beautifully crystallized by Matthew Arnold in his famous lines:

*The East bowed low before the blast,
In patient, deep disdain.
She let the legions thunder past,
And plunged in thought again.*

This is not mere poetry, but a fact writ large on the pages of Indian History.

This has given rise to another characteristic difference in the attitude of philosophy to religion. If Socrates was the first in the line of great European philosophers, he was also the first rebel against the priests and the traditional gods of his country. He died a martyr, the first in the long line of martyrs in the history of Europe. Scientists like philosophers have paid for their advancing knowledge with imprisonment, torture and even death. No such conflict has been seen in India. Philosophy as an inherited creed has become a part and parcel of the religious tradition, with all its paraphernalia, while science as a humble and a subordinate partner in the firm has never evoked any opposition. There have been conflicts between rival schools, but rarely have they gone beyond verbal gymnastics, and if there has been religious persecution it has taken the form of excommunication of individuals or of families, not so much for differences of creed as for breaches of caste rules. Whether Advaita is strictly consistent with a theistic religion is a very big question which cannot be taken up in this short paper. Suffice it to say that while relegating even *Iswara* to the world of *maya* in philosophic theory, in practice the Advaitin has remained as religious as the more pronounced theists, like the followers of Ramanuja or Madhava.

If philosophy in the West ends in knowledge, in Advaitic India as in other schools of Indian philosophy, that knowledge as *jnan* must end in liberation from the cycle of births and deaths. In other words Indian philosophy is pragmatic in character. This liberation from the iron chain of births and deaths does not come easily. It is an achievement of life after life: a patient toil either of *bhakti* or *karma* culminating in *jnan*. Philosophy is not an end in itself. It is but a means to something higher, i.e. the highest aim in life: *moksha*. This brings out a fundamental difference in methodology too, for this highest knowledge is not won through logic or what the West has come to know as concepts. It is a direct intuition, a *darshana*, a vision of reality, which is beyond words and therefore incommunicable. It is mystical, at bottom a matter of faith. That is why in India there are numerous schools of philosophy and even more religious sects, which fundamentally are based on the individual's faith in a teacher, who may be dead or alive.

Then there is the fourth difference between the West and India. Where religion is strong there is bound to be a greater

emphasis on its ritualistic aspect than on its moral aspect. At the highest level the ethical precepts of India are inferior to none, but the joint forces of caste hierarchy, strength of religious faith, ignorance, with its close ally superstition, and centuries of political subordination have all conspired to put a premium on the conventional morality of castes.

On the basis of these considerations one might be tempted to draw the conclusion that the East and West will ever remain poles asunder, as Kipling is supposed to have taught, though he actually taught something entirely different:

*But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the
ends of the earth.*

Though one particular school of philosophy gives one an impression of an India whose feet are not on solid earth, but dangle somewhere in the clouds, there are other schools who do not look upon the solid earth as a dream. But even if all Indian philosophy were to teach us to look away from the joys of earth as a dangerous snare, there is another phase of Indian life which revels in poesy and song and dance, and in which stones and marble become endowed with sparkling life; while her kings have displayed a splendour that has become legendary in all the corners of the earth. So there is a point where Indian culture cuts across the most secular learning of the West and challenges comparison point by point with the best economic, political and medical thought of the Western world.

In the olden days when wide spaces, high mountains and deep gorges divided one country from another, it was possible for a culture to develop an isolation, which in its turn produced a sense of superiority and aloofness. But while prophets preached the oneness of humanity and philosophers logically evolved a lofty universal ethic, it is the scientific achievements of the last two centuries that have annihilated distances and brought the peoples of the world nearer one another than ever before. Apart from what the physical sciences have achieved, the biological sciences and the social sciences have done much to break down the old ideas of racial or national superiority. Heredity of course counts and plays its part, but improvement in the environment has already done so much that it holds out a hope for a new humanity. The protagonists of negro in-

feriority could hardly have imagined that out of the wombs of slaves could spring such geniuses as George Washington Carver or Booker Washington, that in the space of a century negroes would produce leaders in every field of life. The miracle that has happened in America can happen in Africa too as soon as the fiction of white superiority is exploded and the pressure of political repression is sufficiently relaxed to afford opportunities for educational advancement to the indigenous populations of Africa.

Individuals will differ from one another, but every one of them has a potentiality for good that needs to be exploited to the full—barring of course the limitations imposed by ill-health or an unhealthy environment. No factor in improving an environment is so important as improving education. It is the mightiest lever for the improvement of mankind, and the future of humanity is bound up with the question of education. But before we can think of education on the right lines, we should be conscious of its defects in our existing systems. I am not referring to defects in mere methods of teaching. These are questions of detail, of no intrinsic importance, for even bad methods of teaching have produced good men and good scholars. What I have in mind is something deeper: the contents of our education. The defects here are mainly three.

Religious fanaticism of a virulent type is almost dead in all countries. It may be due to the fact that religion perhaps does not play the same important part in our lives as it used to do. In fact it is a common criticism that modern education tends to be godless, at least it has been so in my country; and among the educationists in India generally there is a deep mistrust of religious education, inspired by a fear that it might give free rein to old prejudices and provide a fillip to antiquated notions which would ultimately do more harm than good. In considering this question we have to be conscious of the fact that man is spiritual or religious at heart. No less a person than Dr. Robert Millikan, a Nobel Laureate, told leading physicists that a lifetime of scientific research had convinced him that there is a divinity that is shaping the destiny of man and he added: "a purely materialistic philosophy is to me the height of unintelligence". Far too often has religion in most of us taken a narrow view of man and God alike. This has been

abundantly proved by the religious history of mankind. Each onward moral step has led to a deepening conception of God and that in its turn has deepened the moral foundations of our life. Nothing is so interesting as the study of the growth of religion in the world as a whole. But most religious teaching in our schools and homes runs in a narrow groove, sincere perhaps but rather cramped. No wonder that it produces in some a zeal to convert the world, and tends to breed in others a supercilious indifference. Real religion should produce in each a reverent consciousness of a transcendent and benevolent power, irrespective of the individual modes of approach to that power in the form of worship. Such an attitude can be developed only if, even as children, our boys and girls are taught that God is one, and that all the prophets teach the same truth. Such a training will develop a sense of tolerance and appreciation and a consciousness of man's journey in the quest of God; and they will begin to feel that "a flame that has passed on its light to countless other flames must disdain so sordid a feeling as jealousy" and identify themselves as fellow-pilgrims on a common search. Habits of a broad catholicity imbibed in childhood will bear their fruit in the ripeness of age.

Nationalism today has grown into a dangerous virus and needs to be curbed. This danger was by no means unforeseen. It was looked upon as the greatest political discovery of the nineteenth century but even then a wise political thinker had the foresight to say that the task of the twentieth century would be to curb and control this spirit of nationalism. Two devastating wars in one generation with the clouds of another floating on the horizon bear this out, and Unesco, which has set out to plant the seeds of peace in the minds of men cannot do better than tackle this question with all the earnestness at its command. It is but fair that each child should know the history of his own country and his own people, but this has been apt to be taught in such a way as to give birth to an exaggerated sense of the importance of his own country and to a distorted view of the history of other countries. I believe this problem is already being tackled by Unesco. Rewriting the histories of different countries is not an easy problem. It might be easier to attack the evil by the writing of a history

of the world, in which the achievements of different peoples and nations would be presented in a proper perspective. The study of such a book in schools would tend to develop an attitude of mind which would look upon humanity as one with its different branches in the East and the West regarded as fellow families that have laboured in their own way toward human progress. Needless to say such a history will lay less emphasis on battles and kings than on the achievements of the great of all nations in the fields of literature and art, science and philosophy, morals and religion.

The third evil of our education today has become world-wide and that is extreme specialization. Knowledge has grown so vast that specialization has become inevitable for those engaged in research. But it is questionable education to encourage it for the rank and file, few of whom will ever aspire to be specialists and most of whom will have to bear the humdrum burdens of everyday life. We are aware that industrialism has not been an unmixed blessing. It has introduced a monotony of work, which has destroyed the joy of creative activity so common among the craftsmen. There must be some means to lessen this ennui of life and that something can only be supplied by a system of education that has the whole of man before it: man as craftsman, rejoicing in doing; man as a lover of the beautiful in painting, sculpture, architecture and music; man as a thinker; man as a social creature; man as a pilgrim in search of the divine.

Education has to remake the men and women of our generation. The old contrast between the East and West has lost its former antithesis. In addition to the superficial veneer of the Western ballrooms, which now have their counterparts in India and Iran and China, we find the impress of the West on the life of the teeming millions of the East. The new sense of individuality, the new intoxication of freedom, the new zest for life, the new womanhood that we have begun to see flowering in the so-called unchanging East, give us a foretaste of the future, in which the West and the East will be just geographical terms without the connotation of different moral, political and religious attributes. Democracy is an equalizer and its greatest tool is education.

In this changed world, philosophy too will have to change

so as not to be known as Eastern or Western. The West may yet come to look kindly upon the basic Indian conceptions of *karma* and rebirth, and perhaps the scientific genius of the West may succeed in giving them a scientific basis instead of their being accepted as dogmas. This may give the West a clearer perspective of the infinitude of life and a deeper insight into the mysteries of life through the psychological approach to the mysteries of Indian mysticism. Similarly India too will have to learn through her contact with the virile West that life is more than a dream and something too concrete to be dealt with lightly. If her new-born democracy is to be a fact and not a mere political aspiration, India will have to develop a new zest for life in all its richness. The peace that India has preached is not a mere negation of wars, but that inward peace which implies harmony in the soul and in our relations with all, be they of the East or West. What we must aspire to achieve is to create a world in which man becomes conscious of the sacredness of his body as the temple of his soul and the vehicle of his mind, so that he keeps it clean and makes it beautiful and free from disease. His mind has to be enriched with all the wealth of civilizations and his soul made alive to his destiny as man the spirit. Only by aiming at the highest can we attain what is worth attaining, though as practical men we can take only measured steps, inch by inch, in the spirit so beautifully expressed by Goethe: *Ohne Hast, ohne Rast*.

*Address delivered
at the Formal Closing Session
of the Symposium*

Address
by
The Hon'ble Shri Jawaharlal Nehru
Prime Minister of India

MR. President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am grateful to you for this opportunity of attending the closing session of this symposium. I must apologize for not having attended the opening session to welcome you all here. I looked forward to it greatly and it was a great disappointment that I could not do so, not merely to perform a formal function of opening, but rather, as the President has suggested, to participate in some way in your discussions and talks and to try to gather light from those discussions. It is good of you to ask me to speak but I feel somewhat hesitant, because of the presence of very eminent friends who have come from distant countries, specialists and men and women of great experience; and for me to say something about the great subject of your debate appears to me rather presumptuous. Had I had the chance to attend some of your sessions, I would have listened to what was said there, perhaps sometimes participated, put a question, but, generally speaking, listened, because I would have been anxious to find out what you had in your minds and how that could help me to understand some of the problems that confront us. Because, most of us, I suppose, are burdened with the complexity of our present-day problems. We live our day-to-day lives and face our day-to-day difficulties, but somehow that is not enough. And when one seeks something behind that daily round to find out how one can solve the problems that affect the world, especially one who, owing to circumstances, is placed in a position of great responsibility, it is particularly difficult to avoid thinking about these problems. During the last few weeks I have been going about this great country and seeing multitudes of human beings—my countrymen and countrywomen, surging masses—and always a thought has come to me: what is going to happen to these people; what

are they thinking; in which direction are they and we—because we are in the same boat—going? And then I thought of other multitudes in other countries. What about these vast masses of human beings? Here we are, some of us, functioning on the political plane and presuming to decide the fate of nations; how far do our decisions affect these multitudes; do we think of them or do we live in some upper stratosphere of diplomats and politicians, exchanging notes and sometimes using harsh words against each other? Politics in this context becomes rather trivial, in this mighty context of the world and its vast masses of human beings and the tremendous phase of transition through which we are passing. So I have no particular light to throw on the problems that you have been discussing; rather, I would like to put before you some of the difficulties that I have in my mind. Indeed, I hope that when I have the occasion to read some of the reports of what you have been saying to each other, perhaps they may help me to understand the methods needed to solve some of these problems.

One of my chief difficulties is this: that somehow it seems to me that the modern world is getting completely out of tune with what I might call the life of the mind—I am leaving out at the moment the life of the spirit. Yet, the modern world is entirely the outcome of the life of the mind. After all, it is the human mind that has produced everything that we see and feel around us. Civilization is the product of the human mind and yet, strangely enough, one begins to feel that the function of the mind becomes less and less in the modern world—or certainly not so much as it used to be; that somehow, generally speaking, mind counts for less. Mind may count for a great deal in specialized domains; it does, and so we make great progress in these specialized domains of life. But, generally speaking, in life itself as a whole, mind counts for less and less. That is my impression. Now, if that is true, there is something radically wrong with the civilization we are building or have built, and which is ever changing. The changes that are so rapidly taking place emphasize other aspects of life and somehow prevent the mind from functioning as it should, and as perhaps it used to do in the earlier periods of the world's history. If that is true, then surely it is not a good outlook for the world, because the very basis on which our civilization has grown, on which man has risen step by step to the great

heights on which he stands today, the very foundation of that edifice is shaken.

We talk about many things, and they are important. Here am I, in India, concerned about everything, but more particularly about the primary necessities of life for our people. I am concerned with food for our people, with clothing for our people, shelter and housing for our people, education, health, etc. Now these are primary necessities and of course unless you have these primary necessities it seems to me rather futile to talk about the life of the mind or the life of the spirit. You cannot talk of God to a starving person; you must give him food. So one has to deal with these primary necessities, it is true. Nevertheless, even in dealing with them one has some kind of an ideal or object in view which is more distant; and if that ideal or objective somehow becomes less and less connected with the growth of the human mind, there must be something wrong. I do not know if what I say is true or if you agree with it; and I do not know, even if it is true, how it can improve.

I am a great admirer of the achievements of modern civilization, of the growth of science, of the applications of science and of technological growth. Humanity has every reason to be proud of them, and yet if those achievements lessened the capacity for growth in the future—and that will happen if the mind deteriorates—then, surely, there is something wrong about that process. Because, I suppose, it is obvious that the mind ultimately should dominate. I am again not mentioning the spirit but that comes into the picture too. If the world suffers from mental deterioration as a whole or from moral degradation, then something goes wrong at the very root of civilization or of culture. And while that civilization may last a considerable time, it grows less and less and ultimately it might tumble down. When I look back on the past periods of history, they are very different of course but, nevertheless, certain periods stand out. They show great achievements of the human mind. Other periods are not so. One finds races achieving a high level and then apparently fading away, at least fading away from the point of view of their achievements. And so I wonder if something that led to the fading away of a relatively high culture is not happening today and producing an inner weakness in the modern structure of our civilization.

Then the idea comes to me, what is the environment which is likely to produce the best type of human being? You talk about education and that obviously is very important. But apart from the school or college education, the entire environment that surrounds us naturally affects the development of the human being. What is the environment that has produced in the past these great ages of history? Do we now have that proper environment basically? Are we going towards it or away, in spite of the great progress we have made in many departments of human life? What about the industrial revolution that started about 170 or 200 years ago, and the enormous changes, largely for the good, that this industrial revolution has brought about? That process, I take it, is continuing and the tempo becomes faster and faster—the tempo of change. Where is it leading us? It has led us in one direction—to great conflicts and possibly greater conflicts which threaten to engulf a large part of humanity in a common cataclysm.

Now there is an essential contradiction in all this—this race between progress and building and the other element which destroys, which is likely to destroy all that we have built up. We seem to live, most of us, as if both were inevitable and we have to put up with it. It seems to me very odd that we wish to build and build and at the same time look forward to the possible destruction of all that we build. The destruction of the outer emblems of the mind and spirit may also follow. Is it something, I wonder, some resultant of this growth of the industrial revolution that is overreaching itself? Have we lost touch with the roots that give strength to a race, to humanity or to the individual, just as perhaps a city dweller loses touch with the soil and sometimes even the sun, and then may live an artificial life in comfort and even in luxury. There is something that he lacks, something that is vital to the human being. So whole races begin to live more and more an artificial life, cut off from the soil and the sun. Is that not so? These ideas trouble me. Again I find that this growth of a mechanical civilization which obviously has brought such great triumphs and has helped the world so much, gradually affects the man and the mind. The mind which produced the machine to help itself, gradually becomes a slave of that machine and we become progressively as a race mechanically minded.

I suppose the vitality of a group, of an individual or a society is the extent to which it possesses creative imagination, courage, etc., but above all creative imagination. If that creative imagination is lacking, our growth becomes less and less, which is a sign of decay. What is happening then today? Are we trying to improve in this or are we merely functioning somewhere on the surface without touching that reality which is afflicting the world, which may take shape in political conflicts, in economic warfare or in world war?

So when discussions take place on the concept of man, the Eastern ideal or the Western ideal, they are very interesting to me from a historical point of view, from a cultural point of view, although I have always resisted this idea of dividing the world into the Orient and the Occident. I think that is a very simple way of saying something and thereby dividing ourselves, by dividing into compartments like this. I do not believe in such divisions. I do think that there are differences, there have been differences in racial and national outlook and ideals, but to talk of East and West has little meaning. The West, the modern West—meaning thereby a great part of Europe and the Americas—has developed a certain type of civilization, more especially during the last 200 years or so, based no doubt on certain basic traditions derived from Greece or Rome. But it is the tremendous industrial growth of which I have spoken that has made the West what it is, the scientific industrial growth. I can see the difference between the industrialist country and the non-industrialist country. I think the difference, say between India and Europe, in the Middle Ages would not have been very great, just as there are differences between any of the great countries of Asia. I feel the East-West division is a misleading approach which prevents us from thinking correctly, and that differences have crept in or have been intensified by the process of industrialization, mechanization, etc. which has promoted material well-being tremendously and which has been a blessing to humanity. But it is somehow, if not in the past, now perhaps, corroding that life of the mind and thereby encouraging a process of self-destruction. I am not, for the moment, talking or thinking about wars and the like. We have seen in history races come up and gradually fade away, in Asia, in Europe and other places. Are we witnessing any such thing?

It may be that this will not take effect in our lifetime. In the past there was at least one great consolation—things happened in one particular quarter of the world. If there was a collapse in one part of the world, the other part carried on. Now, the whole world hangs together in life or in death, so that if this civilization fades away or collapses it takes practically the whole world with it. There is no part of it left, in a sense, to survive, as in the olden times it did. During the so-called dark ages of Europe, there were bright periods in Asia, in China, in India, in the Middle East or elsewhere. So that, in the old days, if progress was limited, disaster was also limited both in extent and intensity. Today, when we have arrived at a period of great progress we have also arrived at a period of great disaster, and it is a little difficult for us to choose some middle way so as to assure a little progress and possibly limit the risks of disaster. Can we avoid that disaster? That becomes the major question and idealistic conceptions of the concept of man, etc. become rather academic, although they are very important. At any rate, for one who has to carry a burden of responsibility, the practical aspects of this question are a great cause for anxiety. So, I should have liked your Conference to throw light on this question. Am I right in saying that the mental life of the world is in a process of deterioration, chiefly because the environment that has been created by this development of the industrial revolution does not give time to individuals to think, does not give them that opportunity? There are many great thinkers today, I do not deny it, but it is quite likely that they might be submerged in the mass of unthinking humanity.

Again, we are dealing with and talking a great deal about democracy, and I have little doubt that democracy is the best method that I can see of all the various methods available to us for the governance of human beings. At the same time we are seeing today—by today I mean the last decade or two decades—the emergence of democracy on a mass scale and in a somewhat uncontrolled way. When we think of democracy, we normally think of it in the rather limited phases of the nineteenth century or the early twentieth century. Now something has happened since then, owing to this remarkable technological growth, and meanwhile democracy has also spread in the form of adult suffrage and similar measures, with the result

that we have vast masses of human beings brought up by this industrial revolution not encouraged or given opportunity to think much, living a life which from the point of view of physical comfort is ever so much better than in any previous generation, but seldom thinking or seldom having a chance to think. And yet at the same time it is the vast mass of human beings that will, in a democratic system, ultimately govern or elect those who govern.

Are they likely to elect the right sort of persons they need, or more or less right persons? That becomes a little doubtful. And I think it may be said without offence—and I certainly can say it without offence for I belong to the tribe of politicians—that the quality of men who are selected by this modern democratic method of adult suffrage gradually deteriorates. There are outstanding individuals chosen, no doubt, but it does deteriorate because of this gradual lack of thinking and the application of modern methods of propaganda. All the noise and din and the machinery of advertisement prevent man from thinking. He reacts to this din and noise and he produces a dictator or a dumb politician; one who is insensitive, who can stand all the din and noise in the world and remain standing on his two feet, gets elected; the other man collapses because he cannot stand all this din. It is an extraordinary state of affairs. It is all very well for us to praise the growth of democracy but the point I wish to make is not in regard to democracy but rather to the fact that modern life—I go back to what I said at the beginning—does not encourage the life of the mind. If it is so, that is, if the life of the mind is not encouraged, then inevitably—it follows for me—civilization deteriorates, the race deteriorates and ultimately either collapses in some great cataclysm or simply fades away and becomes as other races have become. So I would like the eminent delegates of this Conference who have come here to help me to find some answer to these doubts and difficulties which arise in my mind—and I suppose they are not only in my mind, but also in the minds of large numbers of people elsewhere.

Appendixes

Appendix I

Basic Document: drawn up by the Unesco Secretariat on the basis of suggestions received from Professor Olivier Lacombe and Swami Siddheswarânanda.

Proposed Theme for Discussion: "The concept of man and the philosophy of education in East and West."

THE GENERAL PROBLEM: EAST AND WEST

East and West can each preserve its own peculiar genius without becoming encased in a sterile hostility. It has often been rightly said that for the one party to view itself in contrast with a distorted and over-simplified conception of the other, is to run the risk of losing all but the most superficial of its own values; it is also to run the risk of stagnation in a tradition doomed to degenerate for lack of revitalizing contact with the outer world. This is the reason for the many meetings, discussions, symposia, investigations and visits that have taken place since the beginning of the present century, with the object of developing a better understanding between the parties.

Unesco could not remain indifferent to this problem; it was bound to face it squarely in the present circumstances of the world, brought about by the increasingly rapid process of unification, the reduction of distances, the growing importance of technology, the gradual attainment by all the peoples of political independence and international responsibility and, above all, the disquiet and perplexity prevailing among the two great civilizations of yesterday, ready to give birth to the one civilization of tomorrow but cowering under the threat of a world crisis far beyond their capacity to control.

It was Unesco's task to help each of these two civilizations to view itself in just relation to the other and to help both of them to adopt a policy with regard to the grave problems that now beset all nations, problems demanding a reassessment of their traditional wisdom in order that man may develop all the potentialities of his

kind in an environment which he has created but which he is not yet able to dominate by the power of the spirit. If peace is to be soundly based, the old intercourse between East and West must be revived, and efforts must be made with all possible speed to bring about mutual understanding between them, in preparation for that future civilization which should be the common property of all men, at the same time as the expression of their unity and of the ideal they live to serve.

Those are the reasons for organizing this discussion between thinkers and philosophers, with the help of the Indian Government and National Commission. Such a discussion, conducted in the atmosphere of candour and impartiality proper to philosophical contemplation, should serve as a leaven to produce a better understanding between the peoples.

OBJECT AND METHOD OF THE DISCUSSION: THE DISCOVERY OF PRACTICAL CONVERGENCIES

What object and what method can be proposed for such a discussion? The first snare to be avoided would be that of suggesting any attempt to secure an artificial uniformity or a surface-deep reconciliation. The alternative danger would be that of dissipating effort in academic discussions with little prospect of leading to agreement.

To avoid both these dangers, the discussion organized by Unesco should derive from the ideas set forth by Mr. Jacques Maritain at the Second Session of Unesco's General Conference and represent *an effort to discover practical points of convergency in the light of the fullest possible mutual understanding*. This should not, however, in any way debar each philosopher from explaining his own doctrinal attitude.

THE SELECTION OF A TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION

In order to find a common ground for the conduct of discussion, it was felt necessary to suggest a specific topic, so as to avoid the mere accumulation of unco-ordinated ideas; on the other hand, it was desirable that the proposed topic should be capable of epitomizing every significant aspect of the civilizations represented. It is in the attempt to satisfy these two requirements that Unesco has chosen as the subject: "*The Concept of Man and the Philosophy of Education in East and West.*"

The problems of the philosophy of education in its relation to the concept—or concepts—of man in each civilization, do in fact help to bring out the fundamental conceptions of man in his relationship

to the divine principle, to the world, nature, society and the practical sphere of action, historically and in the contemporary world. They involve comparison of the various forms in which spiritual and ethical ideals take shape, with the more immediate question of organization and practical value in societies in which technology is necessarily taking an ever-growing place; they thus permit consideration of the different ways in which ideals can be implemented in the actual circumstances decreed for us by history, and of the ways in which each civilization may attain to understanding of others through the knowledge of their methods of dealing with the problems arising out of the contemporary development of societies.

This discussion might thus lead on finally to the following question: *What are the elements in each civilization conducive to the definition of the cultural and philosophic bases of a well-balanced education, adapted to the spiritual and material needs of contemporary man, and apt to promote understanding between the peoples, respect for human rights, and peace?*

The feature distinguishing the discussion organized by Unesco from the many similar efforts made in the last 50 years, would be precisely this attempt at a re-definition of the values of civilization, not so much in themselves as in their practical implications, in their significance in relation to one another and, as a body, in relation to the contemporary problems of mankind.

THE CONCEPTS OF MAN IN EAST AND WEST: TRADITIONAL CONTRAST BETWEEN THEM

When we consider the individual concepts of man, in what form do we find the contrast between East and West to be usually expressed? We may summarize briefly the traditional formulations of these concepts, even if such formulations by their over-simplicity do not appear to present a faithful picture of the reality.

Firstly, certain characteristics of Western man have appeared most likely to place him in opposition to Eastern man and indeed have been held to express the essence of Western civilization. The West emphasizes the distinction between the ego and the non-ego, regarding nature as man's domain and as an instrument at his service. This accounts for the development of a form of thought which is most characteristically expressed in science, making use of discursive reason and distinguishing one object from another by analysis; it accounts equally for the importance attributed to the self and to self-interest, the striving after individual originality, the insistence on freedom directed towards personal welfare and the exercise of power, and the need for regulating these freedoms

and personal desires by means of social institutions. Western man, it has been said, by nature looks out upon the world with the desire to dominate it; he is not naturally inclined to meditation; the technical therefore tends to take precedence over the spiritual, rational analysis over intuitive communion, and the exercise of the intellect over metaphysical experience. The sharp separation between the sacred and the profane leaves to reason and science the responsibility of ordering daily life for the common good, regarded as the sum of individual interests. Western man, it is said again, does not generally aspire to escape from the bounds of the temporal to eternity; he believes in progress rather than tradition and is ever in search of new ideas, inventions and fresh discoveries. All this results in a form of thought, a way of life and action in which technology founded on science plays a major part, the mastery of material things opens up tremendous vistas and the practice of government has led to certain fine achievements. But Eastern man is struck at once by the instability of Western values and the inability of Western men to give those values the predominant place in the direction of human development; in his view, Western civilization is unable, by itself, to give man tranquillity, essential contentment, and roots in the world.

The East appears to sum up the whole sense of its civilization in the key-word spirituality. In most of the civilizations, at least those which may be described as oriental (and here, many fine distinctions must be made), Eastern man seeks, first and foremost, to find his place in, and to develop more fully his close communion with, nature, instead of subduing it by technical skill or forceful intervention. Hence, in contrast to the discursive science of the West, the development of forms of spirituality laying emphasis upon the intuitive experience of a profound unity of being, or on daily contact with the sacred, regarding all things as the manifestation of a fundamental reality which could only be distorted by analysis, or of a divinity by whose laws the whole world of man and nature is governed; hence, too, the idea of the essential bond between all individuals in a single spiritual universe, and the striving after spiritual elevation in which the mundane world is abandoned and the way opened to higher forms of existence. Eastern man, it is said, is therefore naturally given to introversion; he seeks his real being by the repudiation of the apparent self, cheerfully despising the material goods of this world. To him, the sacred essence is everywhere, and the profane cannot survive save imbued with it. Development is but an illusion and the true life is situated in eternity. The sage's mind is more concerned with meditation on, and the ever fuller experience of, a tradition than with the search for new discoveries or formulae. All this results in a form of thought, a way

of life and action, in which harmony with nature and communion with the divine, founded on spiritual contemplation, play a major part, and in which the examples of sanctity and wisdom are often achieved in societies, which sometimes on the contrary give little thought to the improvement of living conditions for the mass of the people. But Western man, for his part, is prone to see the factors of possible stagnation in the tradition of the East, the sterility of its resignation, the undemonstrability and incommunicability of its metaphysical intuition; Eastern civilization, in his view, is incapable, by itself, of extending the benefits of progress, culture and even spirituality to the race of men as a whole.

THE ERROR OF SIMPLIFICATION

The foregoing gives in brief the general picture of the opposition between East and West, as traditionally presented. It can hardly be denied that there is some truth in it, particularly when the most obvious outward features of these two forms of civilization are considered.

If these contrasts are carried to extremes, however, we should be led to the conclusion that the Eastern outlook and the Western outlook are the exact complements of one another, but lack the minimum points of identity which would enable them to benefit from what each can teach the other. In this light, the ideal of man as man in the fullest sense would remain permanently beyond the scope of either side, with no hope of its attainment, for lack of mutual understanding.

Many years ago, however, the idea was evolved that it is wrong to simplify and sharpen that opposition in this way. Firstly, each of the two civilizations contains so many diverse elements that it cannot be permissible to reduce either to a simple, homogeneous formula. Eastern man, too, takes steps to order earthly life and to transform nature; to him science is indebted for certain intellectual discoveries, particularly in mathematics and astronomy, without which analytical reason could never have forged ahead and ultimately mastered the material world; he is responsible for some of the technical discoveries on which the life of mankind rests; and the history of the nations of Asia shows, too, what a high pitch has been reached, at certain periods, in the art of organizing societies for the common good and for the free development of the individual.

The West, for its part, has also produced saints and sages whose teachings are still a living influence; it has seen and still sees philosophical and spiritual movements of a high order; mystical communion, an intuitive sense of the unity of being, the desire for

eternity, universal love, renunciation, are all essential parts of its tradition. Its very science and the derivative technology are the fruits of primarily disinterested research, in which a remarkably fine aspect of intellectual power has come to flower. The West has discovered and adopted humane values of the very highest importance; freedom of thought, the universal application of law, and the dignity of the individual are the cornerstones of Western humanism; and in Christianity itself, the Franciscan tradition extends to the whole of nature the charity that expresses the link between every created thing and God.

Secondly, it is impossible to speak of *the* civilization of the East or *the* civilization of the West; both terms cover groups of civilizations differing profoundly from one another. Can we, for instance, confound the culture of the Latin and the Slav worlds? Are there not in Asia religions recognizing no personal God, side by side with essentially theistic creeds? Can we fail to distinguish between the traditionally negative attitude of the Hindus towards the State, and the art of government practised for centuries by the Chinese? Does the term "oriental" mean the same thing when applied to the Islamic and the Buddhist civilization?

History shows us that each of these cultures is the product of the intermingling of different streams; in the West, the Mediterranean contribution is faced by that of the barbarian invasions; in Asia, the agricultural societies of the great river valleys by the successive influxes of nomadic peoples. Here we see a striking parallel. There are equally striking parallels in the alternation of wars and cultural revivals. Nay more, Asia has, to a large extent, made Europe what it is, even though it can no longer recognize itself in what Europe has become. Long before the East had to define its attitude towards all that Western expansion offered or imposed upon it, the West—whose religion, incidentally, was derived from the East—first became aware of its identity in the Middle Ages in contradistinction to the East, whence invasion threatened, even while Oriental learning, wisdom and the refinements of Eastern civilization exercised their lure. The Arabs penetrated far into France and settled in Spain, Mongols imposed their law upon a great part of the Slav world, and the Turks lay for a long while at the gates of Vienna. On the other hand, the Crusades established Christian dominions in the heart of the Middle East. It is also significant that Arab civilization, for example, contributed to Europe not only a conception of love which brought about a renewal of social relations and literary inspiration, but also a wisdom and a philosophy directly derived from the main currents of Greek thought. Accordingly, the first attempt at a synthesis recorded by Western civilization in the Middle Ages, namely, the research for a means of reconciling

ancient philosophy and Christian dogma, was made possible by the flowering of Arab philosophy, itself the heir to Mediterranean thought. Speaking generally, the great Renaissances forming landmarks in the history of European and Asiatic civilizations were the results of some sudden eruption from abroad: Buddhism, for instance, whose birthplace was India, took firmest roots in other Asiatic lands.

It would seem, therefore, today that it should be easy to find common ground and that a revival of civilization should be at hand as the fruit of increased and close exchanges. Men owing allegiance to different traditions can meet and understand each other in many matters; the common possession of reason makes converse and the comparison of ideas possible; the similarity of the ethical principles of the great religions bespeaks an everywhere similar aspiration towards spirituality; the mentality of our primitive forefathers underlying that of civilized men peoples their world with myths in which we find profound analogies; the material needs of life, the common necessity of food, shelter and clothing, the experience of human labour in the midst of nature, the use of the same technical methods, represent the *de facto* unity of the world; mutual understanding and respect for one another's culture, and the knowledge of their contacts in the course of history, make it possible for the peoples to live side by side in fruitful intercourse; lastly, the necessity of living peacefully in a closely-knit world whose component parts have become intimately interdependent, now compels all men to reach agreement on a form of organization and balanced system in which all peoples and all civilizations can take their place.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE DISCORD

An inward understanding between the civilizations of the East and the West seems therefore feasible, if we study each of them in itself and in all its complexity. But it is not enough to clear up a simple mutual misunderstanding; it is also necessary to remove a more grievous confusion born of the experience of contemporary history and of contacts which that history has witnessed.

In the last few centuries, Western science and technology have been carried to every country in the world, not only by their own force of attraction, but by virtue of the power they have conferred on those commanding them. It is therefore not surprising that, to the Eastern peoples, the West has appeared to be solely concerned with technical matters, using analytical reason alone as the servant of interest, wholly taken up with material things, and incapable

of any higher aspiration. Nor is it surprising that the agents of this expansion, sometimes conducted by force, found the East impenetrable and saw in it, as it withdrew into itself, only a picture of stagnation and poverty.

Hence the tragedy in the relations between the two civilizations; hence the difficulty in finding a sphere for better understanding between cultures so prejudiced against each other.

Seeing this, we see the full significance of the discussion organized by Unesco: it is the frank recognition of this very tension which may bring together Eastern and Western man, provided that both are made aware of the situation and the needs they now have, each alike, to face.

3

THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN PROBLEMS AND MAN'S
ASPIRATIONS IN THE PRESENT-DAY WORLD

It is by assimilating Western technical advances that the peoples of the East are now achieving full political independence and responsibility for the conduct of their own affairs; in the same way they can raise the living standards of growing populations now a prey at every turn to epidemics, famines and natural calamities; as Swami Siddheswarānanda writes: "The intimate relations between economic conditions and cultural standards have to be examined. When millions and millions in the East have nothing to eat, to speak of humanism and the evolution of the concept of man is just a caricature. Efficient steps have to be taken to liquidate illiteracy and hunger and illness." Whatever the spiritual traditions of a people, it would be impossible today to neglect the technical achievements which alone can enable men to survive in a world that those achievements have transformed. The assimilation of this technological knowledge means, for the East, the undertaking of an enormous programme of political and social organization, educational development, modernization of agriculture and industrialization. What forms and what new significances will its spiritual traditions assume in this new context? They have a greater part than ever to play, and that part may well be vital to keep man in mind of what is loftiest in himself and what might be in danger of extinction. The East is therefore seeking a redefinition of its wisdom, an assessment of what is most vital in its content; it is also anxious to assimilate the traditions of the Western mind, which has, for a long time, been associated with the teachings of science and incorporates in its wisdom the lesson of nature transformed by human labour. The East is therefore trying to eradicate from its tradition any factors too slavishly associated with the past, sub-

stituting a creative tradition, renewing its content by contact with reality and courting encounter with other civilizations. In short, the East desires to evolve a form of civilization in which both the material needs and the spiritual aspirations of man may find satisfaction.¹

As for Western man, he can now less than ever be content with the mere technical achievements due to the progress of science, or by a system of ethics based on interest or ambition. Man has been outstripped by the power of the instruments he has himself created, which have so transformed the world and have given rise to such new and complex problems that the generally (and often implicitly) accepted values thus suddenly challenged are no longer sufficient to teach men how they should use their power and organize their relationships for the peace and happiness of the world. Even the freedom of science is threatened by governmental controls. The dangers which the lust of power may hold for the survival of mankind are only too obvious. How far can man's wish to adapt his surroundings be allowed to go? How can men be inspired to use the resources at their disposal for truly humane purposes? The West is seeking to rediscover in its ethical and political tradition ideals capable of adaptation to the present circumstances of the world and of serving as a guide to mankind in the crisis through which it is passing. But it may also derive new suggestions from the wisdom of the East calculated to provide a counterpoise to its own scientific and technical tradition.

Is a synthesis possible? Can a comparison of the concepts of man characteristic of the East and West help to disclose values on which a humanism adapted to our times may be based? The Unesco discussion will be called upon to go deeply into this question. Put briefly, the technical and material needs common to all the nations, and the urgent demand for a statement of values on which they can all agree, while preserving their own characteristic features, provide the common ground on which it is possible to engage this discussion.

EDUCATION—THE CRUX OF THE MATTER

In both East and West, education is today the crux of the problem: the training of technicians to play an efficient part in society; the education of every individual, without any form of discrimination,

¹ This has been admirably expressed by Rabindranath Tagore in a speech delivered to his compatriots: "Let me make it clear that I am not distrustful of any civilization because it is foreign. On the contrary, I believe that encounter with such forces is necessary to preserve the vitality of our intellectual nature. . . . European culture has come to us with its speed as well

to fit him to develop his potentialities to the full and to play his part as a free man; and lastly the education of man in general so that he may learn to control his own discoveries and may at last attain to wisdom. The object of education should thus be to form men and women in every civilization, capable, by allegiance to their values and knowing how to define them anew, of preserving their humanity in the daily stress of life from the constant dangers created by the growth of new factors in the conditions of society.

Placed thus in relation to the ideal of man which each civilization has inherited from its past and which it is seeking to define anew in the light of modern needs, educational problems are seen in their full significance and scope. How can men be educated today in the different cultural communities to adapt them for living in the modern world; to help them to raise their standard of life; to attain to greater nobility and to retain their cultural originality; to help each nation to understand the others; and, lastly, to aid in the establishment of human rights, and of justice and peace?

There have been many educational experiments in both East and West connected with the transformations which the ideal concept of man has undergone in the last few decades: in India, the impetus imparted by Rabindranath Tagore and by Mahatma Gandhi; in the Islamic world and in many other parts of the East, the present campaigns for the extension of education and its organization on a democratic basis; in the West, the movements initiated by Mrs. Montessori, John Dewey and Jean Piaget, and the new education experiments calling into play the creative freedom of the individual and the fruits of practical experience; and, lastly, the immense amount of work being done everywhere for the training of executives and technicians. Elementary education, technical training, and general education designed to produce the fully developed men and women of tomorrow, are thus indissolubly linked. But it may well be impossible to combine all these movements effectively, unless the present efforts of civilization can produce new ideals. The discussion which Unesco is organizing will have fulfilled its purpose if it helps towards the definition of those ideals.

ADDENDUM: SOME CRUCIAL QUESTIONS

We have deliberately refrained, in the foregoing, from too precise a definition of specific questions, which might confine the discussions

as its knowledge. Although we have assimilated it only imperfectly and it has given rise to many aberrations, it has roused our intellectual life from the inertia of its old habits to an increasing awareness, resulting from the very contrast it offers to our mental traditions."

within unduly narrow limits, militating against their successful development and effect. We have tried simply to describe the premises of the problem facing the whole of mankind. Nevertheless, without pretending to set forth successive headings for the discussion, we may list some of the standpoints from which the civilizations of the East and West have defined their ideals of humanity, and which may today give us a clearer picture of the terms in which man is in general questioning his own nature. We have attempted, as an example, to give below a list of such aspects of the problem, in the hope that they may suggest instances which will facilitate the clear statement of the questions involved, and orderly reflection upon them.

Man in relation to the divine and the sacred. Relationship between the sacred and the profane; relationship between religion and spiritual, ethical and political life.¹ The claims of a life transcending everyday worldly existence. The concept of perfection immanent in human nature and that of original sin or the fall of man, and their consequences to the philosophy of education.²

Man in relation to the cosmos and nature. The concept of man mastering nature by technology, and the concept of man in communion with nature. The attitude of man towards the animal kingdom.³ The cosmic significance of non-violence. The idea of universal justice.⁴

Man and knowledge. The value of knowledge as a means of man's salvation and betterment. Initiation and discovery. Knowledge and wisdom; the limitations to be assigned to the power of the intellect: intellectual learning and the cultivation of the whole being.⁵ Relation between instruction and education. The traditional ideals of education, viewed in regard to the need for the universal dissemination of knowledge.

¹ Points which will come to mind are the significance of the "Sharia" or Koranic Law as a synthesis of ritual, law, ethics and social organization; the relations between the three degrees of morality in India: the lofty morality of the sage, the morality of special duties varying with social status ("svadharma"), and lastly, general ethics, imposing obligations in regard to all human beings ("samanyadharma"), etc.

² "The Indian view of life . . . asserts that perfection is already in man, and that the function of education is only to discover it" (Swami Siddheswarananda).

³ A comparison may be made between the respect for animal life found in certain Eastern civilizations and the Western movement for the "prevention of cruelty to animals" together with the measures taken in the West for the preservation of natural beauties and wild life. On the other hand, consideration may be given to the possible dangers, from man's point of view, of a too unquestioning respect for nature.

⁴ Instances which will come to mind are: the idea of immanent justice in the West; the law of "Karma" in Hinduism and in Buddhism; and the concept of divine justice in Islam.

⁵ An example often quoted is that of Chinese thought, which is directed less towards purely intellectual development than towards the cultivation of the whole man. It is also said that Western peoples are more interested in objective judgments, while Eastern peoples are more concerned with value judgments.

Man and ideals. The influence of ideals in relation to conduct and institutions. Relation between expediency and virtue. The importance of aesthetic values in education; their relation to ethical values; the concept of the cultivated man. Relation between an ideal commensurate with man and the claims of a form of life transcending the purely human.¹

The individual and society. The humanistic bases of democracy; purely political democracy and social and economic democracy; the importance of these concepts in establishing the relations between the individual and the community. The ideal of justice and the fact of inequality.² The conceptions of education and the ideal of equality; the participation of all in cultural life. The betterment of the individual and social harmony.³ Education as a means of liberating the individual, and education as a means of fitting him to a cultural community. The ideal of conformity and the ideal of individual development.

The part played by political institutions, and their significance. What part can national and international political institutions play in the formation of a new humanism?⁴ The problem of the relationship between ethics and politics.⁵ The value of patriotism and the dangers of nationalism.

Man and his neighbour. The problem of tolerance: its meaning; tolerance and scepticism. The importance of altruism.

¹ Consideration may be given to the significance of Nietzschean philosophy, that of the practice of Yoga, and the importance in Indian civilization of a philosophy such as that of Aurobindo.
² In the various cultures, should the status of the individual be regarded as implying strict equality or may it include inequality with respect to function or other considerations? Comparison may be made between the Western distinction between commutative and distributive justice, the Islamic conception of the equality of all believers before God, and the hierarchical principle in traditional Hindu society, which is nevertheless bound up with the law of "Karma", applying equally to all.

³ The wisdom of the Chinese sages, Mencius and Confucius, for example, consists largely in the attempt to reconcile these two terms; comparison may be made with certain theories of democracy in the West and the East.

⁴ Comparison may be made between the Hellenic and the Chinese traditions, regarding government as an exercise of reason and virtue, the traditional dissociation of social and political matters in Hinduism, and the application of the Koranic Law to the exercise of power in Islam.

⁵ It would be easy to discover in all civilizations the self-same temptation to reduce politics to a question of technique entirely divorced from ethics; we may also see a series of similar reactions against this tendency e.g.: Plato and Aristotle in Greece; medieval Christianity, regarding politics from the moral standpoint, and "arhasastra", regarding it from the technical aspect, in India; the idea of civilization as higher than the idea of the State, in Confucius; and, in all Chinese wisdom, the concept of the ordering of life and human activities, including but transcending politics, with the object of achieving the integration of society in a cosmic system.

Man in relation to time and history. Time and eternity. Progress and survival. The concept of tradition and the concept of renewal as formative factors in the philosophy of education.

The significance and scope of action. The relationship between action and contemplation: the sage, the philosopher, the saint and the mystic, and their reactions to the claims of activity. The ethical and political significance of non-violence; is it to be regarded as an ultimate end of human progress, or as a current means?

Man, his physical condition and his work. The traditions proper to different cultures in relation to the technical knowledge of the world and the requirements of the ordering of life. The overcoming of the self and the overcoming of external conditions: the relationship between the ascetic ideal and the desire for greater welfare. The importance of the philosophy of human labour.

Man's position in present world conditions. Spiritual tradition and material development. The influence of scientific advances on the concept of man, considered from the standpoints mentioned above. Man's attitude to what is different and what is new: other ideas, other communities, new methods. The problem of comprehension and assimilation. Man as a member of a community and as a citizen of the world; means of introducing the view of the world as a whole into education.

Contemporary problems and experiments in education. In the light of certain major experiments of recent times, the following problems may be posed in an instructive form. Tradition in education and changes in the social structure. Education and instruction. The education of the full human being and the training of the specialist. The education of the individual as such and the training of socially useful citizens. The ideal of conformity and the ideal of individual development in education. The importance of manual work and craftsmanship. The importance of the arts and aesthetic experience. The part played by the teacher as a guide in initiation, compared with that of the teaching profession as a social institution. Experiments in "modern education": the appeal to free initiative and practical experience. Education in relation to the problem of a world conscience.

CONCLUSION

Possible definition of what constitutes a well-balanced democratic education, inspired by ideals satisfying the requirements of our time.

Appendix II

BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF AUTHORS

ALBERT BÉGUIN

Born Switzerland, Canton of Neuchâtel, on 17 July 1901, studied at Geneva University, and later at the Sorbonne.

Taught French literature and the language and literature of classical Greece at the University of Halle-Wittenberg (Germany), in Geneva, and then at Basle University from 1929 to 1945. Since 1945 has been living and writing in Paris.

In 1941 Albert Béguin founded the review *Cahiers du Rhône*, later becoming its editor and publishing the works of the French Resistance writers. On the death of Emmanuel Mounier in 1950, took over the editorship of the monthly review, *Esprit*. The late Georges Bernanos appointed him his literary executor.

Béguin's works include: *L'Ame romantique et le rêve. Essai sur le romantisme allemand et la poésie française* (1937, new revised edition 1945); *Gérard de Nerval* (1937, new revised edition 1946); *La prière de Péguy* (1942); *L'"Eve" de Péguy* (1948); *Léon Bloy l'impatient* (1943); *Léon Bloy, mystique de la douleur* (1948); *Faiblesse de l'Allemagne* (1945); *Balzac visionnaire* (1946); *Patience de Ramuz* (1949); *Blaise Pascal* (1952).

He is joint author of the following works: *Hommage à Bergson* (1941); *Léon Bloy* (1943); *Georges Bernanos* (1948); *Le romantisme allemand* (1937 and 1947); *Cinquante ans de découvertes* (1950).

Has translated from German works by Goethe, Tieck, Arnim, Hoffmann, Mörike, Jean-Paul Richter (10 volumes published between 1929 and 1950); has edited or adapted works by St. Bernard de Clairvaux (*La Queste du Graal*), Maurice Scève, Pascal, Gérard de Nerval, Balzac (complete works) and Léon Bloy, and has contributed to *Esprit*, *Fontaine*, *Les cahiers du sud*, *La nef*, *Poésie* 46, *Revue de Paris*, *Revue d'histoire littéraire*, *Etudes carmélitaines*, *Une semaine dans le monde*, *Terre des hommes*, *Témoignage chrétien*, *Gazette de Lausanne*, *La table ronde*, *Wort und Wahrheit*, etc.

JOHN TRAILL CHRISTIE

Born October 1899, scholar of Winchester College; 1918 he received a commission in the Coldstream Guards and later won a scholarship to Trinity College, Oxford.

Was appointed Senior Classics Master at Rugby School, then Fellow and Classical Tutor of Magdalen College. After successively occupying the post of Head Master at Repton and Westminster, became Principal of Jesus College, Oxford, in 1950.

Has published articles, reviews and addresses on religious and educational subjects.

RAS-VIHARY DAS

Born about 1894 in a village in the district of Sylhet, now part of Eastern Pakistan. Won scholarships to a middle vernacular school, then to an English secondary school and finally to Calcutta University. While yet a student he helped to organize a night school and founded a society to help needy students.

For his M.A. degree he studied dialectical and metaphysical logic with special reference to Hegel's *Logic*, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* and Lotze's *Metaphysics*.

In 1946 received an appointment at Calcutta University and in 1951 became Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy at Saugar University.

His first published book, *The Self and the Ideal*, was an essay in metaphysical construction based on moral consciousness. Two of his works, the *Essentials of Advaitism* and *Ajnana or the Theory of Ignorance* (written in collaboration with two friends) provide an account and criticism of the *Advaita Vedānta*. In English he has also written *The Philosophy of Whitehead* and *A Handbook to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, and in Bengali a general work on Kant, *Kanter Darshan*.

CLARENCE H. FAUST

Born 11 March 1901 at Defiance (Iowa). Was elected President of the Fund for the Advancement of Education on 4 April 1951, when the Fund was created by the Ford Foundation as a non-profit-making corporation to co-operate with primary, secondary and higher educational establishments for the improvement of education.

Before accepting this appointment had since 1947 been on the

staff of Stanford University, first as Director of the Libraries, then as Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Sciences. In 1949 he was Acting President of the University.

He was formerly on the staff of the University of Chicago, where he held various posts over a period of 17 years: Dean of Students in the Division of Humanities, Professor of English and Humanities and Dean of the Graduate Library School.

Clarence Faust is a graduate of Chicago University, the North Central College and the Evangelical Theological Seminary.

His publications include *Jonathan Edwards* (in collaboration with Clarence Johnson, 1935); *Jonathan Edwards and Science* (American Literature, 1930); *The Background of the Unitarian Opposition to Transcendentalism* (Modern Philology, 1938); *Emerson's Literary Theory and Practice* (Modern Philology, 1946); *From Edwards to Emerson* (the Colver Lectures, delivered at Brown University in 1945). He is also a contributor to *General Education in Transition—A Look Ahead* (1951).

HELMUTH VON GLASENAPP

Born 6 September 1891 in Berlin, studied at the Universities of Tuebingen, Berlin, Munich and Bonn, and since 1918 has been lecturing on Indian civilization and comparative religions in the first three of these as well as at Koenigsberg University. Is a Professor at the University of Tuebingen and a member of the Mainz Academy of Science and Literature, the Academy of Indian Civilization in Lahore (now Nagpur) and the All-India Sanskrit Parishad.

In 1927-28 he visited India, and in 1931 and 1938 travelled extensively in Europe, Japan, China, Indo-China, Indonesia, North and South Africa, North and South America, the Fiji Islands and Australia, primarily in order to study at first hand the influence of Indian civilization and immigration.

He is the author of numerous books and articles (in German) on Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, Indian literature and philosophy, notably on the Indian philosophers Madhva, Vallabha and Shankara, and also the two following works: *Kant and the Religions of the East* and *The Five Great Religions*. The following of his works have been translated: *Jaina Dharma* (translated into Gujrati, 1927); *Brahma and Buddha* (French translation, 1937); *The Doctrine of Karma in Jain Philosophy* (English translation, 1942); *Buddhist Mysteries* (French translation, 1944); *Indian Philosophy* (French translation, 1951).

HUMAYUN KABIR

Born Faridpur, Bengal, in 1906, Humayun Kabir has been a professor at both Andhra and Calcutta Universities. His two main interests have been philosophy and poetry on the one hand, and politics and administration on the other. Was Secretary-General of the Bengal Peasants Party and its leader in the Bengal Legislative Council. Was appointed Chairman of the Ethics and Politics Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1941 and 1945, and of the History of Philosophy Section at the Silver Jubilee Session of this Congress in 1950.

Was Deputy Leader of the Indian delegation to the Third Session of Unesco's General Conference. Now Adviser on Education to the Government of India.

His English writings comprise: *Mahatma and Other Poems*; *Our Heritage* (a survey of Indian history); *Poetry Monads and Society* (a study in aesthetics); *Men and Rivers* (a novel, translated into Swedish).

A contributor to the volume *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, and acts as Secretary to the Board of Editors for *History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western*.

Made the first English translation of Kant's "Introduction" to the *Critique of Judgement*, and has published many works in Bengali, among them *Immanuel Kant*, *Marxvad*, etc.

YENSHO KANAKURA

Born 17 November 1896, graduate of Tokyo University. Assistant Professor at the Imperial University of Tohoku, Sendai; later, Professor of Indian civilization in the Faculty of Law and Literature, then Dean of the Faculty of Literature and, since 1949, Dean of the Faculty of General Education.

Between 1923 and 1926 visited England, Germany and India to pursue his study of Indian civilization. From 1949 has been a member of the Japanese Science Council.

His chief works are: *An Enquiry into the Veda Philosophy*; *Indian Moral History in Ancient Times*; *Indian Moral History in Medieval Times*; *Formation of Indian Spiritual Culture*; *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*; *Indian Thought and Culture*; *Sanron Gengi*; *Indian Studies by Japanese*; *Study of Dharma*; and many other works on Oriental philosophy.

IBRAHIM MADKOUR

Born 1902, student at the Teachers' Training College, Cairo, and then in France, where he graduated in literature and law, and later obtained a D.Litt. Professor at the Fuad I University, Cairo, 1935 to 1940. Elected to the Egyptian Senate, and since 1945 has been a member of the Fuad I Academy of Arabic.

Among his French writings are the following: *La place d'Al Farabi dans l'école philosophique musulmane* (Paris, 1934); *L'"Organon" d'Aristote dans le monde arabe* (Paris, 1934); *La réforme agraire* (Revue de l'Egypte contemporaine); *Le canal de Suez et l'économie égyptienne* (Revue de la Société des études belges); *Ibn Sina et l'alchimie arabe*.

In Arabic he has written: *Lessons of the History of Philosophy* (Cairo, 1937); *Muslim Philosophy: a system and its application* (Cairo, 1947); *The Governmental System in Egypt* (Cairo, 1937); *Al Chifa* (Healing), *a General Introduction to the Philosophy of Ibn Sina (Avicenna)* (Cairo, 1951).

While continuing to lecture in the Faculty of Literature, Ibrahim Madkour has for the past 10 years been Secretary of the Senate Finance Committee.

He is particularly interested in the history of Islamic thought and in social science. Since he became a Member of the Academy he has also taken a keen interest in the problem of the Arabic technical vocabulary, which needs to be improved and amplified to meet the demands of modern scientific instruction.

GUNAPALA PIYASONA MALALASEKERA

At the age of 52 Gunapala Piyasona Malalasekera, Ph.D., is Dean of the Faculty of Oriental Studies and Professor and Head of the Department of Pali (in which is included Buddhist Civilization) at the University of Ceylon. He is President of the World Fellowship of Buddhists (with representatives from 53 countries); President of the All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress, to which are affiliated Buddhist religious, cultural and humanitarian societies in Ceylon; member of the Council of the Royal Asiatic Society (Ceylon Branch); Honorary Secretary, Ceylon Society of Arts (since 1927); member of the Advisory Board of the National Museums of Ceylon and of the Archaeological Survey of Ceylon; member of the Executive Committee of the Singhalese National Council for Unesco.

He has travelled very widely in Asia, America and Europe and has just returned from an extensive tour of South-East Asia, including Burma, Thailand, Singapore, Malaya, Cambodia, Viet-Nam,

Laos and India, during which he lectured on Buddhist culture.

He has taken part in numerous international conferences, both cultural and religious, including the Wembley Conference of Living Religions (1924), the Inaugural Conference of the World Fellowship of Faiths (1936), the East-West Philosophers' Conference in Hawaii (1949) and the All-India Oriental Conference (October 1951), where he presided over the section on Pali and Buddhism. He broadcasts regularly on cultural subjects over the Ceylon radio and has given a number of broadcast talks in India, England and America. °

His published works include: *The Pali Literature of Ceylon* (Royal Asiatic Society prize publication); *The Commentary of the Mahavansa* (chronicle of Ceylon, published by the Government of Ceylon); *The Dictionary of Pali Proper Names* (2 volumes in the Indian Historical Texts Series of the Government of India); *The Extended Mahavanna* (Pali chronicle dealing with Ceylon, published by the Royal Asiatic Society of Ceylon).

Was General Editor of the Translation Series of the *Pali Buddhist Canonical Texts* under the auspices of the Buddhist Congress of Ceylon (5 volumes published).

The Government of Burma recently invited him to be General Editor of their series of English translations of Buddhist canonical texts. During 1952 he lectured in several universities in the U.S.A. under the Exchange of Persons Scheme.

SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN

M.A. Oxford and Madras; Honorary D.Litt. Andhra, Agra, Allahabad, Patna and Lucknow; Honorary LL.D. London, Benares and Ceylon; D.L. Calcutta; F.B.A., F.R.S.L., Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford, Hon. Fellow, Royal Asiatic Society, Bengal; Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, Oxford University.

Born on 5 September 1888, educated at Madras Christian College. From 1911 to 1917 Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Presidency College, Madras; then Professor of Philosophy at the Universities of Mysore (1918-21) and Calcutta (1921-31 and 1937-41). Vice-Chancellor of Andhra University, Waltair, from 1931-36 and of Benares Hindu University from 1939 to 1948. Has held lectureships at Manchester College, Oxford (1926 and 1929-30) and at Chicago University. He was Hibbert Lecturer for 1929. Since 1941 he has occupied the Sir Sayaji Rao Gaekwad Chair of Indian Culture and Civilization at Benares Hindu University. Lectured at Calcutta University in 1927 and 1942, and in 1946 was a visiting lecturer at the following Universities: Harvard, Yale,

Princeton, Columbia, Chicago, Michigan, Minnesota and Southern California.

He presided at the Third Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress at Bombay in 1927 and from 1925-27 was chairman of the Congress' Executive Committee. In 1930 he was President of the All-Asia Conference on Education, held at Benares. From 1931-39 he served on the League of Nations International Committee of Intellectual Co-operation. From 1946-49 he was a member of the Indian Constituent Assembly, was chairman of Unesco's Executive Board in 1949 and President of the Universities Commission of the Government of India in 1948 and 1949. In 1949 he was appointed Chairman of the Indian Pen Club.

From 1949 to 1952 Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan served as Indian Ambassador to Moscow. In 1952, he was elected Vice-President of the Indian Union.

His publications include: *Indian Philosophy*; *The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore*; *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*; *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*; *The Hindu View of Life*; *An Idealist View of Life*; *East and West in Religion*; *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*; *Mahatma Gandhi*; *India and China*; *Education, Politics and War*; *Religion and Society*; *Is this Peace?*; *Bhagavadgita*; *Dhammapada*.

He edited the volume: *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*.

ANDRÉ ROUSSEAU

Born Paris, 1896. Since 1920 has been a contributor to literary reviews and other Paris journals. He has devoted himself exclusively to criticism and, since the death of Henri de Régnier in 1936, has edited the literary supplement to *Figaro*. The greater part of his work presents a picture of the contemporary literary scene viewed through the medium of its chief writers, and includes, for example: *Ames et visages du XXe siècle*; *Le Paradis perdu*; *Littérature du XXe siècle* (3 volumes).

Rousseau is now adding to this gallery of contemporary literary portraits a series of studies on the masters of the past, of which three volumes have already appeared under the title *Le Monde classique*.

In 1940 he threw in his lot with the writers who decided to resist the German occupation, an attitude which he maintained for four years, at first with his pen, during the period of comparative freedom enjoyed for a few months by the press in the unoccupied zone, then later with complete silence. He put this period of retirement to good use by writing a weighty study of Péguy: *Le prophète Péguy*, which is now deemed to be the most important critical work published on this author. During the occupation he published his

Chronique de l'espérance, bearing witness during the darkest hours of France's suffering of a faith that could not be shaken.

Has lectured at the Sorbonne, the Centre universitaire méditerranéen and the Universities of Brussels, Antwerp, Liège, Louvain, Namur, Geneva, Lausanne, Basle, Zürich, Freiburg, Algiers, Tunis, Rabat, Casablanca, etc. From January to March 1951 he visited Cairo to deliver a course of public lectures on French literature from 1900 to 1950, under the auspices of the Fuad I University. He has also visited Alexandria, Beirut and Damascus Universities, and these journeys of late years in the Near East have led him to take a special interest in the problem of East-West relations and to make it the subject of several lectures and articles.

JACQUES RUEFF

Born 1896, Jacques Rueff received a solid mathematical training at the Ecole Polytechnique (Paris). In 1922 he published his first book: *Des Sciences physiques aux sciences morales (Introduction à l'étude de la morale et de la politique rationnelle)*. He next published his *Théorie des phénomènes monétaires* (1927), then a study that has become a classic on the hard core of unemployment (1931). In 1945 he published *L'Ordre social*, in which he reasserts much of his monetary theory and examines the mechanism of society in greater detail. Some critics consider this work to be the foundation of a new philosophy of social evolution.

In 1949 he published his *Épître aux dirigistes*, and, in 1951, a *Discours aux indépendants*.

While still holding the chair of Political Economy at the Paris School of Political Science, he has been appointed Director of the General Monetary Movements Department in the Ministry of Finance, Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, and Head of the Inter-Allied Reparations Commission. He is also Chairman of the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies and a member of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques.

HILMI ZIYA ULKEN

Born Istambul, 1901. Son of Ziya Ulken, Professor in the Faculty of Science, Istambul. After studying at Istambul University was appointed Director of Statistics at the Ministry of Education. In 1933 became a university lecturer in sociology and the philosophy of history, then in 1940, Professor of Sociology in the Faculty of Letters, Istambul.

His publications include: *L'éthique de l'amour* (1930); *Le patrimoine humanitaire* (1932); *Histoire de la pensée turque* (1933); *Les contradictions du conformisme* (1933); *Les philosophes du XXe siècle* (1936); *La sociologie générale* (1942); *La pensée de l'Islam* (1946); *Les influences réciproques dans la civilisation islamique* (1947); *La morale* (1947); *La Nation et la conscience de l'histoire* (1948); *Critique du matérialisme historique* (1951): an introduction to his *L'expérience totale de l'homme*, now in the press.

At one time editor of the review *l'Homme*, he now fulfils this function on the *Revue de sociologie*, which has published its last three issues in Turkish, French and English. He is one of the founders of ISA, a member of the French Institute of Sociology and President of the Turkish Society of Sociology.

A. R. WADIA

Born Bombay, 4 June 1888, graduated in philosophy at Bombay University (1909) and later obtained a Diploma in Economics and Political Science (with distinctions) at Oxford University. He was called to the Bar (Middle Temple, London) and read the Moral Science Tripos at Cambridge.

He then held the posts of Professor of English and Philosophy and Lecturer in Psychology at Bombay University and Professor of Philosophy at Mysore University.

He is a member of the Boards of Studies in Philosophy at Mysore, Annamalai, Agra and Baroda Universities.

Was President of the Ethics Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1925, of its Logic and Metaphysics Section in 1929 and of the whole Congress in 1931. Since 1937 has been Chairman of its Executive Committee.

Among his publications are: *The Ethics of Feminism* (Allen and Unwin); *A Textbook of Moral Instruction for Teachers* (Government of Mysore); *Zoroaster* (G. Matesan and Co., Madras); *Civilization as a Co-operative Adventure* (University of Madras); *Religion as a Quest for Values* (Calcutta University).

He has collaborated in the following collective volumes: *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* (Allen and Unwin); *Radhakrishnan: comparative studies in philosophy, presented in honour of his sixtieth birthday*; *The Social Philosophy of Radhakrishnan* (in the volume *Radhakrishnan, Library of Living Philosophers*).

He has contributed to the following reviews: In England; *Mind* and *Philosophy*; in the United States: *The Monist*, *Philosophical Review* and *International Journal of Ethics*; in India: *Aryan Path*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, etc.

